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Abstract 
 
Although there have been many prior studies of the determinants of capital 
structure, most have investigated listed companies in countries with well-
developed markets and institutions. The main objective of the present study is 
to extend prior research by investigating both listed and unlisted companies in 
Saudi Arabia where many cultural and institutional features may have an 
impact on financing decisions in a different manner to ‘developed’ countries. 
A further contribution is the application of a systematic statistical approach, 
using meta-analysis, to summarise the many prior empirical studies. 
The empirical part of the study investigates 60 listed and 403 unlisted firms 
over the period 2000-2004 using several regression-based archival techniques 
including panel data analysis. Robustness checks are carried out to investigate 
the potential impact of the different methods and alternative measurement 
proxies. 
The results show that, in general, companies in Saudi Arabia have 
substantially lower levels of debt than in many other countries. This finding is 
related to the very low tax regime and other environmental characteristics. 
Unlisted firms have more short-term debt but less long-term debt than listed 
firms, as found in other countries. 
Despite the profound institutional differences, several firm-specific factors 
(such as firm size, asset tangibility, profitability, and liquidity) are found to 
have similar impacts on capital structure decisions in Saudi Arabia as they 
have in prior research. However, the impact of some factors is different, most 
 iii 
likely reflecting lower levels of agency costs in the Saudi Arabian institutional 
environment. 
 iv 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 5 
The determination of capital structure has been one of the most contentious 
issues in the finance literature since Modigliani and Miller introduced their 
capital structure irrelevance prepositions in their seminal article in 1958. Since 
then, several theories have been developed suggesting a number of factors that 
might determine a firm’s capital structure decision. However, out of these 
theories of capital structure, two models appear to come across strongly. One 
of them is the trade-off theory, which assumes that there are benefits and costs 
associated with the use of debt. In the beginning, the theory was limited to the 
trade off between the tax advantages of debt and bankruptcy costs. Then, it 
was extended to include benefits and costs of debt associated with agency 
conflicts. The other main theory is the pecking order hypothesis which 
assumes that, under information asymmetry between insiders and outsider, 
firms will resort to internally generated funds first to finance their growth, but 
when external financing is needed, firms prefer to raise debt before equity.  
Empirically, numerous studies have been conducted to investigate the 
determinants of capital structure on the basis of these two theories. However, 
neither trade-off theory nor the pecking order hypothesis has found to provide 
robust and exclusive explanatory power. Nevertheless, Harris and Raviv 
(1991) conclude that it is necessary that empirical research be directed to test 
determinants of capital structure in various contexts. Motivated by their 
conclusion, this dissertation investigates the determinants of capital structure 
in the quite different context of Saudi Arabia.  
This chapter is presented as follow: Section 1.1 introduces the statement of 
problems. Section 1.2 presents the research objectives, with Section 1.3 
 6 
outlining the research methods while Section 1.4 establishes the expected 
contribution of the research. Finally, Section 1.5 demonstrates the structure of 
the dissertation.  
1.1 Statement of the Problems 
The question of what determines firms’ choice of capital structure has been a 
major field in the corporate finance literature. A number of factors have been 
suggested to have an influence on a firm’s capital structure decision. 
However, while there is a wide and growing body of empirical studies 
investigating the influence of these factors on the firms’ capital structure, the 
findings of these studies are not always consistent in terms of the direction 
and strength of the relationship between leverage and its determinants. Given 
the large number of studies, it is perhaps surprising that no one has yet 
undertaken the important test of summarising the empirical evidence in a 
systematic manner. This would enable a much clearer understanding of the 
current state of knowledge.  
Another issue is that the capital structure theories have very little to say about 
inter-country differences in corporate financing patterns. No existing theory 
explains how country-specific factors affect firm’s capital structure. Cross-
countries empirical studies (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; 
Giannetti, 2003; Fan et al., 2004; Hall et al., 2004; De Jong et al., 2007) assert 
that the influence of institutional characteristics is as important as the 
influence of firm’s characteristics on corporate leverage level. However, our 
knowledge of capital structure has mostly been derived from a large volume 
of research conducted in developed countries with very little from developing 
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countries. Therefore, it is important to know how capital structure theories 
work in different countries, especially those with different traditions and 
institutional factors. 
Moreover, a significant gap in the research has been in the determinants of 
capital structure for unlisted companies, probably due to the lack of data for 
those companies (Hall et al., 2004). It is quite likely that capital structures of 
unlisted companies will differ from listed companies since the former cannot 
gain stock market access. Accordingly, conducting analysis of both listed and 
unlisted companies and comparing the results may be particularly fruitful.  
Finally, another issue in prior research is the robustness of results under 
different estimation techniques and different measures for both the dependent 
and the explanatory variables. Limiting the analysis to certain estimation 
techniques or to certain proxies for dependent or explanatory variables may 
lead the researcher to be subject to the significant results bias. Therefore, it is 
important to conduct a comprehensive analysis that considers these issues in 
order to avoid such bias.    
1.2 Objective of the Research 
The dissertation has several objectives. The first is to provide a systematic and 
comprehensive review of the empirical literature on the determinants of 
capital structure. This will provide a sound basis from which to proceed to 
address the other objectives. 
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The second objective of this dissertation is to test empirically the determinants 
of capital structure in Saudi Arabia. In order to achieve this objective, the 
following questions are formulated: 
Do the tradition and institutional factors in Saudi Arabia have an influence on 
firms’ capital choice decisions? 
Do the determinants of capital structure identified in western settings have the 
same influence in Saudi Arabia? 
Furthermore, given that unlisted companies are constrained from stock market 
access, the third objective is to answer the following questions: 
Do unlisted firms’ capital choice decisions differ from the decisions of listed 
firms? 
Do the influences of firm-specific factors on capital structure identified for 
listed firms differ in unlisted firms?       
Some prior research (e.g. Titman and Wassel, 1988; Bevan and Danbolt, 
2002, 2004) identifies that differences in the measurement of both dependent 
and independent variables, as well as differences in estimation techniques can 
significantly affect the influences of a firm’s capital structure determinants. 
Accordingly, the final objective of this dissertation is to provide a 
comprehensive analysis that investigates the robustness of the results under 
different estimation techniques and for different proxies. In the analyses, 
therefore, the findings will be compared to determine whether these issues are 
significantly affecting the results.  
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1.3 Research Method  
A research method is a set of means used to collect and /or analyse data to 
fulfil the research objectives. There are various analysis methods, for 
example, analyses based on secondary data, interview, questionnaire, survey, 
and case study. The exploratory nature of this research suggests that the most 
appropriate approach is to undertake analysis based on secondary data. 
However, though the analysis is based in secondary data, there are two 
analysis phases.  
Informed by the first aim, phase one involves synthesis using the meta-
analysis technique. In accordance with literature in this area, the first step is to 
determine the scope of the literature, which is the topic of capital structure 
determinants in this dissertation. The next step is searching for prior studies. 
Then, identify the appropriate studies and extract the statistical data needed. 
The final step conducts the analysis and reports the finding.   
Phase two, on the other hand, involves regression analysis techniques. 
Informed by the general literature and the other aims of this dissertation, this 
requires first extracting the data from the financial statements of listed and 
unlisted companies. However, due to no readily available computerised 
database in Saudi Arabia such as DataStream or Compustat, a field trip is 
required to collect the needed data1, followed by manual data extraction. The 
final step involves regression analysis employing different techniques and 
different measures for both the dependent and explanatory variables. 
                                                 
1 Datastream has data for just one Saudi Arabian company (SABIC). 
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1.4 Expected Contributions and significances of the research 
Bearing in mind the above issues, the contribution of this study to the 
literature is therefore fourfold. First, to my knowledge, this is the first 
empirical work that statistically synthesises the finding of previous studies 
using meta-analysis to summarise and clarify the findings of prior studies. 
This analysis provides an insightful and useful framework for studying the 
variation in the findings of prior studies of capital structure determinants. 
Second, the study adds fresh empirical evidence to the determinants of capital 
structure in developing countries where there are relatively few studies. Third, 
in addition to listed companies, the study contributes to the literature by 
investigating also the capital structure determinants of unlisted companies, 
unlike most studies in this area, which exclusively focus on the listed 
companies. The study derives its importance also from its comprehensive 
analysis nature. Therefore, it is hoped to contribute to the literature where 
there are few studies investigating the sensitivity of the results under different 
estimation technique and different proxies.   
In addition to the contribution to the literature, the researcher anticipates the 
findings of this research will develop recommendations that may be useful in 
particular to the regulator body in Saudi Arabia as well as to academics and 
other researchers in general.  
1.5 The Structure of the Thesis  
The structure of the thesis is shown in Figure 1.1; the thesis is organized into 
eight Chapters. Following this introductory Chapter, Chapter 2 provides a 
literature review of capital structure. Chapter 3 presents the meta-analysis of 
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prior empirical studies. Chapter 4 explains the Saudi Arabia environment, 
with particular reference to the financing environment. Chapter 5 deals with 
the research hypotheses development, Chapter 6 deals with research methods 
and Chapter 7 presents the findings of the determinants of capital structure in 
the context of Saudi Arabia. Finally, Chapter 8 is the conclusion and presents 
the main findings arising from the empirical works, the limitations of the 
study and suggestions for future research.  
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Chapter 2:  Literature review   
 14 
2.1 Introduction: 
Over the past four decades, much of the corporate finance literature has 
rotated around different theories that try to fully explain factors behind 
financing policy and capital structure. These theories cover various aspects of 
the firm that can explain how firms choose their capital structure.  
The current chapter presents a comprehensive theoretical and empirical 
literature review over the capital structure theme. Section 2.2 covers 
theoretical literature review. Section 2.3 covers theoretical prediction of 
variables that have been found by a large number of studies. Section 2.4 
reviews prior empirical studies. Finally, section 0 provides chapter 
conclusion. Detailed analysis of the large number of empirical studies of the 
determinants of capital structure is deferred to chapter 3. 
 
2.2 Theoretical literature review: 
2.2.1 Modigliani and Miller propositions: 
When reviewing the theoretical literature related to capital structure, one must 
start with the paper of Modigliani and Miller (1958). The authors assume a 
perfect capital market to derive their very well known propositions2.  
The Proposition I states that the firm’s average cost of capital and hence the 
value of the firm (V) are independent of its capital structure. Therefore, there 
is no optimal capital structure that maximises the value of the firm (i.e. any 
                                                 
2 Perfect market assumptions include:  
1. Firms with the same degree of business risk are in homogenous risk class, 2. Investors have 
homogenous expectations about future corporate earnings and their levels of riskiness, 3. 
Securities are traded in perfect capital markets, 4. Interest rate on debt is the risk-free rate and 
5.  All cash flows are perpetuities. 
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level of leverage is as good as any other). Accordingly, in a perfect world, the 
value of the levered firm is equal to the value of un-levered firm. Proposition 
II states that the rate of return required by shareholders increases as more debt 
is used. In another word, any benefits from using debt would be offset by the 
corresponding higher cost of equity.  
However, in reality, a perfect world clearly does not exist. Issues such as 
taxes, financial distress, asymmetric information, and conflicts between 
economic agents associated with the firm have an effect on the firm’s capital 
structure. Subsequent theoretical works, thus, focus on these factors 
associated with market imperfections and their effects on the capital structure. 
2.2.2 Models based on trade-off theory  
Trade off-theory assumes that there are benefits and costs associated with the 
use of debt as against equity and firms thus chose an optimal capital structure 
that trades off the marginal benefits and costs of debt. In the beginning, the 
theory was limited to the trade off between the tax advantages of debt against 
the bankruptcy costs. Then it was extended to include benefits and costs 
associated with the use of debt in mitigating the conflicts among the agent 
groups associated firm (i.e. managers, equity-holders and debt-holders). 
2.2.2.1 The impact of tax on capital structure  
In the first form of the static trade-off theory of capital structure, the trade-off 
between the tax advantage of debt and the costs of financial distress is 
expected to yield the optimal level of debt that maximizes the value of the 
firm (Myers, 1984).  
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Figure 2.1 shows a graphical representation of this theory. Here, the value of 
the firm rises as the firm uses more debt up to an optimum, where the benefits 
of additional debt through the increase in the present value of tax shield are 
offset by the costs due to the increased in the present value of costs of 
financial distress.  
Figure 2.1: The traditional static trade-off theory  
 
 
 
 Source: Myers (1984) 
 
The first paper take into account the corporate tax was the Modigliani and 
Miller (1963) tax correction article. The authors recognised that their perfect 
capital markets assumptions need modifying to allow for corporate tax in their 
propositions. They argue that debt typically offers a tax shelter, because 
interest is deducted before taxable profit is calculated. Thus, in the presence of 
corporate taxes, the value of the firm increases by an amount equal to the debt 
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tax shield. Modigliani and Miller (1963) demonstrate this argument 
mathematically in following equation. 
VL = VU + TC* D    
Where  
VL = the value of levered firm, 
VU = the value of un-levered firm, 
TC = the corporate tax and  
D = the value of used debt.  
The main implication of Modigliani and Miller (1963) paper is that debt 
financing is highly advantageous and, in the extreme, a firm's optimal capital 
structure is 100 percent debt. 
However, debt-holders and shareholders are also subject to tax on their 
security income, and this affects their after-tax returns. Miller (1977) suggests 
that, when the personal income tax on corporate share and interest is taken 
into account together with corporate income tax, the gain from corporate 
leverage (GL) can be expressed in following equation. 
  GL = {1 – [(1 - TC) * (1 – TPS)] / (1 – TPB)} * BL  
   
Where 
TC   = the corporate tax, 
TPS = personal tax rate on income from corporate shares,  
TPB = personal tax rate on income from bonds and 
BL   = the market value of the firm’s debt. 
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Miller (1977) shows that the tax gains from issuing debt at the corporate level 
will be exhausted at the personal tax level and, thus, the value of the firm, at 
equilibrium, is irrelevant to its capital structure. If markets are perfect (i.e. no 
taxes) then the gain from debt is equal to zero and as Modigliani and Miller 
(1958), indicating capital structure is irrelevant. In the special case where the 
two personal tax rates are equal, the gain from leverage reduced to TC* BL 
gives exactly the expression in the Modigliani and Miller (1963) tax model. 
However, when the tax rate on income from corporate shares (TPS) less than 
the tax rate on income from bonds (TPB), the gain from leverage will be less 
than  (TC* BL). Moreover, when the rate satisfy that (1 - TC) * (1 – TPS) = (1 
– TPB), the gain from leverage vanishes entirely.  
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) further argue that firms usually have pre-
existing non-debt tax shields such as depreciation and investment tax credits 
will face an increasing probability of financial distress as debt increases. Thus, 
firms with large non-debt tax-shields will have less debt in their capital 
structure, because the non-debt tax-shields are substitutes for the tax benefits 
of debt financing.  
However, the trade-off theory was extended to include benefits and costs 
associated with the use of debt in mitigating the conflicts among the agent 
groups associated with the firm (i.e. managers and equity-holders and debt-
holders). 
2.2.2.2 The impact of conflicts among the agent groups on capital structure: 
The seminal work on agency theory and capital structure is Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). They identified two types of conflicts that are a major 
 19 
source of agency costs and these are:  agency costs that arise due to the 
conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders and agency costs that 
arise as a result of the conflicts of interest between shareholders and debt-
holders.  
2.2.2.2.1 Conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders: 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), conflicts arise between managers 
and shareholders when managers hold less than 100% of the residual claim. 
Consequently, managers capture only a fraction of the gain from their profit 
enhancement activities, while they bear the entire cost when they refrain from 
investing in such activities. Hence, managers are expected to pursue excessive 
perquisite consumption and not invest in activities that would maximise the 
value of the firm.  
To mitigate this kind of conflict, different analysing approaches have been 
proposed. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the larger is the fraction of 
equity held by managers, the more they concentrate their energies on 
enhancing firm value. They also argue that if the absolute investment by 
managers is held constant, the use of debt provides a vehicle for increasing 
managers’ share-holdings and, thus, mitigate the conflicts of interest between 
managers and shareholders. Jensen (1986) further argues that managers will 
attempt to avoid shareholder control by using internal funds (i.e. free cash 
flow) to expand the firm size beyond the optimal size and to accept projects 
with a negative net present value (i.e. over-investment). Shareholders can 
prevent management from undertaking such action by reducing the free cash 
flow through increasing the firm’s debt. The presence of debt causes the 
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manager to pay out the cash flow as an interest and repayments. Moreover, 
debt-holders will have the firm declared bankrupt if the firm cannot meet its 
obligations to them. Grossman and Hart (1982) argue that if bankruptcy is 
costly for the managers because they lose benefits of control and reputation, 
then an increase in leverage can commit managers to generate the necessary 
cash flows to meet debt repayments and consequently reducing the possibility 
of management engaging in excessive perquisites.  
Another form of conflict between managers and shareholders is that managers 
and shareholders may also disagree over a firm’s operating decisions. Harris 
and Raviv (1990) and Stulz (1990) formalise this conflict and the role of debt 
to mitigate this disagreement. In Harris and Raviv (1990), because of 
managers’ personal loss of control and reputation, they will in general wish to 
continue operating the firm even when shareholders desire liquidation. They 
argue that debt mitigates this conflict through the debt-holders’ option to 
liquidate the firm in the event of default, which would also benefit 
shareholders if liquidation was the best strategy. Therefore, high leverage is 
likely to be associated with higher firm’s liquidation value, and lower 
probability of reorganisation following the default. In Stulz (1990), on the 
other hand, managers may prefer to invest all available funds even if 
shareholders want to be paid dividends. He argues that increasing debt level 
can mitigate this divergence since debt payment reduces the amount of free 
cash available to managers. Therefore, as in Jensen (1986), firms with high 
free cash flow and with low growth opportunities are expected to have high 
debt levels.  
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2.2.2.2.2 Conflicts of interest between shareholders and debt-holders: 
Different fundamental sources of equity-holders and debt-holders conflicts 
have been identified in the agency cost literature. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
identify the asset substitution problem that arises in the case when 
shareholders may seize wealth from debt-holders by switching from safer to 
riskier and value-decreasing investments (i.e. asset substitutions). Myers 
(1977) points to the under-investment problem that arises in the case where a 
firm in financial difficulties has an incentive to sacrifice low positive net 
present value projects whose benefits accrue mainly to debt-holders. He 
further argues that the greater the investment opportunity in a firm, the greater 
is the potential conflict of interest between shareholders and debt-holders.  
To mitigate such conflicts, Smith and Warner (1979) suggest using restrictive 
covenants on debt such as include interest coverage requirements or 
prohibitions against investing in new unrelated lines of business. However, 
restrictive covenants themselves also involve costs in which they reduce 
management flexibility by restricting the firm’s investment and financing 
opportunities. Smith and Warner (1979) also suggest that secured debt may 
provide the issuer with a means to mitigate agency costs of debt. 
Alternatively, firms may use convertibility option, where debt-holders have 
the option to convert to shareholders, to mitigate the agency costs of debt. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that conversion rights enable debt-holders 
to recapture any positive wealth transfers to shareholders and to gain from any 
increase in risk. Maturity of debt is another option that firms can use to 
mitigate agency costs. The use of short-term debt may mitigate the agency 
problems. Myers (1977) observes that if debt matures before growth options 
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are exercised, the firm’s incentive to deviate from a firm-value-maximizing 
exercise policy is eliminated. Billett et al (2007) argue further that short-term 
debt can mitigate both under- and over-investment incentives by making the 
debt less sensitive to changes in firm value and by allowing for more frequent 
re-pricing of debt.   
In an alternative approach, Diamond (1989) argues that managerial reputation 
plays an important role in mitigating the conflicts between shareholder and 
debt-holder, mainly asset substitution problem. He suggests that the longer the 
period of non-default, the better is a firm's reputation as a safe firm, and the 
lower will be its borrowing costs. This suggests that older firms will choose 
the safe project to maintain reputation. Younger firms with a lesser reputation 
may choose risky projects with higher prospective returns, but, if they survive, 
they will eventually choose the safe project.  
In sum, the extended static trade-off theory suggests that benefits of issuing 
debt can be traded against their costs to determine the optimal level of debt 
that will maximise the value of the firm.  
2.2.2.3 Dynamic trade-off theory: 
One of the main criticism directed to the static form of trade-off theory is that 
the firm is always at an optimal point, where the observed debt level is 
assumed to be equal to the optimal one. In reality, the decisions are often 
dynamic and adjustments to firm-specific optimal debt levels are costly and, 
thus, firms usually restructure their capital structure over time. Myers (1984) 
emphasises this point and argues that there must be costs and time lags 
involved in adjusting to the optimal capital structure when events cause a firm 
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to deviate from the optimal level. He further concludes that if adjustment costs 
are large then we ought to give less attention to refining our static trade-off 
stories and put relatively more emphasis on understanding what adjustment 
costs are, why they are so important and how rational managers would 
respond to them. Fischer et al. (1989) argue that fixed costs of adjustment 
imply that firms allow debt level to fluctuate until it becomes too extreme, and 
then they restructure it.  
In sum, the dynamic form of trade-off theory assumes that the actual capital 
structure of a particular firm at a particular moment in time does not 
necessarily equal the target capital structure of that firm but firm dynamically 
adjusts its capital structure to a moving target. Therefore, the dynamic form in 
which both taxes and agency concerns are present provides more 
comprehensive picture than the static form about the mechanism of the capital 
structure decision over time.  
2.2.3  Models based on asymmetric information: 
Asymmetric information is another dimension of the capital structure theories. 
It is generally thought there is asymmetric information between firm 
managers (or insiders) and outside investors. There are two main approaches 
that have been developed in the literature of asymmetric information. In the 
first approach, Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984) argue that the 
capital structure is designed to mitigate inefficiencies in the firm’s investment 
decisions that are caused by information asymmetry. In the second approach, 
Ross (1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977) assert that firm’s capital structure 
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choice is used as a means to signal to outside investors the information held 
by insiders. 
 
2.2.3.1  Pecking order and modified pecking order hypothesis: 
Myers (1984), Myers and Majluf (1984) works are the seminal contribution to 
this literature. They provided a theoretical justification for Donaldson’s 
(1961) findings that firms prefer to use internally generated funds as a 
financing source and resort to externals funds only if the need for funds was 
unavoidable. In their prospective, the nature of the asymmetric information is 
that managers or insiders are assumed to possess more information about their 
firms’ prospects, risks and values than outside investors.  
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that the capital structure can help to mitigate 
inefficiencies in a firm’s investment decision that are caused by information 
asymmetries. They demonstrate that if there is an asymmetry of information 
between investors and firm insiders, then the firm’s equity may be under-
priced by the market. As a result, new equity, which is used to finance new 
investment projects, will be also under-priced. Therefore, if management has 
favourable inside information and acts in the best interest of the existing 
shareholders, then management will refuse to issue equity even if it means 
passing up positive NPV projects because the net loss to existing shareholders 
(due to under-pricing problem) might outweigh the project’s NPV. On the 
other hand, passing up NPV projects is contrary to the wealth maximization. 
Using financial sources that may not be undervalued by the market, 
particularly internally generated funds could solve this under-investment 
problem.  
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Accordingly, the existence of sufficient internal finance allows firms to accept 
desirable investments without relying on costly external finance. Myers and 
Majluf (1984), argue that firms are most likely to generate financial slack (i.e. 
liquid assets such as cash and marketable securities) to be used for internal 
funding. Thus, in order to protect present shareholders, firms with financial 
slack and in the presence of asymmetric information, will not issue equity, 
even though it may involve passing up a good investment opportunity. If 
investors realize this point, then the market will take the decision not to issue 
shares as good news. On the other hand, if management does offer a new 
share issue, it will be interpreted as a bad news, and the firm’s share issue will 
be under-priced.  
This adverse selection problem has an influence on the choice between 
internal and external financing. This choice lead to the Pecking Order 
Hypothesis, which Myers (1984) summarised as following: 
Firms prefer internal finance. 
Firms adjust their target dividend payout ratios to their investment 
opportunities, although dividends are sticky and target payout ratios are 
gradually adjusted to shifts in available investment opportunities. 
Sticky dividend policies as well as unpredictable fluctuations in both 
profitability and investment opportunities mean that internally generated 
funds are more or less than investment outlays. If internally generated cash 
flow is less than investment outlays, the firm first exhausts its cash balances 
or marketable securities portfolio. 
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If external financing is required, firms will resort to the safest security   first. 
They start with debt, then hybrid securities such as convertible bonds and 
finally equity as a last resort.  
A single optimal or target debt-equity ratio does not exist in the pecking order 
theory since financing decision does not rely on the trade off between 
marginal benefits and costs of debt. Moreover, there are two types of equity, 
internal and external; one is at the top of the pecking order and one at the 
bottom. A firm’s leverage ratio thus changes when there is an imbalance 
between internal funds and real investment opportunities.  
Moreover, Myers (1984) introduced implication similar to the pecking order 
theory known as the modified pecking order theory. In this framework, both 
asymmetric information and costs of financial distress are incorporated. 
Myers argues that as firm climbs up the pecking order it faces higher 
probability of both incurring costs of financial distress and passing up future 
positive-NPV projects. Thus, firm may rationally decide to reduce these costs 
by issuing stock now though new equity is not needed immediately to finance 
real investment, just to obtain financial slack and move the firm down the 
pecking order.  
2.2.3.2  Signalling with proportion of debt: 
In this approach, it is assumed that the investment opportunity is fixed and the 
choice of capital structure signals to outside investors the private information 
of insiders. The seminal contribution in this area of literature is due to Ross 
(1977). In his model, Ross assumes two types of firms (high quality with high 
leverage and low quality with low leverage) that have different prospects and 
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that these are known by managers but not by investors. Moreover, managers 
benefit if the company’s securities are more highly valued by the market but 
are penalized if the firm goes bankrupt. Under such circumstances, the level 
of debt the company managers choose serves as a signal about the quality of 
the company, a signal sent from the managers as possessors of private insider 
information towards outside investors. Since lower quality firms have higher 
marginal expected bankruptcy costs for any debt level, managers of low 
quality firms do not imitate higher quality firms by issuing more debt. 
Therefore, higher leverage is a “good signal” in this model.  
The Ross’s model has two main empirical implications. First, the probability 
of bankruptcy rises as the amount of debt issued by the firm increases. 
Second, the value of the firm is positively related to its leverage ratio. Thus, 
the firm value, leverage, and bankruptcy are all positively related. 
Leland and Pyle (1977) develop a model of capital structure and financial 
equilibrium where an entrepreneur who wants to undertake an investment 
project and plans to hold a certain fraction of the firm’s equity and the 
remaining is raised from outside lenders. Since entrepreneur is known to be a 
risk-averse, he will choose a high fraction in a risky project only if he 
confident about its success. Thus, in the signalling equilibrium, the market 
inferred the amount of equity retained by the entrepreneur as a signal of the 
firm quality.  
2.2.4 Models based on the market for corporate control: 
This literature explains the firm’s choice of capital structure by utilizing the 
fact that common stockholder carries voting rights while debt-holder does not. 
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Here, the capital structure has indirect influence on the result of the takeover 
contests through its effect on the distribution of votes particularly the portion 
that held by the manager. Several models have been proposed in the literature 
regarding this concept. 
Harris and Raviv (1988) develop a model where the incumbent manager 
changes his ownership in the firm’s equity by altering firm’s capital structure 
to direct the outcome of takeover contests. The manager chooses his optimal 
ownership by trading off capital gains on his stake against the loss of any 
personal benefits derived from being in control. Since manager can increase 
his stake by issuing debt to repurchase equity from the passive investors, he 
well chooses the debt level that determines his optimal stake and, thus, 
maximizes his payoff. The main predictions of Harris and Raviv (1988) model 
are: first, that takeover targets will raise their debt on average. Second, debt 
issues on average are accompanied by stock price increase.  
Stulz (1988) shows that the shareholders could have influence on the outcome 
of a takeover attempt by changing stake of incumbent manager. He argues that 
increasing the fraction of manager’s ownership (which is financed by issuing 
debt) reduces the probability of a successful tender offer but increases the 
takeover premium paid by rival and the value of investors’ equities if a tender 
offer is made. Therefore, the optimal debt level is that maximizes the value of 
investor’s equity.   
The main predictions of Stulz’s model are: first, that takeover targets will 
have more debt than firms that are not targets; second, that changing of debt 
for equity are accompanied by stock price increase; and third, that there is a 
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negative relationship between the probability of a successful tender offer and 
target’s leverage ratio; finally, that there is a positive relationship between the 
takeover premium and target’s leverage ratio.  
Israel (1992) uses another model where capital structure has an effect on the 
distribution of cash flow between shareholders and nonvoting debt-holders 
such as debt and preferred stocks. Here, the optimal debt level involves 
trading off the increase in the gain to target’s shareholders against the 
decrease in the probability of the acquisition. The main implications of 
Israel’s model are: first, there is a negative relationship between the 
probability of firms becoming takeover targets and their leverage ratio; 
second, there is a positive relationship between the gain to target’s 
shareholders and leverage ratio; third, target’s debt value, target’s stock price 
and acquirers’ firm value increase when acquisitions are initiated.  
2.2.5 Models based on industrial organization theory: 
This section of literature presents the models that establish the link between 
capital structure and industrial organization theory. The connections between 
the firm's capital structure and industrial organization theory could be 
explained through two approaches: First, models that concern the relationship 
between firm's capital structure and its competitive strategy. Second, models 
that consider the relationship between firm's capital structure and the 
characteristics of its products or inputs.  
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2.2.5.1   Capital structure and the firm's competitive strategy: 
This approach of literature starts from industrial organization and firm's 
strategic management in order to determine capital structure. In particular, it 
considers the relationship between the firm's capital structure and its strategy 
when competing in the product market.  
Brander and Lewis (1986) develop a model where two firms are engaged in a 
competition and face uncertainty demand. They argue that financial decisions 
affect output market strategies because of the limited liability of equity 
holders (i.e. levered equity holders receive payoffs only in good states). 
Therefore, debt financing creates an incentive for the firm to adopt an 
aggressive output policy.  
Maksimovic (1988) studies the interaction between the financing choice and 
product market decisions by modelling profits in terms of demand and cost 
functions and number of firms. He shows that debt capacity rises with 
elasticity of demand and declines with the discount rate.  
2.2.5.2  Capital structure and the characteristics of firm's products or inputs:  
This approach concerns identifying product (input) or product market (input 
market) characteristics that interact in a significant way with the debt level. 
The basic idea here is that debt influences interaction with firm's non-financial 
stakeholders (i.e. customers, workers and suppliers). According to Titman 
(1984), customers might incur costs such as inability to obtain the product, 
parts, and/or related services following a firm’s liquidation. These costs are 
transferred to the shareholders in the form of lower prices for the firm's 
product. Titman (1984) shows that the cost imposed on customers when a 
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producer goes out business (bankrupt) is higher for unique and/or durable 
companies, than for non-durable products or those made by more producers. 
This in turn leads to the result that firms that produce unique products use less 
debt to avoid the possibility of bankruptcy. 
Leverage may also have an effect on the shareholders’ bargaining position in 
relation to their input suppliers. Sarig (1998) argues that employees of highly 
leveraged firms can negotiate better contract terms than can employees of less 
leveraged firms since highly leveraged firms are more susceptible to 
employees' threats to seek alternative employment than less leveraged firms. 
Consequently, firms that require skilled employees might be expected to have 
lower debt to protect themselves against employees’ negotiating threat. 
Moreover, this effect of leverage is not limited to negotiations with employees 
but also may affects negotiations with any supplier of specialized production 
factors. 
2.3 Theoretical Prediction  
Harris and Raviv (1991) argue that theories of capital structure have identified 
a large number of potential factors that might have an impact on debt levels. 
Among these factors which have been found by a large number of studies to 
influence the firm’s capital structure are size, tangibility, profitability, risk, 
tax, growth, uniqueness, dividends, free cash flow, liquidity, age and 
percentage of outstanding shares held by the government. However, there is 
significant disagreement among the capital structure theories, in particular, 
between the trade-off and the pecking order theories about the influence of 
some factors on the firm’s capital structure. In this section, therefore the 
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discussion involves the viewpoints of the capital structure theories about the 
effect of these attributes on leverage ratios.  
2.3.1 Size 
It seems there is an agreement between theories about the positive effect of 
size on firm’s capital structure though their explanation differs. From the 
point view of the trade-off theory, firms trade-off between the benefits of 
leverage such as tax savings or mitigation of agency problems against the 
costs of leverage such as the costs of bankruptcy. Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
however, argue that large firms tend to be more diversified and so suffer 
bankruptcy less often. Accordingly, an observed positive dependence is 
expected between leverage and firm size. Alternatively, because of 
information asymmetries, smaller firms are likely to face higher costs for 
obtaining external funds. Moreover, Bevan and Danbolt (2002) argue that due 
to credit rating, large companies are more likely to have access to non-bank 
debt financing. In turn, this too would suggest a positive relationship between 
size and debt.  
2.3.2 Tangibility  
Titman and Wessels (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1991) argue that tangibility 
might be the major factor in determining the firm’s debt levels. Theoretically, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that issuing debt increases the shareholders 
motivation to invest sub-optimally in high-risk projects, taking advantage of 
the possibility of increasing their benefits at the expense of increasing the risk, 
which is passed on to the debt-holders, who are the ones that would suffer the 
possible losses. However, if debt is secured against assets, the borrower is 
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restricted to using loaned funds for a specific project, and creditors have an 
improved guarantee of repayment. Thus, firms with high level of fixed assets 
would have higher level of debt. Bevan and Danbolt (2002), however, argue 
that if the tangibility provides a reasonable proxy for the availability of 
depreciation tax shields, the tax-based hypothesis of DeAngelo and Masulis 
(1980) would expect a negative rather than a positive association between 
leverage and tangibility.  
2.3.3 Profitability  
There are no consistent theoretical predictions on the influence of profitability 
on firm’s capital structure. From the point view of the trade-off theory, the 
more is the firm profitable, the higher the leverage should be due to debt tax 
deductibility of interest payment. Rajan and Zingales (1995), further, argue 
that debt suppliers should be more willing to lend to profitable firms. 
Accordingly, a positive dependence is expected to be observed between 
leverage and profitability. On the other hand, the main argument supporting a 
negative relationship between leverage and profitability comes from the 
pecking order theory. Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that, 
as a result of information asymmetry between corporate insiders and the 
market, investors may under price firm’s equity. If firms finance new projects 
by issuing equity, the net effect is that new investors obtain a higher gain from 
this investment than pre-existing shareholders, which may cause the project 
not to be accepted on these grounds even when it has a positive NPV (under 
investment problem). To avoid such problems, internal funds and even debt 
that is not too risky will be preferred to equity. Accordingly, firms will prefer 
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to finance from retained earnings first, then from debt and finally from issuing 
new equity. This, in turn, suggests a negative relationship between 
profitability and debt ratios.  
2.3.4 Risk  
The theoretical literature argues that firms with high variability in earnings 
have a greater risk not to meet their debt obligations, so increasing the 
probability of default. Thus, lenders will be less willing to lend or will charge 
a higher risk premium since they will have a greater probability of losing their 
money. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argue that the cost of debt will increase 
for firms that have variability in their earnings since investors will not be able 
to accurately predict future earnings based on publicly available information. 
Bradley et al. (1984) argue further that the variability of the firm value 
expected to show negative influence on the debt ratio when the costs of 
financial distress are significant. Consequently, this suggests an inverse 
relationship between risk and leverage.  
2.3.5 Tax  
Modigliani and Miller (1963) argue that firms with high tax liabilities are 
expected to utilize greater amounts of debt to take advantage of the 
deductibility of interest payments. Accordingly, a positive association 
between debt and tax is expected. However, Graham et al (1998) argue that 
corporate tax is endogenous to financing decisions, which induces a spurious 
negative association between debt ratios and marginal tax rate (MTR). They 
demonstrate that including the interest expense in the tax rate computation 
would cause a decline in the MTR. In this case, firms with high level of debt 
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will associated with a low observed MTR and, thus, a negative relationship 
will be observed between debt level and tax proxy. Accordingly, they suggest 
using before financing marginal tax rate (i.e. after removing the effect of 
interest tax shield from MTR calculation). 
Alternatively, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) incorporate the effect of 
corporate taxes, personal taxes, and non-debt tax shields in their model of 
optimal capital structure. Their argument is that tax deductions for 
depreciation, losses, and investment tax credits are substitutes for the tax 
benefits of debt financing. Accordingly, this suggests that firms with greater 
non-debt tax shields expected to have lower levels of debt.  
2.3.6 Growth  
Myers (1977) argues that the under-investment and asset substitution issues 
are likely to be more severe for firms with great growth opportunities and, 
thus, such firms should use less debt in order to mitigate these agency 
problems. Titman and Wessels (1988) further argue that since growth 
opportunities are capital assets that add value to the firm but cannot be 
collateralised, the costs associated with agency conflicts between equity and 
debt holders is expected to be higher for firms in growing industries. 
Accordingly, a negative relationship between debt and growth opportunities 
suggested. Pecking-order hypothesis also suggests a negative relationship 
between leverage and growth opportunity. According to Myers and Majluf 
(1984), information asymmetry demands an extra premium for firms to raise 
external funds irrespective of the true quality of their investment project. In 
the case of issuing debt, the extra premium is reflected in the higher required 
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yield. Therefore, firms with growth opportunities may find it too costly to rely 
on debt to finance its growth. Myers (1977), however, argues that these 
agency problems can be mitigated if the firm issues short-term debt rather 
than long-term debt. This would suggest that growth to have a negative 
relationship with long-term debt and a positive relationship with short-term 
debt.    
2.3.7 Uniqueness  
Titman (1984) argues that firms, which produce unique or specialised 
products, use less debt to avoid the possibility of going out of business since 
the costs imposed on their customers, workers and suppliers are relatively 
high in the event of liquidation. Accordingly, an inverse relationship between 
uniqueness and debt ratios is expected.   
2.3.8 Dividends  
According to the pecking order hypothesis, firms prefer to use internally 
generated funds and if external funds are needed, firms prefer to raise debt 
before equity. One of the main predictions of the pecking order hypothesis is 
that there is a negative interaction between dividend payout and investment 
opportunity because higher dividend payout lower the retained earning and 
that increase the need for the use of external source of fund (i.e. debt) to 
finance growth opportunity (Baskin 1989; Allen, 1993 and Adedeji, 1998). 
Therefore, a positive relationship is expected between dividends and debt 
ratios. On the other hand, dividends and debt are substitutes for controlling the 
free cash flow agency problem (Stulz, 1990), which would suggest a negative 
relationship between dividends and debt ratios. 
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2.3.9 Free cash flow 
Agency theory argues that debt reduces the amount of the free cash flow 
available to managers to involve in personal benefit activities since debt 
commits the firm to serve its debt payments (Grossman and Hart, 1982; 
Jensen, 1986 and Stulz, 1990). Accordingly, this would suggest a direct 
relationship between free cash flow and leverage. On the other hand, if the 
free cash flow represents the capacity of the firm’s internal generated 
resources, the pecking order theory would suggest an inverse association 
between free cash flow and leverage.    
2.3.10 Liquidity  
According to pecking order hypothesis, in the presence of asymmetric 
information, firms with financial slack (i.e. liquid assets such as cash and 
marketable securities) will prefer internal sources to finance future 
investments. Accordingly, firms with higher liquidity ratio are expected to 
have lower leverage.  
2.3.11 Age 
Diamond (1989) argues that aged firms with a long history of credits will have 
relatively low default probability and lower agency costs using debt financing 
than newly established firms. Accordingly, a positive relationship is expected 
between age and debt ratio. On the other hand, according to pecking order 
hypothesis, firms prefer raising funds first from retained earnings and resort to 
external funds only if the former is insufficient, in which issuing debt is 
preferred over issuing equity. Therefore, young firms are more likely to 
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depend on debt instruments since they do not have sufficient funds internally 
to finance new investment. Hall et al. (2004) argue that new firms will not 
have had time to cumulate funds and may be forced to borrow. This suggests 
an inverse relationship between age and debt ratio. 
2.3.12 Government   
Theoretically, the impact of the government as large shareholders on leverage 
is ambiguous. On one hand, Jensen (1986) argues that the use of debt can 
minimize the conflicts between management and shareholders. Accordingly, 
the presence of shareholders owning large percentages of equity shares (in this 
case government) in a firm may have incentives to use debt to reduce the 
ability of the management from engaging in the consumption of excessive 
perquisites. Moreover, Leland and Pyle (1977) argue that the market inferred 
the amount of equity retained by the entrepreneur as a signal of the firm 
quality. The government ownership, therefore, will signal to the lenders the 
firm’s guaranteed solvency. Accordingly, these arguments would suggest a 
positive relationship between government ownership and debt ratio. On the 
other hand, the presence of the government as large external shareholders may 
also force managers to engage in activities that benefit shareholders at the 
expense of debt-holders such as asset substitution (Myers, 1977). This would 
suggest an inverse relationship between debt and government attribute.  
2.4 Review of prior empirical studies:  
The purpose of this section of the literature review is to provide a wide range 
of the relevant empirical studies related to the area of capital structure. Prior 
empirical studies in this area can be divided into two main approaches of 
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which the first approach involves a survey-based analysis while the second 
involves regression analysis using company’s accounting data.  
This section proceeds as follow: Section 2.4.1 goes over the prior survey 
based studies. Section 2.4.2 reviews prior regression based studies examining 
specific theory. Section 2.4.3 reviews prior regression based studies 
examining general capital structure themes.   
2.4.1 Prior empirical studies survey-based analysis: 
As an attempt to narrow the gap between theory and the behaviour of financial 
managers in practice, some studies adopted survey methodology. In this 
approach, company or financial managers have been asked about their views 
and behaviour regarding capital structure decisions, in particular, their views 
on issues related to the two dominant theories (i.e. pecking order and trade-off 
theories). Following are the studies that have been carried out adopting survey 
approach.  
Donaldson (1961) conducted an interview survey on 25 large US firms. 
Consistent with pecking order hypothesis, he found that management strongly 
prefer to use internal generation as a source of new funds and resort to 
external funds only if the need for funds was unavoidable. With a response 
rate of 21% of the 468 industrial firms surveyed from the 1984 fortune 500, 
Norton (1989) found that financial managers preferred to use internal 
resources first and in the case where external financing is needed, debt is used 
more than equity due to the tax deductibility of interest payments. However, 
factors dealing with bankruptcy costs, agency costs and information 
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asymmetries were found to have little effect on financial decision makers’ 
behaviour.  
Graham and Harvey (2001) carried out a survey on 392 CFOs of US firms, 
which represents a response rate of 8.5%. In their analysis of capital structure 
responses, they found financial flexibility and credit ratings were the most 
important debt policy determinants whereas earnings per share dilution and 
recent stock price appreciation were the most important determinants 
influencing equity issuance. Moreover, while a moderate support was found 
for both the pecking order and trade-off theories, issues related to asset 
substitution, asymmetric information, transactions costs, free cash flows and 
personal taxes were found to have little effect on executives’ financial 
decisions.  
In countries other than US, Allen (1991) interviewed senior financial 
personnel of 48 listed Australian companies. He found that 93 % of the 
respondents were found to pursue a policy of maintaining spare debt capacity. 
Relatively consistent with pecking order prediction, 52.1 % of the respondents 
preferred to fund their business by internal funding sources. Moreover, some 
evidence on target debt ratios and tax considerations of debt is found.  
More recently, Beattie et al (2006) conducted survey on 192 financing 
directors of UK listed companies, which represents a response rate of 23%. 
The main finding is heterogeneity among companies regarding capital 
structure policies, in which about 50% respondents seek to maintain a target 
debt level (i.e. consistent with trade-off theory) and 60% claim to follow a 
financing hierarchy, (i.e. consistent with pecking order hypothesis). The 
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respondents, however, did not view these two theories as either mutually 
exclusive or comprehensive. Moreover, company size is found to have an 
important influence on corporate financing decisions. Broadly, theoretical 
arguments related to interest tax shield, financial distress, agency costs and 
information asymmetry were found to be acceptable by respondents. 
In international comparisons,  Bancel, and Mittoo (2004) carried out a survey 
on CFOs of 87 firms in 16 European countries with a response rate of 12%3. 
In comparison to Graham and Harvey (2001) study, they found that European 
managers use factors similar to those used by their U.S. counterparts for their 
financing decisions. However, there were differences among European 
countries on several dimensions, particularly between Scandinavian and non-
Scandinavian countries. Country’s institutional structure, especially the 
quality of its legal system was found an important determinant of debt policy. 
Financial flexibility and earnings per share dilution were the managers’ 
primary concerns in issuing debt and common stock respectively. Most firms 
determined their optimal capital structure by trading-off factors such as tax 
advantage of debt, or bankruptcy costs, agency costs, and accessibility to 
external financing. 
2.4.2 Empirical results concentrated on the testing of specific theories 
Many studies have investigated the process of how firms chose their 
debt/equity level in the framework of the two leading theories, namely, the 
                                                 
3 Countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Holland, 
Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. 
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pecking order hypothesis and trade-off theory. This subsection, thus, 
organised based on either study tests pecking order hypothesis or it examines 
trade-off theory or both.  
A limited number of studies directly test the pecking order theory using 
specific econometric models. Baskin (1989) examined the pecking order 
hypothesis directly by using structural model. The key finding is that the 
payments of high levels of past dividends reduce the amount of the retained 
earnings and, thus, increases the demand for debt. Studies carried out by Klein 
and Belt (1993); Allen (1993) and Adedeji (1998) also have directly tested the 
pecking order theory and find support for it. On the other hand, Frank and 
Goyal (2003) tested the pecking order theory using system equations. 
Inconsistent with the prediction of the pecking order theory, their results show 
that external funding is largely used, and debt financing does not dominate 
equity financing in magnitude. Moreover, net equity issues track the financing 
deficit more closely than do net debt.  
On the other hand, much of the empirical work in this area has focused on the 
static and dynamic trade-off theories. An early study that tested trade-off 
theory adopting a static approach is Taggart (1977). The author found that 
movements in the market values of long-term debt offset by movements in the 
market of equity and, thus, firms adjust toward a target debt/equity ratio. 
Marsh (1982), Opler and Titman (1994), Hovakimian et al (2001) also found 
evidence that firms appear to adjust toward debt targets which is consistent 
with the prediction of the trade-off theory. However, these studies have been 
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conducted using static approach in which they assume that observed ratios 
equal optimal ratios and the adjustment to the target is costless. 
 Recently, studies have extended traditional static models by introducing 
dynamics into the capital structure choice in which firms dynamically adjust 
their capital structure to target and the adjustment is costly. Jalilvand and 
Harris (1984) used system equations to estimate their target-adjustment 
model. They found that firms adjust gradually toward long-run financial 
targets. Firm size, interest rate conditions, and stock price level were found to 
be the main factors affecting the cost and the speed of adjustment. Large firms 
appeared to adjust to the long-term debt target faster than small firms do. 
Fischer et al. (1989), Gatward and Sharpe (1996), DeMiguel and Pindado 
(2001), Ozkan (2001), Bhaduri (2002), Mayer and Sussman (2004), Gaud et 
al. (2005) and Kayhan and Titman (2007) also provide evidence that firms 
have target ratios and adjust dynamically to the target ratio with different 
costs and different speeds.  
Finally, a few studies have sought to distinguish which of the two main 
theories (the pecking order hypothesis and trade-off theory) best explains 
capital structure practice. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) perform a 
simulation test for the two models and conclude that the pecking order 
hypothesis is an excellent first-order approximation of actual corporate 
financing behaviour. Chirinko and Singha (2000), however, criticize Shyam-
Sunder and Myers’s test and show that their “elegantly simple” test generates 
misleading inferences when evaluating plausible patterns of external 
financing. They argue further that their empirical evidence can evaluate 
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neither the pecking order nor static trade-off models. Fama and French (2002) 
use system equations to test for the two models. In line with the predictions of 
both models, the results show that more profitable firms and firms with fewer 
investments have higher dividend payouts. In support of the pecking order 
model, the results show that firms that are more profitable are less levered and 
short-term variation in investment and earnings is mostly absorbed by debt.  
2.4.3 Empirical results on general capital structure themes 
Since the pioneering work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), the question of 
what determines firms’ choices of capital structure has been a major field in 
the corporate finance literature. Since then, numerous studies have attempted 
to identify those factors that have an effect on firms’ choice of capital 
structure. A previous narrative review conducted by Harris and Raviv (1991) 
showed that the direction of the relationship between leverage and its 
determinants across studies shows some inconsistent findings. Accordingly, 
they conclude that understanding and analysing these mixed results across 
research studies is filled with difficulty in the capital structure literature. 
Moreover, cross-study comparisons in traditional literature review are usually 
undertaken with ignoring any differences in measurement and sample sizes. 
Wolf (1986), however, suggests that contemporary research reviewing should 
be more scientific and statistical than it is narrative. One way to do a statistical 
synthesis technique is employing a meta-analysis procedure. Rosenthal (1991) 
argues that meta-analysis is a useful methodology in summarizing 
relationships, determining moderating variables and establishing relationships 
across studies that are addressing the same research issue. Accordingly, the 
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meta-analysis technique is used in the next chapter (chapter 3) to determine 
the significance level of the hypothesised relationship between capital 
structure and its determinants and investigate the underlying factors that 
moderate the apparent variation observed in the previous studies. The 
technique does not appear to have been applied previously within the capital 
structure literature.  
However, before proceeding further it is necessary in the next section to 
consider prior studies that are very important to the current study as they deal 
specifically with determinants of capital structure in Saudi Arabia. Since the 
current study investigates the determinants of capital structure of Saudi 
unlisted companies, studies relating to capital structure in unlisted sample will 
be summarised in section 
2.4.4 Prior studies related to the context of Saudi Arabia  
Our knowledge of capital structure has mostly been derived from a large 
volume of research conducted in developed countries but very little is known 
about Arab countries, in particular Saudi Arabia. Following are the studies 
found in the literature to investigate directly or indirectly the capital structure 
determinants of listed Saudi Arabian companies. 
Omet and Mashharawe (2001) examined the determinants of the capital 
structure choice of Jordanian, Kuwaiti, Omani and Saudi non-financial listed 
companies. Pooled ordinary least squares, fixed effects and random effects 
models were applied using data of 51, 30, 38 and 29 Jordanian, Kuwaiti, 
Omani and Saudi Arabian companies respectively over the period 1996 to 
2001. They found that in general the companies of these countries employ 
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relatively low leverage ratios. The mean values of long-term debt to total 
assets were found to be 5.4%, 8%, 13% and 9% for Jordan, Kuwait, Oman 
and Saudi Arabia respectively. Contrary to tax theory, while Jordanian 
companies are subject to 35% tax rate, they did not have significantly higher 
leverage than their counterparts in the other countries that are subject to lower 
or even zero percent tax rates. In the context of the determinants of capital 
structure the authors found that the coefficients of profitability and liquidity 
are significantly negatively in all countries and the coefficients of size are 
significantly positive in all countries, except for Oman. The coefficients of 
tangibility, on the other hand, were positively significant only in the case of 
Jordanian companies.  
Barakat and Roa (2004) investigated the influence of tax on the choice of 
capital structure in 12 tax and non-tax Arab countries (Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia 
and United Arab Emirates). They employed pooled Tobit regression 
techniques to estimate their models using the consolidated data of these 
countries over the period 1996 to 2001. Unlike Omet and Mashharawe's 
(2001) findings, they found that taxed countries use more debt than non-tax 
countries. Non-debt tax shields are also found to be positively and 
significantly correlated with leverage in non-tax countries but negatively and 
significantly correlated in tax countries. Further, they found that the 
coefficients for dividends, family ownership, growth, collateral, size are 
positive and significant while the coefficients for profitability and earnings 
volatility are negative and significant. However, the authors failed to find 
significant relationship between government ownership and leverage. 
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Although the above papers have begun to explain the Saudi Arabia 
environment, there is scope to investigate this much more thoroughly. In 
particular, for listed companies it would be useful to consider how robust the 
results are to timeframe consideration, alternative model specifications and 
different variable proxies. Also, little is presently known about capital 
structure in unlisted companies in Saudi Arabia. The current thesis will 
address these issues.  
2.4.5 Prior empirical studies in the context of small and medium firms  
It is quite likely that capital structures of unlisted companies will differ from 
listed companies since the former cannot gain stock market access. However, 
a significant gap in the research has been in the determinants of capital 
structure for unlisted companies, probably due to the lack of data for those 
companies (Hall et al., 2004). Following are the studies that have been carried 
out to investigate the determinants of capital structure in the context of small 
and medium firms.  
Petersen and Ragan (1994) conducted a comprehensive investigation about 
how ties between a firm and its creditors affect the availability and cost of 
funds to the firm in the context of small firms. In the examination of the 
firm’s debt ratio determinants, a Tobit technique is employed to estimate their 
model using a sample of 3233 firms over the period 1988 to 1989.  They 
found that firm’s size is significantly positively correlated to its total debt 
ratio. They also found that factors such as profitability, age, length of longest 
relationship and risk have negative and significant influence on the total debt 
ratio. 
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Jordan et al. (1998) investigated the link between capital structure and both 
competitive and corporate strategies in UK small and medium firms by 
adopting both questionnaire and regression based analysis4. In relation to the 
corporate strategy, insignificant relationship was found between capital 
structure and the level of diversification adopted by SME’s. However, 
competitive strategy was found to influence capital structure: innovation 
strategies differed from cost leadership and differentiation strategies with 
negative rather than positive correlations with debt levels. Furthermore, 
inconsistent with trade-off theory, they found that leverage was positively 
correlated with earnings variability and negatively correlated with effective 
tax rate. Jordan et al. concluded that the pecking order hypothesis is very 
important in the determination of capital structure in small firms.   
Cassar and Holmes (2003) investigated the influence of size, tangibility, 
profitability, growth and risk on capital structure for Australian small and 
medium enterprises using the data of 1555 firms over the period of 1995 to 
1998. They found that all debt ratios are significantly positively correlated 
with size and growth while significantly negatively correlated with 
profitability. They also found that tangibility is significantly positively 
correlated with long-term debt and significantly negatively correlated with 
short-term and total debt ratios. The authors, however, failed to find 
significant results for risk attribute. They concluded that their results in 
general provide support for both static trade-off and pecking order hypothesis 
arguments. 
                                                 
4 A total of 275 completed questionnaires representing a response rate of 45% and a financial 
data on 219 small and medium UK firms over the period 1989 to 1993 were used in the 
analysis. 
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Esperanca and Gulamhussen (2003) investigated the determinants of capital 
structure of Portuguese small firms using the data of 995 firms over the period 
of 1992 to 1996. Consistent with DeAngelo and Masulis's (1980) tax theory, 
they found that the coefficients of non-debt tax shields are negative and 
significant in long-term and total debt models but insignificant in short-term 
model. Consistent with the pecking order hypothesis, they found a negative 
and significant relationship between profitability and all debt ratios. Size was 
found to be significantly positively correlated with long-term debt while 
significantly negatively correlated with short-term and total debt ratios. The 
authors also found that tangibility is significantly negatively correlated with 
short-term and total debt ratios and it is significantly positively with long-term 
debt. This finding in turns supports the asset maturity principle. However, 
they found that risk and growth variables are significantly positively 
correlated with short-term and total debt ratios but are insignificantly 
correlated with long-term debt, while age is significantly negatively correlated 
only with long-term debt.  
 Hall, et al. (2004) investigated the differences in capital structure for 
European small and medium enterprises by examining whether any 
differences were due to country-specific factors or to differences between 
countries in firm-specific factors. Short-term debt to total assets and long-term 
debt to total assets were regressed on a wide set of firm’s characteristics using 
data for 4,000 Small and Medium Enterprises in eight countries (Belgium, 
German, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and UK). They found 
that differences in SME capital structures between countries were due to firm-
specific variations not country-specific ones. With regard to determinants of 
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SME capital structure, they found that while asset structure was consistent 
across countries and had the expected sign, other variables such as growth, 
size, profitability and age exhibited different insignificant influence across 
countries. They argue that since there were variations in the effects of the 
determinants of capital structure between countries, their hypotheses did not 
explain everything in term of SME capital structure. 
While information about SME capital structure in developed countries is 
somewhat limited, in developing countries there is virtually no knowledge. 
The present study seeks to contribute by addressing this issue through an 
investigation of unlisted companies in Saudi Arabia. 
2.5 Conclusion  
The history of the theoretical research in capital structure has started with the 
famous irrelevance theory of Modigliani and Miller (1958). However, by 
relaxing Modigliani and Miller’s assumptions of perfect capital markets, 
several theoretical frameworks have been developed to explain the firm’s 
capital structure.   
Trade off-theory assumes that there are benefits and costs associated with the 
use of debt as against equity and firms thus chose an optimal capital structure 
that trade-off between benefits and costs of debt. The theory comes in several 
forms. The first distinction is that in the beginning the theory was limited to 
the trade off between the tax advantages of debt against the bankruptcy costs. 
Then it was extended to include benefits and costs associated with the use of 
debt in mitigating the conflicts among the agent groups associated with the 
firm. A second distinction is between the static trade-off model in which a 
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firm is always at an optimal point, and the dynamic model in which a firm 
dynamically adjusts its capital structure to a moving target and the adjustment 
is costly.  
Asymmetric information is another dimension of the capital structure theories. 
It is generally thought there is asymmetric information between firm 
managers (or insiders) and outside investors. In the pecking order theory, 
there are three sources of funding available to firms: retained earnings, debt, 
and equity. Equity is subject to serious adverse selection, debt has only minor 
adverse selection problems, and retained earnings avoid the problem. 
Therefore, due to asymmetric information, firms prefer internal over external 
financing and if external financing is needed debt is preferred over equity. 
Under this theory, a single target debt ratio does not exist; instead the debt 
ratio reflects the residual of retained earnings, dividend payout and investment 
decisions over time. In signalling theory, however, firm’s capital structure 
choice is used as a means to signal to outside investors the information held 
by insiders. 
Finally, models based on industrial organization and corporate control 
considerations provide explanations of how the characteristics of a firm’s 
inputs/products and firm’s control and strategy affect its capital structure.  
Although the theories presented in this chapter identified many potential 
determinants of capital structure, the question of which of these theories best 
explains capital structure practice remains unanswered.  
Seeking to provide an answer to this question, many empirical studies have 
been carried out concerning the main two theories (i.e. trade-off and pecking 
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order theories) and using survey and regression methods. The finding of both 
method show overall mixed results. Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 provide a 
summary of the main findings of the survey and the regression approaches 
concerning the two main theories.  
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Table 2.1: Studies found support to trade-off theory. 
 
Survey based studies 
 
Regression based studies 
Static studies 
 
Dynamic studies 
 Study Finding 
Study Finding Study Finding 
Graham& 
Harvey 
(01) 
 
37%, 34% and 10% 
of respondents 
followed flexible 
target, somewhat 
tight target and 
tight target 
respectively. 
Taggart (77). 
 
Movements in 
the market 
values of long-
term debt offset 
by movements 
in the market of 
equity 
Jalilvand & 
Harris (84) 
Firm size, interest 
rate and stock price 
affect the speed of 
adjustment. 
 
 
Brounen et 
al. (04) 
 
More than two third 
of the surveyed 
have some target 
debt ratio. 
 
Marsh (82), 
Hovakimian et 
al (01), 
Opler&Titman 
(94) and 
Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers (99) 
 
Changes in debt 
demonstrate 
firm's 
adjustment 
toward target 
debt ratio. 
 
Fischer et 
al (89) 
 
Re-capitalisation 
costs lead to a wide 
swing in a firm's debt 
ratio over time. 
 
Bancel& 
Mittoo (04) 
 
59 % of managers 
rank maintaining a 
target debt-to-
equity ratio as 
important. 
 
  Ozkan  (01)  
UK firms adjust to 
the target ratio 
relatively fast. 
Beattie et 
al. (06) 
51% of the firms 
surveyed did 
maintain a target 
capital structure. 
 
  
Gatward & 
Sharpe 
(96), 
DeMiguel 
& Pindado 
(01) and 
Gaud et al. 
(05) 
Australian, Spain, 
Swiss firms adjust to 
the target ratio 
relatively slow. 
    Bhaduri (02) 
The costs and the 
speed of adjustment 
towards optimal 
capital structure are 
higher for short-term 
debt than for long-
term debt. 
 
    Kayhan & Titman (07) 
Cash flows, 
investment 
expenditures and 
stock price lead to 
deviations from 
target. 
 
    
Mayer & 
Sussman 
(04) 
In the long-term, 
firms revert to 
previous levels of 
leverage. 
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Table 2.2: Studies found support to Pecking order hypothesis. 
 
Survey based studies 
 
Regression based studies 
Study Finding Study Finding 
Donaldson 
(61) and 
Norton 
(89) 
Surveyed firms prefer to use internal to 
external financing and debt is preferred 
over equity as external financing.  
 
Mayers 
(1989) 
Corporate growth is financed 
mainly from internal resources and 
if external finance is needed bank 
loans were the main source in both 
market-base and bank-base 
countries 
Allen (91) 
52 % of the respondents preferred 
internal funding sources and 93 % pursue 
a policy of maintaining spare debt 
capacity. 
 
Allen (93) 
Investment growth found 
negatively correlated with previous 
dividend levels.  
 
Graham & 
Harvey 
(01), 
Bancel, & 
Mittoo (04) 
Managers view financial flexibility is an 
important determinant of the company's 
debt policy. 
 
Klein and 
Belt (94) 
Debt being the primary choice for 
the most efficient firms.  
 
Beattie et 
al. (06) 
60% of the respondents claimed to 
follow a financing hierarchy. 
 
Adedeji (98) 
Negative relationship was found 
between dividend payout and 
investment. Leverage found 
positively correlated with dividend 
payment and negatively correlated 
with profitability.  
 
  
Shyam-
Sunder & 
Myers (99) 
Changes in debt ratios are 
explained by the need for external 
funds due to the internal financing 
deficit.  
 
  Fama & French (02) 
Firms that are more profitable 
found to have less leverage. Firms 
with more investment found to have 
lower long-term dividend payouts 
and the short-term variation in 
investment and earning is mostly 
absorbed by debt.  
 
  Mayer and Sussman (04) 
The pecking orders hold in the 
short-term in which profitable, 
large firms issue debt and increase 
their debt corresponding to their 
financing requirements. 
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As it can be seen from the tables, while some studies support the trade-off 
theory, some others provide support to the pecking order hypothesis and some 
others show mixed evidence. This would suggest neither of the two theories 
independently provide sufficient descriptions for the process of how firms 
chose their debt/equity levels.  
The chapter addresses also a brief discussion about the inconsistency of 
previous empirical results on general capital structure themes. The discussion 
highlights the importance of studies’ measurement differences and sample 
sizes issues in the cross-study comparisons that are generally ignored in 
traditional literature review. Since meta-analysis technique has been proven in 
different areas as useful methodology that considers such issues, it will be 
used in chapter 3 to summarise and clarify inconsistencies in the cross-study 
comparisons. The next chapter describes the technique and summarises the 
findings of prior empirical studies. This chapter ends with a reviewed of the 
prior empirical studies related to capital structure in the context of Saudi 
Arabia and in the context of unlisted firms. 
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Chapter 3:  Meta-Analysis Techniques 
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3.1 Introduction  
The vast majority of empirical studies in the capital structure area are 
concentrated on testing variables that have been suggested by theories to have 
an influence on debt ratio. One drawback of the previous narrative reviews is 
that they usually done with the results mostly taken at face value, ignoring any 
differences in measurement of the explanatory and the dependent variables 
and studies sample sizes. Harris and Raviv (1991) and Bevan and Danbolt 
(2002) assert on the importance of measurement differences as a source of 
variation in the previous finding. In light of this assertion, a meta-analysis 
technique, which statistically synthesises the finding of previous studies, is 
used in this dissertation to summarise and clarify inconsistency in the findings 
of prior studies. 
The chapter is presented as follow: section 3.2 presents the meta-analysis 
technique. Section 3.3 summarises the finding of prior empirical studies. 
Finally, section 3.4 provides chapter conclusion. 
3.2 Meta analysis technique   
Glass (1976) describes meta-analysis as a statistical synthesis technique, 
which integrates the statistical results across individual studies investigating 
the same research question. Previously, vote counting was the procedure 
primarily employed for summarising statistical results. In this method, 
findings are categorised as significantly positive, significantly negative, or 
insignificant and the category with the most entries is considered the best 
representation of research in this area. The main drawback of this method is 
that the process does not take into account the differences between studies in 
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terms of the statistical significances and sample sizes. Cooper (1998), 
therefore, concludes that vote counting will produce very imprecise results.  
Recently, two common methods of quantitative procedures, namely, the 
combined significance test and the effect size index are developed to 
overcome the shortcoming of vote counts. In the combined significance 
technique, the exact probability associated with the finding of the previous 
studies is statistically combined to arrive at an overall significance level 
regarding the research issue of interest. On the other hand, the effect size 
method involves an accumulation of the correlation coefficients across studies 
in order to estimate the size of the relationship related to the research issue of 
interest. Wolf (1986), Greenberg (1992) and Cooper (1998) pointed to the 
importance of these two meta-analysis techniques in the synthesis of previous 
findings. Greenberg (1992) argues that when past results conflict or some 
results are significant and other are not significant, combined significance test 
can be useful in determining the overall significance level. Moreover, most of 
the studies included in the sample do not report the statistical data (i.e. 
Pearson correlation coefficient) required to apply the effect size technique. 
Accordingly, the combined significance test is applied here.   
3.2.1 Combine significance test 
The combined significance technique statistically combines the finding of the 
previous studies that address the same question. The major advantage of this 
procedure is that it combines the exact probabilities associated with the results 
of each estimate of a relation to arrive at an overall significance level (Cooper, 
1998). Accordingly, it is essential to know or estimate the P-value associated 
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with each of the studies included in the meta-analysis. On the other hand, the 
major disadvantage of this procedure is that all studies synthesized in a meta-
analysis are given equal weight. Wolf (1986) argues that this could lead to the 
less representative studies with small sample size contributing just as much 
weight to the results of the meta-analysis as the studies with large sample size. 
Generally, a study with a large number of observations is more precise, or 
more reliable, and thus more influential than a study with a small number of 
observations. Therefore, a large study should have more weight and should 
contribute proportionately more to the overall results. 
To overcome this problem, the combined test should give weights to the 
studies with larger samples. Cooper (1998), Greenberg (1992) and Wolf 
(1986) argue that the Stouffer test can be modified to overcome this issue. 
Generally, this is performed using the degrees of freedom associated with 
each statistical test as weights in the meta-analysis. Accordingly, the formula 
for the weighted Stouffer test applied in this dissertation is as follow:  
Weighted Stouffer test (Zc)  = ∑ df Z 
              √ ∑ df 2 
Where Z is the standard normal deviate associated with the one tailed P-value 
and df is the degree of freedom associated with each statistical test included in 
the meta-analysis. Then after, the probability associated with Zc can be 
obtained from the normal distribution table. The steps to carry out the analysis 
are as follow: 
Each study, which reports a t-test, a Z-test, p-value, or standard error, is 
included in the meta-analysis. 
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Tests reporting standard errors are converted to a t-statistic by dividing the 
coefficient by its standard errors. 
The t-statistic is transformed to a p-value using the Excel function (TDIST (t-
value), n, 1). 
The p-value is transformed to a Z value by using the Excel function 
(NORMSINV (p-value)). 
Table 3.1 illustrates the meta-analysis process used to synthesise the findings 
of prior empirical studies. The illustration derives from the analysis of size 
(see Table 3.4, p.70) with just a smaller sub-sample of the data being used. 
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Error! Reference source not found.Table 3.1: Illustrate of meta-analysis applied to size variable  
using Weighted Stouffer test  
Study Sample size t-test p-value Zc Df** Zc*Df Df2 
Frank & Goyal (03), 
TD (MV) (Sales) 82613 25.0 1.9894E-137 24.95 82609 2061329 6824246881 
Bevan & Danpolt*(04), 
LTD ( BV) (Sales) 6001 5.39 7.43E-08 5.38 5997 32263.86 35964009 
DE JONG A. (02) 
 LTD (BV) (Assets) 
665 2.43 0.0153624 2.42 647 1568.1474 418609 
Akhtar& Oliver (06), 
TD (MV) (Assets) 2942 7.97 2.249E-15 7.93 2930 23225.534 8584900 
Heshmati (01), 
TD (BV)  
(# of employee) 
6783 -4.25 2.145E-05 -4.24922 6763 -28722.6 45738169 
Mueller E. (05),  
TD (BV) 
 (# of employee) 
26522 15.82 4.14352E-56 15.78 
 
26514 
 
418442 702992196 
Weighted Stouffer 
test   
∑ df Z 
√ ∑ df 2 
∑ df* Z SQRT ∑ df 2 
Overall  =2508105.94 / 87280.84 =  28.74 and  p-value=  0.0000 2508105.94 87280.84 
Sales  =2093592.86 / 82826.39 =  25.28 and  p-value=  0.0000 2093592.86 82826.39 
Assets  = 24793.68 / 3000.58  =  8.26  and   p-value=  0.0000 24793.68 3000.58 
# of employee =389719.40 /  27362.94 = 14.24  and   p-value=  0.0000 389719.40 27362.94 
Leverage based on MV = 2084554.53 /82660.94 =  25.22  and   p-value=  0.0000 2084554.53 82660.94 
Leverage based on BV = 423551.41 / 28019.87=  15.12  and   p-value=  0.0000 423551.41 28019.87 
Total debt = 2474273.93 / 87072.17= 28.42 and   p-value=  0.0000 2474273.93 87072.17 
Long-term debt = 33832.01 / 6031.801  =  5.61  and  p-value=  0.0000 33832.01 6031.8 
* The authors report the standards error, thus,  t-test= β / (SE)= 0.0167/0.0031= 5.39  
** Degree of freedom (df) = sample size - # of included independent variables in the model. 
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Moreover, the percentages of the total significant observations to the total 
number of observations, as well as the percentage of the significant positive 
and negative observations to the total significant observations, are calculated. 
Such steps provide information about the driving forces behind the obtained 
results associated with Zc in more detail. It is noteworthy that the number of 
observations rather than the number of studies is used, to maintain the 
consistency of the results with the results obtained by using the weighted 
Stouffer test. 
3.2.2 Moderating effects 
Harris and Raviv (1991) argue that the interpretation of research findings 
should be tempered by taking into account differences in the measurement of 
both leverage and the explanatory variables of interest. This means that the 
relationship between leverage and the corporate characteristics might be 
moderated by the differences in the measurement of leverage and its 
determinants. Cooper (1998), Greenberg (1992) and Wolf (1986), amongst 
others, define a moderating variable as a third variable that causes differences 
in the association between two other variables. Greenberg (1992) stated that 
further investigation might reveal a moderating variable masking a 
relationship. Previous meta-analysis studies suggest sub-grouping studies 
according to differences in the measurement of the dependent and the 
independent variables (Ahmed and Courtis 1999). Accordingly, to capture 
moderator effect, studies are sub-grouped based on the differences in the 
definition of the debt ratios and in the differences in the proxies used to 
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measure firm’s attributes. Moreover, the weighted Stouffer test is performed 
for each sub-group.  
Bevan and Danbolt (2002) argue that the different financial ratios used in 
prior literature to measure leverage may cause the determinants of leverage to 
differ considerably. Since most of the studies measure debt by total or long-
term debt, the sub-groupings of debt ratios are according to these definitions. 
Further, these two debt ratios are usually scaled by either total assets or 
equity. Total assets are necessarily based on book value recorded in the 
financial statements. However, equity can be measured either at book value 
(i.e. shareholders funds in the financial statements) or at market value (as 
quoted in the stock exchange). Both equity measures have been used in prior 
studies. Throughout this dissertation, these will be described as debt “based on 
book value” or “based on market value”. These phrases represent an 
abbreviated from of ‘debt scaled by total assets (or equity), measured at book 
value’ and ‘debt scaled by total assets (or equity), measured at market value’ 
respectively. Scaling by total assets or equity is not distinguished in this study; 
this represents a limitation of the analysis. 
Titman and Wessels (1988) and Bevan and Danbolt (2002) point out that 
proxy variables might be selected by the goodness-of-fit criteria and, thus, 
bias may arise in interpretation of the significance level tests. Consequently, 
corporate attributes are sub-grouped according to the major differences in the 
proxies used to capture the effect of these attributes. For example, the attribute 
of uniqueness is sub-grouped into research & Development (R&D) and selling 
& administration (S&A) expenses which are usually employed as proxies for 
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uniqueness. However, either these proxies scaled by sales or assets is not 
considered in this study for the same reason above. Therefore, this becomes 
also a limitation inherent in this study. 
3.2.3 Data collection procedure 
The data collection process went through a systematic method as described 
below.  
3.2.3.1 Determining the research issue and the scope of the literature  
The first step in meta-analysis is to determine the research issue to be 
investigated. It was pointed out earlier in chapter one that though the literature 
is rich in empirical studies examining the determinants of capital structure, 
their findings are not always consistent in terms of the direction and strength 
of the relationship. After determining the research issue, the second step in 
meta-analysis is to determine the scope of the literature appropriate to 
examining the research issue. Greenberg (1992) argues that it is important to 
expand the scope of the search to include more than one area. Accordingly, 
the literature search was expanded to covers publications in different areas 
such as accounting, business, economic, finance and management. 
Commonly, meta-analytic data are obtained only from published research in 
order to ensure quality (Schmidt, 1985 and Ahmed and Courtis, 1999). 
However, this has potential to bias the results as it is likely that only 
significant findings will be published. To reduce this bias, the literature search 
included working papers as well as published studies in journals.  
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3.2.3.2 Searching process 
Before the search process began, it was essential to set up an empty database 
that will include the references of the studies under investigation. Utilizing the 
reference manager application provided by the university, an empty reference 
manager database was established. The next step is to search studies for 
review and transform their references into the database. A combination of 
manual scanning of the previous studies’ references and on-line searching of 
the related websites such as Blackwell Synergy, Business Source Elite, 
Econlit, Emerald, IngentaConnect, JSTOR and Science Direct (for published 
studies) and Social Science Research Network (SSRN) and Google (for 
working papers) was carried out.  Since all of these websites other than 
Google provide an option to export references electronically to the reference 
manager database, most of the references were transformed into the database 
electronically and some references were entered manually. 
3.2.3.3 Sample selection  
The reference manager database reveals that the above search process 
produced an initial sample of 403 studies' references related to capital 
structure subjects. However, it is most likely that this process involve a 
repetition issue (i.e. one study's reference were entered into the database more 
than once). Indeed, utilising the check for duplicates function provided by 
reference manager showed that 47 references were duplicated. Moreover, 79 
Non-empirical studies are excluded from the meta-analysis. Similarly 
excluded are 12 empirical studies based on survey method and 2 case studies. 
Also, excluded are 14 non-English language studies.  
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The reduced sample, thus, limited to studies based on regression analysis. 
These studies employed different estimation techniques such as time-series, 
cross-sectional, pooled and Panel data regressions. However, estimation 
techniques are not distinguished in this study although prior empirical studies 
assert on the importance of the estimation differences as a source of 
inconsistency (Bevan and Danbolt, 2004).  Therefore, this becomes also a 
limitation inherent in this study and represents a potential expansion for this 
analysis.    
Including the regression-based studies in the meta-analysis review required 
further the presence of: (1) a dependent variable measuring debt ratios and (2) 
explanatory variables. The dependent variables include total debt and long-
term debt scaled by either total assets or total equity and defined by book or 
market value. The explanatory variables include attributes widely-used to 
investigate the capital structure determinates. These include size, tangibility, 
profitability, risk, tax, growth, uniqueness, dividend, free cash flow, liquidity, 
age and government ownership. Some studies (24) did not relate to capital 
structure determinants at all, but had leverage as one of a number of 
explanatory variables, so these studies were picked up in key word (leverage) 
searches. A further 39 studies (including some from management, economic 
and accounting) were identified of a similar nature, but where leverage was 
not even included as an explanatory variable. Excluded are 29 studies which 
did not report the required statistical data.  Also, excluded are 17 studies 
investigating only a particular capital structure aspect or, for example, banks 
capital structure (Yu, 2000), incremental capital structure decisions (De Jong 
and Veld, 2001) and event study (Givoly, 1992).  
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Accordingly, the final sample of 140 [see footnote 6 next page] related studies 
was included in the analysis of which 105 published studies were obtained 
from 46 journals and 35 working papers were obtained mainly from SSRN 
and a few from Google websites5. Table in Appendix 1 summarises these 
studies by author name, year, data source, country and years covered in the 
study.  
Table 3.2 summarises the sample selection process. 
                                                 
5 Some of these studies involve cross-countries analysis. Since countries’ samples are drawn 
from different population, each country is considered as individual study.  
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Table 3.2: Summary of number of papers included in meta-analysis study and 
reasons for paper exclusion 
 No No
Initial identification of possible capital structure papers   403
  
Reasons for exclusion from meta-analysis study  
Duplicated papers 48 
Non-empirical studies 79 
Survey studies 12 
Case studies 2 
Specific investigations rather than general capital structure 
determinants 
(eg study of banks, incremental capital structure decisions; event 
studies 
17 
Leverage as explanatory variable in non-capital structure studies 24 
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Other  non-capital structure studies but leverage not even as 
explanatory variable  
39 
Total excluded because different methods applied  (221)
Non-English language studies 14 
Insufficient statistical measures reported in paper for meta-analysis 29 (43)
Total number of papers included in meta-analysis study 6  139 
  
Published papers  102
Working papers  37
Total number of papers included in meta-analysis study 6  139
 
3.3 Results  
The discussion, here, is according to the main attributes discussed earlier, 
which are assumed theoretically to determine capital structure. First, an 
aggregate meta-analysis is conducted. Next, the main sample is disaggregated 
                                                 
6 After completion of the dissertation, it was identified that the number of papers used in the 
meta-analysis actually 139 rather than the 140 reported elsewhere in the dissertation. 
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based on proxies used in prior studies to capture attribute effect and based on 
debt’s measurement and definition. An independent meta-analysis is further 
carried out for each sample. Tables 3-2 to Table 3.16 summarise the results of 
meta-analysis of the relationship between debt levels and these variables. 
Table 3.3 provides guidelines for the format of results presentation for each 
panel of the tables. In the results tables, the column labelled W.S.T is the p-
value (and sign) of the Weighted Stouffer Test. 
Table 3.3: Format of results presentation for each panel of the tables 
Row Proxy Shading Font Dependent variables 
1 Un-shaded Normal Total debt based on book value 
2 Un-shaded Italic Long-term debt based on book value 
3 Shaded Normal Total debt based on market value 
4 Shaded Italic Long-term debt based on market value 
5 
Proxy 
name 
Un-shaded Bold italic 
Summary of aggregated results for the particular proxy across 
both dependent variables and book value and market value 
measures 
Last 
row  Un-shaded 
Bold 
normal 
Summary of aggregated results across all proxies and all 
measures 
 
3.3.1  Size  
Theoretically, the impact of size on debt levels is positive. Empirically, the 
total asset, the total sales, or the number of employees typically measures 
firm’s size. These proxies are usually transformed to the natural logarithm of 
the raw data in order to improve the linear relationship with debt ratios.  
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The overall percentage of significance demonstrates that a strong relationship 
exists between size and leverage. Consistent with the theory, the weighted 
Stouffer test further shows that the overall direction of this relation appears to 
be significantly positive. Table 3.4 (final row) shows that 92.61% of the total 
observations are significant of which 96.39% are positive and significant at 
1% level. 
Table 3.4: Meta-analysis results of Size attribute. 
Significant 
Positive Negative M.V. N of studies Total Obs. Obs. % 
Obs. % Obs. % 
W. S. T. Dir.
78 1012363 962333 95.06 941552 97.84 20781 2.16 0.0000 P 
59 120455 69939 58.06 52416 74.95 17523 25.05 0.0000 P 
83 736585 714594 97.01 713862 99.90 732 0.10 0.0000 P 
46 145793 137935 94.61 137935 100 0 0.00 0.0000 P 
Assets 
266 2015196 1884801 93.53 1845765 97.93 39036 2.07 0.0000 P 
40 217355 211282 97.21 211282 100 0 0.00 0.0000 P 
52 27506 24456 88.91 17987 73.55 6469 26.45 0.0000 P 
72 414332 362533 87.50 354619 97.82 7914 2.18 0.0000 P 
46 14005 10577 75.52 10577 100 0 0.00 0.0000 P 
Sales 
210 673198 608848 90.44 594465 97.64 14383 2.36 0.0000 P 
# Employees 12 109483 97549 89.10 57324 58.76 40225 41.24 0.0429 P 
Market 247 1310715 1225639 93.51 1216993 99.29 8646 0.71 0.0000 P 
Book 241 1487162 1365559 91.82 1280561 93.78 84998 6.22 0.0000 P 
TD 297 2599601 2445840 94.09 2335963 95.51 109877 4.49 0.0000 P 
LTD 203 307759 242907 78.93 218915 90.12 23992 9.88 0.0000 P 
Overall 488 2797877 2591198 92.61 2497554 96.39 93644 3.61 0.0000 P 
M.V., Obs., W.S.T., and Dir. refer to moderating variables, observations, Weighted Stouffer Test and 
direction of the relationship. 
 
Further analysis suggests that differences in size measurement moderate the 
results, as hypothesised. The meta- analysis results suggest that studies using 
total assets and total sales have higher significant levels (significant at the 1% 
level) than studies using the number of employees (significant at the 5% level) 
in explaining the positive relationship between size and debt levels. A careful 
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study of the table indicates that the split in the significant results between 
positive and negative direction in the number of employees proxy lessen the 
strength of this relationship. The other two hypothesised moderator variables 
(i.e. measurement and definition of debt ratios) show slight differences in the 
percentage of the significant observations though the meta-analysis results are 
significant at the 1% level.  
The result show that studies using debt based on market value compared to 
those using debt based on book value have more power in explaining 
hypothesised positive relationship between size and debt with 99.29% 
compared to 93.78% as a percentage of the total significant results. It is also 
observed that studies using total debt ratio compared to those using long-term 
debt ratio have more power in explaining hypothesised positive relationship 
with 95.51% compared to 90.12% as a percentage of the total significant 
results. However, the observed relationship between long-term debt defined 
by book value and assets proxy (row 2) appears to drive the observed 
differences in the results. In this relationship, only 58.06% of the total 
observations are significant of which 74.95% of the significant observations 
are positive and 25.05% are negative. However, this result worth to be 
discussed in more details, as it is demonstrates the advantage of using 
weighted Stouffer procedure. It is important to note that weighted Stouffer test 
reveals strong significant level (1%) though 58.06% of the total observations 
are significant. The observed highly significant results arise due to the 
majority of the studies (i.e. 46 studies with total 84138 observations), which in 
turn constitutes about 70% of the total sample observations, show positive 
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direction regardless to significant level7. To avoid biasness toward significant 
results, weighted Stouffer procedure includes both significant and 
insignificant results in the calculation process to draw an overall relationship 
and, thus the observed result is not surprising.   
In sum, the overall and the moderator variables support the theoretical 
hypothesised positive relationship between size and debt levels as the 
weighted Stouffer procedures produce significant positive relationships for all 
samples.  
3.3.2 Tangibility 
Generally, tangibility is defined as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. The 
overall percentage of significance demonstrates that a moderate relationship 
exists between tangibility and leverage. However, weighted Stouffer test 
shows that the overall direction of this relation is significantly positive. Table 
3.5 (final row) shows that 79.76% of the total results are significant of which 
94.33% are positive and significant at 1% level under weighted Stouffer test.  
                                                 
7 Not reported due to table’s space limitation. 
Table 3.5: Meta-analysis results of Tangibility attribute. 
Significant 
Positive Negative M. V. N of studies Total Obs. Obs. % 
Obs. % Obs. % 
W. S. T. Dir.
78 1212517 786886 64.90 709875 90.21 77011 9.79 0.0000 P 
59 147802 112886 76.38 110082 97.52 2804 2.48 0.0000 P 
83 1053707 1005647 95.44 969573 96.41 36074 3.59 0.0000 P 
46 148755 138729 93.26 138693 99.97 36 0.03 0.0000 P 
F.A./T.A. 
266 2562781 2044148 79.76 1928223 94.33 115925 5.67 0.0000 P 
Market 129 1202462 1144376 95.17 1108266 96.84 36110 3.16 0.0000 P 
Book 137 1360319 899772 66.14 819957 91.13 79815 8.87 0.0000 P 
TD 161 2266224 1792533 79.10 1679448 93.69 113085 6.31 0.0000 P 
LTD 105 296557 251615 84.85 248775 98.87 2840 1.13 0.0000 P 
Overall 266 2562781 2044148 79.76 1928223 94.33 115925 5.67 0.0000 P 
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Further, the results suggest that the measures and the definitions of debt ratio 
used in the studies have a moderating effect on tangibility and leverage 
relationship. As observed in size, it seems that studies using debt based on 
market value compared to those using debt based on book value have more 
power in explaining the hypothesised positive relationship between tangibility 
and debt. The debt based on market value with 95.17% of the total results are 
significant of which 96.84% are positive compared to 66.14% and 91.13% 
respectively observed in the debt based on book value. 
Contrary to observed in size, studies using long-term debt ratio compared to 
those using total debt ratio have more power in explaining the hypothesised 
positive relationship with 98.87% compared to 93.69% as a percentage of the 
total significant results. However, this is not surprising as long-term debt is 
usually secured against fixed assets. It seems that the differences in the results 
are driven by the observed relationship between total (row 1) and long-term 
debt (row 2) defined by book value and tangibility ratio as they show the 
lowest percentage of overall significant results with 64.90% and 76.38% 
respectively. Nevertheless, weighted Stouffer test show that all results are 
significant at 1% level though variation in term of percentage is observed.  
This leads one to conclude that the overall and the moderator variables 
support the positive relationship between tangibility and debt levels. This in 
turn lends strong support to Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) argument that firms 
with high level of fixed assets would have higher level of debt as fixed assets 
improved guarantee of repayment to the lenders but contradict the tax-based 
hypothesis of DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) that suggests negative influence.  
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3.3.3 Profitability  
It has been seen earlier that there are no consistent theoretical predictions on 
the influence of profitability on firm’s capital structure. Generally, earnings 
before interest, tax, and depreciation (EBITD) scaled by either total assets 
(Return on Assets: ROA) or by total sales (Return on Sales: ROS) are used to 
capture the effect of profitability on leverage ratios.  
The overall percentage of significance demonstrates that a strong relationship 
exists between profitability and leverage. Consistent with pecking order 
hypothesis, weighted Stouffer test further shows that the overall direction of 
this relation is significantly negative. Table 3.6 (final row) shows that 85.64% 
of the total results are significant of which 99.81% is negative and only 0.19% 
are positive. Moreover, the results of the weighted Stouffer test produce 
significance negative association between debt ratio and the profitability 
attribute at the 1% level in all samples. The observed negative relationship, 
however, varies due to the influence of the suggested moderator variables.  
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In general, the results show that the ROS as a proxy for profitability has 
relatively more explanatory power than the ROA in capturing the effect of this 
relationship. Also, when debt is classified into market and book values, it 
seems that studies using debt based on market value compared to those using 
debt based on book value have more power in explaining the hypothesised 
negative relationship between profitability and debt. Moreover, studies using 
total debt ratio compared to those using long-term debt ratio have more power 
in explaining the hypothesised negative relationship between profitability and 
debt.  
It is noteworthy that though the lowest percentage of the significant results is 
observed between the debts levels defined by book value and the ROS proxy 
Table 3.6: Meta-analysis results of Profitability attribute. 
Significant 
Positive Negative M. V. N of studies 
Total 
Obs. Obs. % 
Obs. % Obs. % 
W. S. T. Dir.
123 1301973 936620 71.94 0 0.00 936620 100.0 -0.0000 N 
109 146070 130703 89.48 2202 1.68 128501 98.32 -0.0000 N 
141 1154492 1134145 98.24 0 0.00 1134145 100.0 -0.0000 N 
76 143736 136879 95.23 0 0.00 136879 100.0 -0.0000 N 
ROA 
449 2746271 2338347 85.15 2202 0.09 2336145 99.91 -0.0000 N 
3 2369 1233 52.05 0 0.00 1233 100 -0.0034 N 
3 2280 1136 49.82 0 0.00 1136 100 -0.0001 N 
50 136108 131381 96.53 2602 1.98 128779 98.02 -0.0000 N 
6 5500 5179 94.16 0 0.00 5179 100 -0.0000 N 
ROS 
62 146257 138929 94.99 2602 1.87 136327 98.13 -0.0000 N 
Market 273 1439836 1407584 97.76 2602 0.18 1404982 99.82 -0.0000 N 
Book 238 1452692 1069692 73.64 2202 0.21 1067490 99.79 -0.0000 N 
TD 317 2594942 2203379 84.91 2602 0.12 2200777 99.88 -0.0000 N 
LTD 194 297586 273897 92.04 2202 0.80 271695 99.20 -0.0000 N 
Overall 511 2892528 2477276 85.64 4804 0.19 2472472 99.81 -0.0000 N 
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(about half), the weighted Stouffer test still produces a significant negative 
relationship at 1% level of significance. For total debt (row 6), the observed 
highly significant result is due to two of the three studies with sample sizes of 
558 and 675 observations showing significant negative relationship with Z 
values (–3.28) and  (-4.77) respectively. The third study, with sample size of 
1136, shows an insignificant positive relationship with Z value (1.02). Since 
the weighted Stouffer procedure includes associated Z values in the 
calculation process, multiplying the Z value by the degree of freedom 
associated with each study produce overall negative results and highly 
significant (-0.0034). In the long-term debt ratio (row 7), however, the 
observed highly significant results seems to be driven by the results of all the 
three studies included in the sample as they all show negative direction. 
However, the study with the largest sample (1136 observations) is found 
highly significant with Z value (-3.29) and the other two studies with samples 
of (469 and 675 observations) are insignificant with Z values (-0.90 and –1.42 
respectively).  
In summary, consistent with the pecking order hypothesis, both the overall 
and the moderator variables results reveal that profitability has strong negative 
influence on leverage. This in turn provides strong support to the pecking 
order hypothesis but contradicts trade off theory. 
3.3.4 Risk 
The theoretical literature suggests an inverse relationship between debt ratios 
and risk. To capture the influence of risk on debt levels, most empirical 
studies use firm’s earnings volatility but a few uses the systematic risk of the 
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firms (β). Table 3.7 (final row) shows that 67.08% of the total results are 
significant of which 85.27% is negative and significant at 1%. This suggests 
that the overall relationship between risk and debt levels seems to be a 
moderate negative relationship but the weighted Stouffer test shows that the 
overall direction of this relation is significantly negative.  
It seems that the relatively low percentage of significant results observed in 
earnings volatility proxies (66.53%) reduce the overall explanatory power of 
risk attribute. However, conclusion about the low percentage of significance 
results observed in this proxy is ambiguous. The table shows that the 
influence of the moderator variables is very strong in this particular 
relationship. While only 10 studies employed firm’s β as a proxy for risk, the 
explanatory power of this proxy in capturing the influence of risk on leverage 
is apparently higher than earnings variability proxy.  
Table 3.7: Meta-analysis results of risk attribute.  
Significant 
Positive Negative M. V. N of studies 
Total 
Obs. Obs. % 
Obs. % Obs. % 
W. S. T. Dir.
54 217096 125812 57.95 11734 9.33 114078 90.67 -0.0000 N 
85 48829 17624 36.09 7158 40.62 10466 59.38 -0.0254 N 
36 296709 235248 79.29 37453 15.92 197795 84.08 -0.0000 N 
78 35064 18986 54.15 3035 15.99 15951 84.01 -0.0000 N 
Earnings 
Volatility 
 
253 597698 397670 66.53 59380 14.93 338290 85.07 -0.0000 N 
3 2177 1932 88.75 0 0.00 1932 100 -0.0000 N 
3 2560 1449 56.60 0 0.00 1449 100.00 -0.0001 N 
2 2691 2691 100 0 0.00 2691 100.00 -0.0000 N 
2 6654 6654 100 1056 15.87 5598 84.13 -0.0000 N 
β 
10 14082 12726 90.37 1056 8.30 11670 91.70 -0.0000 N 
Market 118 341118 263579 77.27 41544 15.76 222035 84.24 -0.0000 N 
Book 145 270662 146817 54.24 18892 12.87 127925 87.13 -0.0000 N 
TD 95 518673 365683 70.50 49187 13.45 316496 86.55 -0.0000 N 
LTD 168 93107 44713 48.02 11249 25.16 33464 74.84 -0.0000 N 
Overall 262 611780 410396 67.08 60436 14.73 349960 85.27 -0.0000 N 
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Moreover, though both of them have high weighted Stouffer test significant 
level (1%), the results show that debt based on book value (row 12) with 
87.13% percentage of significance and total debt ratio (row 13) with 86.55% 
percentage of significance has more power in explaining the hypothesised 
negative relationship than debt based on market value (row 11) with 84.24% 
and long-term debt ratio (row 14) with 74.84% respectively. Apparently, these 
results are mainly driven by the results of total debt ratio based on book value 
in earnings variability proxy. The percentage of significance observed in long-
term debt ratio based on book value in earnings variability proxy (row 2) with 
only 36.09% also seem to drive overall of the percentage of significance 
(48.02%) of long-term debt ratio (row 14). 
As observed in assets proxy as measure of size, it seems the observed 
moderate significant weighted Stouffer test (0.0245) that is associated with 
low percentage of significance (36.09%) in long-term debt ratio based on 
book value is driven by that more than half of the studies (i.e. 49 studies with 
total 30347 observations), which in turn constitutes about 60% of the total 
sample observations, show negative direction regardless to significant level.  
In summary, consistent with theory, the weighted Stouffer tests show that risk 
is significantly inversely correlated with debt ratios. However, it is found that 
the strength of this inverse relationship is varying among the hypothesised 
moderator variables in which firm’s (β) as proxy for risk has the highest 
power in explaining this relationship.  
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3.3.5 Tax 
Since there are two main arguments regarding tax issue, the finding of 
previous work associated with each argument is investigated separately.  
3.3.5.1 Effective tax rate 
Theoretically, a positive relationship between effective tax rate and debt ratio 
is expected due to interest deductibility. Generally, the effective tax rate (tax 
charge / profit before tax) is used to capture this relationship. The overall 
percentage of significance demonstrates that the relationship between tax rate 
and debt levels seems to be an undetermined relationship mainly due to the 
split in the significant results between the positive and the negative direction 
as will as the relatively high percentage of insignificant results observed. 
Moreover, weighted Stouffer test show that the overall direction of this 
relation is positive but insignificant. Error! Reference source not found. 
(final row) shows that 66.33% of the total observations are significant of 
which is 45.22% positive and 54.78% is negative. This result combined with 
associated insignificant meta-analysis results provides support to Graham et al 
(1998) argument that corporate tax is endogenous to financing decisions, 
which induce a spurious association between debt ratios and MTR. According 
to Graham et al’s argument, studies that found positive relationship suggests 
that these studies use after financing ‘ marginal tax rate while studies that 
found negative relationship suggests that these studies include the interest 
expense in the marginal tax rate computation.  
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The moderator variables also show conflicting results. The suggested positive 
relationship is only found significantly with debt based on market value and 
insignificantly with total debt. On the other hand, the debt based on book 
value and long-term debt results both show significantly an inverse 
relationship.  
In summary, both the weighted Stouffer tests and the percentage of 
significance of overall and the moderator variables results show insignificant 
and conflicting results. These, in turn, raise the concern about the importance 
of the tax benefits of debt as determinant of capital structure.   
3.3.6 NDTS 
Theoretically, non-debt tax shields substitute for the tax benefits of debt and, 
thus, an inverse relationship is expected between NDTS and leverage. 
Empirically, the overall association between NDTS and leverage seems to be 
a moderate negative relationship. Table 3.9 (final row) shows that about 
Table 3.8: Meta-analysis results of Effective tax rate. 
Significant 
Positive Negative M.V. 
N of 
studies 
Total 
Obs. Obs. % 
Obs. % Obs. % 
W. S. T. Dir. 
38 343629 244917 71.27 18706 7.64 226211 92.36 -0.0000 N 
68 102610 58049 56.57 3049 5.25 55000 94.75 -0.0000 N 
23 307009 224682 73.18 214851 95.62 9831 4.37 0.0000 P 
61 64094 14704 22.94 8662 58.91 6042 41.09 0.2494 Ins. P
Effective 
Tax rate 
190 817342 542352 66.33 245268 45.22 297084 54.78 0.4951 Ins. P
Market 84 371103 239386 64.51 223513 93.37 15873 6.63 0.0000 P 
Book 106 446239 302966 67.89 21755 7.18 281211 92.82 -0.0000 N 
TD 61 650638 469599 72.18 233557 49.74 236042 50.26 0.1495 Ins. P
LTD 129 166704 72753 43.64 11711 16.10 61042 83.90 -0.0000 N 
Overall 190 817342 542352 66.33 245268 45.22 297084 54.78 0.4951 Ins. P
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86.71% of the total results are significant of which is 75.71% negative and 
24.29% is positive. Moreover, the weighted Stouffer test shows that the 
overall direction of this relation is significantly negative.  
 
 
 
 
Table 3.9: Meta-analysis results of NDTS. 
Significant 
Positive Negative M.V. 
N of 
studies 
Total 
Obs. Obs. % 
Obs. % Obs. % 
W. S. T. Dir. 
46 360453 285922 79.32 175832 61.50 110090 38.50 0.0146 P 
28 47627 39037 81.96 2032 5.21 37005 94.79 -0.0000 N 
38 438305 405542 92.53 20251 4.99 385291 92.53 -0.0000 N 
38 141250 125907 89.14 9942 7.90 115965 92.10 -0.0000 N 
NDTS 
150 987635 856408 86.71 208057 24.29 648351 75.71 -0.0000 N 
Market 76 579555 531449 91.70 30193 5.68 501256 94.32 -0.0000 N 
Book 74 408080 324959 79.63 177864 54.73 147095 45.27 0.2474 Ins. P
TD 84 798758 691464 86.57 196083 28.36 495381 71.64 -0.0000 N 
LTD 66 188877 164944 87.33 11974 7.26 152970 92.74 -0.0000 N 
Overall 150 987635 856408 86.71 208057 24.29 648351 75.71 -0.0000 N 
 
The moderator variables, however, show conflicting results, in particular, the 
debt’s based value definition. While the suggested negative relationship is 
significantly observed with market based-value debt (row 6), an insignificant 
positive relationship is found when debt is defined based on book value (row 
7). This results is mainly driven by the significant positive relationship exists 
between NDTS and book based total debt. On the other hand, the second 
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moderator variable results, measurement of debt ratio, show that both total 
debt and long-term have significant negative association with NDTS. 
In summary, the overall results of weighted Stouffer tests reveal that NDTS is 
significantly negatively correlated with debt ratio. However, driven by the 
variation and sometimes conflicting results observed in the hypothesised 
moderating variables, the percentage of significance results show that the 
strength of this relationship is moderate negative.  
3.3.7 Growth 
Both the trade-off and the pecking order hypothesis suggest a negative 
relationship between growth and debt. Commonly, the market to book ratio is 
used to proxy for growth opportunities. To a lesser extent, growth in sales and 
growth in assets are also used to capture the effect of growth on leverage. 
However, as observed in earnings volatility, the time period used in these two 
proxies to capture the effect of growth vary among studies included in the 
sample, which is not considered here. Accordingly, the conflicting results 
obtained by these proxies also should be interpreted with caution. 
Consistent with agency theory, the overall association between growth and 
leverage seems to be strong negative relationship. Table 3.10 (final row) 
shows that about 80% of the total results are significant of which is 92.82% 
negative and 7.18% is positive. Moreover, weighted Stouffer test show that 
the overall direction of this relation is significantly negative. However, the 
result suggests that the type of proxy used has a moderating effect on growth 
and leverage relationship. Indeed, the overall results of the relationship 
between market-to-book ratio and debt (row 15) show strong significant 
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negative relationship. However, the variation in the strength of this negative 
relationship is observed among the hypothesised moderating variables in 
which the relationship is found negative but insignificant in book-based long-
term debt. The split in the significant results between positive and negative 
directions seems to be the reason of obtaining insignificant weighted Stouffer 
test.  
 
For growth in assets and growth in sales proxies, the table shows conflicting 
results. It is found that growth in assets (row 10) demonstrates overall 
Table 3.10: Meta-analysis results of growth attribute.  
Significant 
Positive Negative M. V. 
N of 
studies 
Total 
Obs. Obs. % 
Obs. % Obs. % 
W. S. T. Dir. 
34 128742 47121 36.60 30808 65.38 16313 34.62 0.0262 P 
25 45475 11753 25.84 10268 87.36 1485 12.64 0.0000 P 
3 1563 951 60.84 764 80.34 187 19.66 0.0006 P 
1 5598 5598 100 0 0.00 5598 100.00 Na N 
Sales 
63 181378 65423 36.07 41840 63.95 23583 36.05 0.0001 P 
20 58836 46068 78.30 13546 29.40 32522 70.60 -0.0019 N 
15 15600 8564 54.90 7889 92.12 675 7.88 0.0000 P 
15 20964 12631 60.25 3009 23.82 9622 76.18 -0.0432 N 
10 7032 5632 80.09 3443 61.13 2189 38.87 0.0768 P 
Assets 
60 102432 72895 71.16 27887 38.26 45008 61.74 -0.0000 N 
72 733660 610793 83.25 52848 8.65 557945 91.35 -0.0000 N 
71 70675 23497 33.25 11008 46.85 12489 53.15 -0.3246 Ins. N
133 1088911 961268 88.28 0 0.00 961268 100 -0.0000 N 
74 140358 127208 90.63 0 0.00 127208 100 -0.0000 N 
M/B 
350 2033604 1722766 84.71 63856 3.71 1658910 96.29 -0.0000 N 
Market 236 1264426 1113288 88.05 7216 0.65 1106072 99.35 -0.0000 N 
Book 237 1052988 7477778 71.01 126367 16.90 621429 83.10 -0.0000 N 
TD 277 2032676 1678832 82.59 100975 6.01 1577857 93.99 -0.0000 N 
LTD 196 284738 182234 64.00 32608 17.89 149644 82.12 -0.0352 N 
Overall 473 2317414 1861066 80.31 133583 7.18 1727501 92.82 -0.0000 N 
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moderate percentage of significance (71.16%) with relatively weak negative 
percentage of significance (61.74%) relationship but high significant weighted 
Stouffer test (1%). The significant positive relationship observed with long-
term debt ratios, which contradict the negative association between growth 
and long term-debt hypothesised by agency theory, appears to be the reason of 
observing such semi weak negative results. On the other hand, it is found that 
growth in sales (row 5) demonstrates a relatively weak positive percentage of 
significance (63.97%) and significant weighted Stouffer test at 1% level 
though overall very weak percentage of significance (36.06%) relationship is 
observed. It seems the observed high significant weighted Stouffer test 
(0.0001) that is associated with low percentage of significance (36.06%) in 
overall relationship between growth in sales and debt is driven by that more 
than half of the studies (i.e. 36 studies with total 130009 observations), which 
in turn constitutes about 72% of the total sample observations, show positive 
direction regardless to significant level.  
Moreover, the other suggested moderator variables provide support to the 
hypothesised inverse relationship but with variation in strength of which the 
explanatory power of market based-value debt is better than of book based-
value debt and total debt is out perform long-term debt. Clearly, these findings 
are mainly driven by the significant positive relationship observed in the 
growth of sales and assets and to less extent by the insignificant negative 
relationship found between book-based long-term debt and market-to-book 
ratio.  
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In summary, overall relationship reveals a strong negative relationship exists 
between growth and leverage, which is consistent with the prediction of 
agency theory. However, the differences in growth proxies used seem to have 
a moderating effect on this relationship in which conflicting results among 
these proxies were observed. The other moderator variables, on the other 
hand, show constantly the expected negative relationship but with variation in 
the strength. 
3.3.8 Uniqueness  
According to Titman’s (1984) argument, firms producing unique products 
would use less debt. Generally, Research & Development (R&D) and Selling 
& Administration (S&A) expenses are used as proxies for uniqueness. 
Empirically, the overall percentage of significance demonstrates that a strong 
relationship exists between uniqueness and leverage. Table 3.11 (final row) 
shows that weighted Stouffer test show the overall direction of this relation is 
significantly negative which is consistent with the prediction of Titman’s 
arguments.  
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Table 3.11: Meta-analysis results of uniqueness attribute. 
Significant 
Positive Negative M. V. N of studies 
Total 
Obs. Obs. % 
Obs. % Obs. % 
W. S. T. Dir.
27 390417 368812 94.47 10800 2.93 358012 97.07 -0.0000 N 
14 24676 14449 58.55 10800 74.75 3649 25.25 0.0280 P 
9 339575 339349 99.93 0 0.00 339349 100.0 -0.0000 N 
16 123687 118900 96.13 968 0.81 117932 99.19 -0.0000 N 
R&D 
66 878355 841510 95.81 22568 2.68 818942 97.32 -0.0000 N 
8 342963 314065 91.57 1747 0.56 312318 99.44 -0.0000 N 
6 7082 7082 100 3075 43.42 4007 56.58 -0.0895 N 
14 365219 362397 99.23 1021 0.28 361376 99.72 -0.0000 N 
Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na 
S&A 
Exp. 
28 715264 683544 95.57 5843 0.85 677701 99.15 -0.0000 N 
Market 39 828481 820646 99.05 1989 0.24 818657 99.76 -0.0000 N 
Book 55 765138 704408 92.06 26422 3.75 677986 96.25 -0.0000 N 
TD 58 1438174 1384623 96.28 13568 0.98 1371055 99.02 -0.0000 N 
LTD 36 155445 140431 90.34 14843 10.57 125588 89.43 -0.0000 N 
Overall 94 1593619 1525054 95.70 28411 1.86 1496643 98.14 -0.0000 N 
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The moderator variables results also provide support to the negative influence 
of uniqueness on leverage though both significant positive and weak 
significant negative relationship are observed in the relationship of book 
based-value long-term debt with R&D and S&A proxies respectively. 
It is noteworthy these results also provide support to the hypothesised 
negative relationship between debt and both NDTS and growth opportunities 
attributes that are discussed earlier. On one hand, the above observed negative 
relationship is consistent with NDTS argument since R&D and S&A are 
considered other tax shields like depreciation. On the other hand, if R&D and 
S&A are considered as intangible assets that add value to the firm but cannot 
be collateralised, then the above negative relationship is also lending support 
to growth opportunities argument. 
In summary, both the overall and the moderator variables results reveal that 
uniqueness has a strong negative influence on leverage, which is consistent 
with Titman’s (1984) argument. Moreover, this finding also lends support to 
the hypothesised negative relationship between debt and both NDTS and 
growth opportunities attributes. 
3.3.9 Dividend 
There is no consistent theoretical prediction on the influence of dividends on 
firm’s capital structure. Dividend payout and to less extent dividend yield are 
used in prior studies to capture the impact of dividends on the firm’s capital 
structure. The overall percentage of significance demonstrates that a strong 
relationship exists between dividends and leverage. However, contradictory to 
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the prediction of pecking order hypothesis, weighted Stouffer test show the 
overall direction of this relation is significantly negative. Table 3.12 (final 
row) shows that about 98% of the total results are significant of which is 
93.13% negative and 6.87% is positive. 
 
Table 3.12: Meta-analysis results of dividends attribute.  
Significant 
Positive Negative M. V. N of studies 
Total 
Obs. Obs. % 
Obs. % Obs. % 
W. S. T. Dir.
18 382822 379306 99.08 45175 11.91 334131 88.09 -0.0000 N 
10 15992 14265 89.20 371 2.60 13894 97.40 -0.0000 N 
11 368068 364559 99.05 1243 0.34 363316 99.66 -0.0000 N 
6 14255 9196 64.51 2490 27.08 6706 72.92 -0.0006 N 
Dividends 
payout 
45 781137 767326 98.23 49279 6.42 718047 93.58 -0.0000 N 
1 245 245 100 245 100 0 0.00 Na P 
1 55 55 100 0 0.00 55 100 Na N 
Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na 
6 7128 3476 48.77 3476 100 0 0.00 0.0000 P 
Dividends 
yield 
8 7428 3776 50.83 3721 98.54 55 1.46 0.0000 P 
Market 23 389451 377231 96.86 7209 1.91 370022 98.09 -0.0000 N 
Book 30 399114 393871 98.69 45791 11.63 348080 88.37 -0.0000 N 
TD 30 751135 744110 99.06 46663 6.27 697447 93.73 -0.0000 N 
LTD 23 37430 26992 72.11 6337 23.48 20655 76.52 -0.0000 N 
Overall 53 788565 771102 97.79 53000 6.87 718102 93.13 -0.0000 N 
 
As the number of studies that are employing dividend yield as proxy for 
dividends attribute is limited (8 studies), it is unreliable to compare its results 
with dividend payout ratio results and draw a fair conclusion. However, the 
overall results of the dividend yield proxy suggest a positive influence on debt 
ratio, which is consistent with pecking order hypothesis. On the other hand, 
the dividend payout proxy results show overall strong significant negative 
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correlation debt but with some variation in the strength of the relationship 
among debt measures and definitions with the relationship in the market-
based long-term debt being the lowest. 
The suggested moderator variables based on debt measurements and 
definitions provide support to the hypothesised inverse relationship but with 
some variation in the strength of which the explanatory power of book based-
value debt is relatively better market based-value debt and total debt is 
considerably out perform long-term debt. 
In summary, the overall relationship reveals a strong negative relationship 
exists between dividends and leverage. However, the moderator variables 
based on debt measurements and definitions show constantly the expected 
negative relationship but with variation in the strength. These results, 
therefore, are inconsistent with pecking order hypothesis. Although limited 
numbers of studies are using it, dividend yield, as proxy for dividends, seems 
to be positively correlated with debt ratio, which in turn lends some support to 
pecking order hypothesis. 
3.3.10  Free cash flow 
Again, there is no consistent theoretical prediction on the influence of free 
cash flow on firm’s capital structure. Empirically, the overall percentage of 
significance demonstrates a strong relationship exists between free cash flow 
and leverage. However, weighted Stouffer test show that the overall direction 
of this relationship is significant negative relationship. Table 3.13 (final row) 
shows that about 85.4% of the total sample is significant. However, 78.5% of 
the significant results are negative and significant at the 1% level.  
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Table 3.13: Meta-analysis results of free cash flow attribute. 
Significant 
Positive Negative M. V. N of studies 
Total 
Obs. Obs. % 
Obs. % Obs. % 
W. S. T. Dir.
7 21633 21465 99.22 6325 29.47 15140 70.53 -0.0097 N 
5 8340 6821 81.79 6231 91.35 590 8.65 0.0017 P 
16 37252 34405 92.36 92 0.27 34313 99.73 -0.0000 N 
9 10333 3568 34.53 1584 44.39 1984 55.61 -0.0861 N 
Free cash 
flow 
37 77558 66259 85.43 14232 21.48 52027 78.52 -0.0000 N 
Market 25 47585 37973 79.80 1676 4.41 36297 95.59 -0.0000 N 
Book 12 29973 28286 94.37 12556 44.39 15730 55.61 -0.0159 N 
TD 23 58885 55870 94.88 6417 11.49 49453 88.51 -0.0000 N 
LTD 14 18673 10389 55.64 7815 75.22 2574 24.78 0.0286 P 
Overall 37 77558 66259 85.43 14232 21.48 52027 78.52 -0.0000 N 
 
The moderator variable analysis shows conflicting results. Based on 
measurement of debt, a significant negative relationship is obtained by using 
total debt while a significant positive association is observed by employing 
long-tem debt. On the other hand, the results of based-value moderator 
variable reveals an inverse relationship but with variation in strength. The 
explanatory power of the debt market based-value appears to be higher than of 
the debt book based-value due to the split in the significant results between 
positive and negative direction in the debt book based-value.  
In summary, the overall relationship reveals a moderate negative relationship, 
which lends a moderate support to pecking order hypothesis. However, the 
findings of the moderator variables show conflicting results in specific debt-
measurement moderator variable. 
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3.3.11  Liquidity 
Theoretically, the influence of liquidity on firm’s capital structure is expected 
to be negative. The current ratio is commonly used to capture the effect of 
liquidity on leverage. Empirically, Table 3.14 (column 5) weighted Stouffer 
test produces high significant negative relationship between liquidity and 
leverage though the overall percentage of significant results associated with 
this relationship seems to be relatively weak.  
Table 3.14: Meta-analysis results of liquidity attribute. 
Significant 
Positive Negative M. V. N of studies TotalObs. Obs. % 
Obs. % Obs. % 
W. S. T. Dir.
13 58400 37189 63.68 0 0.00 37189 100.0 -0.0000 N 
51 17066 12168 71.30 423 3.48 11745 96.52 -0.0000 N 
Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na 
55 15253 9540 62.55 97 1.02 9443 98.98 -0.0000 N 
Current 
ratio 
119 90719 58897 64.92 520 0.88 58377 99.12 -0.0000 N 
Market 55 15253 9540 62.55 97 1.02 9443 98.98 -0.0000 N 
Book 64 75466 49357 65.40 423 0.86 48934 99.14 -0.0000 N 
TD 13 58400 37189 63.68 0 0.00 37189 100 -0.0000 N 
LTD 106 32319 21708 67.17 520 2.40 21188 97.60 -0.0000 N 
Overall 119 90719 58897 64.92 520 0.88 58377 99.12 -0.0000 N 
 
The final row shows that about 65% of the total sample is significant. 
However, 99.12% of the significant results are negative and only 0.88% is 
positive.  
Moreover, meta-analysis results show that this negative relationship is 
significant at the 1% level. Similarly, the moderator variable analysis shows 
consistent negative direction and significant at the 1% level. 
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In summary, both the overall and the moderator variables results show a 
relatively weak negative relationship exists between liquidity and leverage. 
This, in turn, lends support to the pecking order hypothesis.  
3.3.12  Age  
Theoretically, the influence of age on firm’s capital structure is also 
ambiguous. Usually, the number of years since the firm’s foundation is the 
proxy used to capture the effect of age on leverage. Empirically, the overall 
percentage of significance demonstrates a strong relationship. Moreover, 
weighted Stouffer test produce overall high significant positive relationship 
between age and leverage. Table 3.15 (final row) shows that about 94% of the 
total sample is significant of which 76.84% of the significant results are 
positive and significant at the 1% level. 
Table 3.15: Meta-analysis results of age attribute. 
Significant 
Positive Negative M. V. 
N of 
studies 
Total 
Obs. Obs. % 
Obs. % Obs. % 
W. S. T. Dir.
19 477232 448876 94.06 357809 79.71 91067 20.29 0.0000 P 
12 22902 19190 85.98 500 2.54 18690 97.46 -0.0000 N 
5 6045 5775 95.53 5775 100.0 0 0.00 0.0000 P 
Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na Na
# Of years 
since 
established 
36 506179 473841 93.61 364084 76.84 109757 23.16 0.0000 P 
Market 5 6045 5775 95.53 5775 100.0 0 0.00 0.0000 P 
Book 31 500134 468066 93.59 358309 76.55 109757 23.45 0.0000 P 
TD 24 483277 454651 94.08 363584 79.97 91067 20.03 0.0000 P 
LTD 12 22902 19190 85.98 500 2.54 18690 97.46 -0.0000 N 
Overall 36 506179 473841 93.61 364084 76.84 109757 23.16 0.0000 P 
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However, the moderator variable analysis shows conflicting results. Based on 
measurement of debt, a significant positive relationship is obtained with total 
debt (row 8) while a significant negative association is observed with long-
tem debt (row 9). On the other hand, the results of based-value moderator 
variable reveals a positive relationship with the explanatory power of the debt 
market based-value being higher than of that of debt book based-value.  
In summary, overall relationship reveals a moderate positive relationship 
exists between age and leverage. However, the findings of the moderator 
variables show conflicting results in specific debt-measurement moderator 
variable. 
3.3.13  Government 
Similar to some of the above determinants, there is no consistent theoretical 
prediction on the impact of the government as a large shareholder on leverage. 
Studies included in the sample are mostly using dummy variable to capture 
the effect of the existence of government as a shareholder on firm’s capital 
structure. However, one study uses the actual percentage of outstanding shares 
held by the government as proxy of this attribute. Therefore, such differences 
are not considered in this analysis as both proxies are potentially using the 
same data as well as only one study is using the actual percentage.  
Empirically, the weighted Stouffer test produces high significant negative 
relationship between government and leverage though the overall percentage 
of significance associated with this relationship seems to be relatively weak. 
Table 3.16 (final row) shows that about 64.88% of the total sample is 
significant of which 89.34% are negative and significant at the 1% level.  
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Table 3.16: Meta-analysis results of government attribute. 
Significant 
Positive Negative M. V. N of studies 
Total
Obs. Obs. % 
Obs. % Obs. % 
W. S. T. Dir.
10 23254 19486 83.80 2570 13.19 16916 86.81 -0.0000 N 
7 10483 6985 66.63 0 0.00 6985 100.0 -0.0000 N 
6 4024 281 6.98 281 100 0 0.00 -0.4554 N 
4 3473 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 -0.2295 N 
Shares 
 held by 
Government 
27 41234 26752 64.88 2851 10.66 23901 89.34 -0.0000 N 
Market 10 7497 281 3.75 281 100 0 0.00 -0.2784 N 
Book 17 33737 26471 78.46 2570 9.71 23901 90.29 -0.0000 N 
TD 16 27278 19767 72.46 2851 14.42 16916 85.58 -0.0000 N 
LTD 11 13956 6985 50.05 0 0.00 6985 100.0 -0.0000 N 
Overall 27 41234 26752 64.88 2851 10.66 23901 89.34 -0.0000 N 
The analysis reveals that the results of both long-term and total debt ratios 
based on market value appears to be responsible of observing the weak 
percentage of significance as they show considerably low percentage of 
significance and insignificant weighted Stouffer results. Moreover, it seems 
that studies using total debt ratio compared to those using long-term debt ratio 
have higher percentage of significance but lower negative percentage level.  
Nevertheless, this observed negative results contradict signalling theory 
argued by Leland and Pyle (1977) and part of agency theory, in particular, 
conflicts between management and shareholders (debt benefits) argued by 
Jensen (1986). The results, however, are lending support to the other part of 
agency theory, in particular, conflicts between shareholders and lenders (debt 
costs) argued by Myers (1977).  
In summary, both the overall and the moderator variables results confirm a 
weak negative relationship exists between government attribute and leverage.  
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3.4 Conclusion  
This chapter presented an alternative methodology that overcomes the 
deficiency of the traditional narrative reviews. Given the large number of 
empirical studies, a meta-analysis procedure seems to be an appropriate 
technique for synthesising scientifically the finding of these studies since it 
has proved its value in other areas. It is found that tax, growth, uniqueness, 
dividends, risk, free cash flow, liquidity, government and age attributes appear 
to be very sensitive to measurement of both leverage and the explanatory 
variables. On the other hand, the analysis shows that size, tangibility, and 
profitability have consistent direction and strong relationship regardless to the 
measurement issue 
Based on the theoretical and empirical evidence discussed in the previous and 
current chapters, this dissertation is intended to extend previous research by 
providing fresh evidence about the determinant of listed and unlisted 
companies in Saudi Arabia, a country in which culture and institutional 
factors are different from those in which the theories were developed. This, in 
turn, will provide further evidence on the significance of institutional 
differences that are argued to have an impact on capital structure 
determinants.    
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4.1 Introduction 
Previous cross-country studies have asserted that institutional arrangements 
are significant determinants of capital structure. Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
examined whether the capital structure in the G-7 countries is related to 
factors similar to those that influence the capital structure of US firms. They 
found that although firms have a fairly similar capital structure across the G-7 
countries, there were several institutional characteristics that affect capital 
structure choice. Booth et al. (2001) investigated whether capital structure 
theory is portable across the developing countries with different institutional 
structures. They found that although debt ratios appeared to be affected by the 
same variables as in developed countries, there were systematic differences in 
way these ratios were affected by country factors. Barakat and Rao (2004) 
investigated the role of taxes in the capital structure of 12 Arab countries. 
They obtained empirical results that support the significance of the 
institutional differences on capital structure decisions. Recently, De Jong et al. 
(2007) investigate the importance of firm-specific and country-specific factors 
in explaining the leverage choice of firms from 42 countries around the world. 
They found that legal environment and economic conditions affect directly 
and indirectly the country’s firm financing choice. 
In summary, all these studies have demonstrated the significant influence of 
the institutional characteristics on financing decision of the firm. Saudi Arabia 
is an Arab Islamic country. Officially, it is governed by the Islamic Law 
(Shari’ah), which is derived from the holy book of Islam (Qur’an) and the 
prophetic guidance (Sunnah). Therefore, the country has some socio-cultural 
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and economic implications that may affect capital structure choice. The aim of 
this chapter is to describe in details the institutional characteristics and socio-
cultural factors that are expected to have influence on the determinants of the 
capital structure of Saudi companies.  
4.2   Central bank 
According to Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA) official web sit 
(www.sama.gov.sa), the top of Saudi Arabia’s financial system is SAMA, the 
central bank of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Since Its establishment in 1952, 
SAMA’s functions as defined by its charter issued in 1952 and amended in 
1957 include the following: 
Issuing and strengthening the Saudi currency and stabilising its internal and   
external value; 
Dealing with the banking affairs of the government; and  
Regulating commercial banks. 
The monetary policy in Saudi Arabia is set to maintain a stable financial 
environment in terms of low inflation and a fixed exchange rate. To this end 
the Saudi Riyal (SAR) has been effectively pegged to the American Dollar at 
SAR 3.75 per U.S. Dollar since 1986. Beside vast state revenues from oil, 
SAMA’s close monitoring of the exchange rate of Riyal has contributed to 
maintaining the stability of this rate. Exchange rate stability constitutes an 
intermediate target of the monetary policy of the Kingdom for achieving the 
ultimate goal of preserving domestic price stability. 
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 In order to achieve the ultimate goal for its monetary policy, SAMA uses a 
range of traditional and modern monetary instruments. These include the 
statutory reserve requirement on bank deposits, liquidity ratio, and deposit 
limits, prudent restrictions on advances and loans, government development 
bonds, treasury bills and floating rate notes and foreign exchange swap 
transactions. The Kingdom’s monetary policy has succeeded remarkably in 
maintaining the stability of the Riyal’s exchange rate and domestic prices over 
a prolonged period of time. As mentioned earlier, Riyal’s parity with the U.S. 
dollar has remained unchanged since 1986, and the inflation has recorded an 
average rise of only 0.1 percent over the last 20 years (Al-Sayari, 2003).  
As set out in its charter, SAMA’s main objectives include supervision of 
commercial banks. The Banking Control Law was issued in 1966 under a 
royal decree. This legislation has vested SAMA with large powers to carry out 
actions believed appropriate to maintain the consistency of commercial banks 
and ensure their financial solvency. According to SAMA Governor, SAMA 
supervises commercial banks in accordance with the latest internationally 
applied standards and practices, such as the Basel Committee’s Core 
Principles of Effective Banking Supervision, International Accounting 
Standards (IAS), the best practices of disclosure, and recommendations of the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF). 
 To facilitate its monitoring and supervision procedures, SAMA, in 
cooperation with commercial banks, has introduced advanced and 
comprehensive electronic payment systems. These include the Automated 
Check Clearing Houses, the Saudi Payments Network (SPAN), Points of Sale 
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(POS) terminals, the Saudi Arabian Riyal Interbank Express (SARIE). 
Moreover, SAMA introduced the Electronic Share Information System (ESIS) 
that has been replaced by a more comprehensive and modern system, called 
(TADAWUL), to supervise and monitor the Saudi Stock Market (SSM).  
4.3 Banking system   
According to Saudi British Bank (2003), the history of banks in Saudi Arabia 
backs to 1926 when the Dutch Trading Company (presently the foreign 
partner of the Saudi Hollani Bank) was established as the first bank to operate 
in the Kingdom. The Company operated through a representative office in 
Jeddah to serve pilgrims arriving from Indonesia. The bank, as the only 
financial institution operating in the Kingdom, played the role of a Central 
Bank and acted as depository for the Kingdom’s gold reserves. The first oil 
related operations were conducted through the bank. The second entry to the 
banking sector came in 1948 with the French Indochine Bank setting up a 
branch in Jeddah. The bank later merged with Suez Company to form the 
Indo-Suez Bank, which is presently the foreign partner of Banque Saudi 
Fransi.  
Established in 1950, the National Commercial Bank (NCB) was the first 
entirely Saudi bank in the kingdom. The bank operated as a partnership until 
1997 when it was converted to a joint stock company. In 1999, the Public 
Investment Fund (PIF) acquired a 70% stake in NCB and the General 
Organization of Social Insurance (“GOSI”) acquired 10 percent, while a rich 
family (Bin Mahfuze that is the founder of the bank) holds the remaining 
shares. However, the shares of NCB are expected to be listed soon on the 
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Saudi stock market. The first bank to be established as a joint stock company 
was Riyad Bank in 1957 with 43% of its shares being held by the government 
through (PIF).  
Mergers in the sector began in 1997 with the Saudi-Cairo Bank merger with 
the Saudi United Bank. Later in 1999, the Saudi United Bank merged with the 
SAMBA financial group8. Moreover, year 2005 witnessed the listed new 
commercial Islamic bank (Bank Al Belad) as a result of the merger between 
currency exchangers (owned by families) operating in the country.  
The Saudi banks have significant weight in the Gulf and Middle East regions 
in terms of their total assets. Table 4.1 shows that total assets of banks, on 
average, constitutes 68.5% of the country GDP. 
As can be seen from the table, the banks have been able to achieve excellent 
growth rate in their assets over the period, with aggregate assets of the sector 
reaching SAR 655.4 billions at the end of year 2004, which represents an 
increase of 44.6% compared with 1999. 
                                                 
8 SAMBA is formerly Saudi American Bank, which is a joint venture between city bank 
(20%) and some Saudis rich families. However, in med of 2004, city bank sold its share to 
Saudi government represented by Saudi pension fund. 
Table 4.1: Total Assets of Saudi Banks (in billion SAR)  
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Total assets 453.3 472.4 508.2 545.2 655.4 
As % Of GDP 64.1% 68.8% 71.9% 67.8% 69.8% 
Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (www.SAMA.co.sa) 
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Currently, there are eleven banks in the Kingdom, of which ten are publicly 
listed. Table 4.2 shows the equity stakes (percent share) and the size of Saudi 
banks based on their total assets and total equities.  
Based on total assets, the Saudi banks can be classified into three categories:  
Large Banks: This group consists of all banks that have total assets and 
equity greater than 10% of the total sector. This includes the National 
Commercial Bank, SAMBA Financial Group, Riyad Bank and Al Rajhi 
Banking & Investment Corp.  
Medium Banks: This group consists of all banks that have total assets and 
equity range from 5-10% of the total sector. This includes Bank Al Saudi Al 
Table 4.2: Equity stakes and total assets & equity of banks as end of 2006 
Bank 
Total Assets
(Millions 
SAR) 
% 
Equity 
(Millions 
SAR) 
% GOV. J. S. Foreign Others
National 
Commercial Bank 
(unlisted) 
188,464 22% 23,999 21% 79.3% 0% 0% 20.7%
SAMBA Financial 
Group 124,015 14% 15,300 13% 43.9% 0% 0% 56.1%
Al Rajhi Banking & 
Investment Corp. 105,209 12% 20,179 17% 9.7% 0% 0% 90.3%
Riyad Bank 94,016 11% 11,992 10% 48.9% 0% 0% 51.1%
Banque Saudi 
Fransi 79,581 9% 9,405 8% 11.3% 0% 31.1% 57.6%
Arab National 
Bank 78,035 9% 7,980 7% 8.7% 0% 40% 51.3%
Saudi British Bank 77,189 9% 9,405 8% 8.6% 0% 40% 51.4%
Saudi Hollandi 
Bank 46,740 5% 4,258 4% 7.3% 0% 40% 52.7%
Saudi Investment 
Bank 40,845 5% 6,001 5% 35.9% 10% 7.5% 46.6%
Bank Al Jazira 15,713 2% 4,194 4% 0% 9% 5.8% 85.2%
Bank Al Belad 11,281 1% 3,024 3% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
Banking Sector 861,088 100% 115,737 100% 23% 2% 15% 60% 
Source: Bakheet Investment Group (www.bakheetgroup.com) 
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Fransi, the Saudi British Bank, Arab National Bank, the Saudi Hollandi Bank 
and Saudi Investment Bank. 
Small Banks: This group consists of all banks that have total assets and 
equity less than 5% of the total sector. This includes and Bank Al Jazira and 
Bank Al Belad. 
In general, the banking system appears to be concentrated. The top four banks 
hold a significant share of the total banks assets with 59%. Moreover, 
government ownership is relatively extensive, exceeding 30% in four banks 
and reaching 79% in one bank. Foreign bank participation is mainly through 
substantial equity positions as opposed to majority shareholdings. Four banks 
have foreign equity stakes of 31% or more.  
In Saudi Arabia, the banking system consists of both Islamic and conventional 
banking systems. In general, all Saudi banks are involved in Shari’ah-
compliant finance, but with different strategies. Al-Rajhi Banking and 
Investment Corporation and Bank Al Belad offer only Shari’ah-compliant 
products with the first being the worlds largest in that sector (IMF Country 
Report, 2006). In other banks, non-interest-bearing deposits are isolated from 
interest-bearing deposits and are intermediated through Shari’ah-compliant 
investments9. Moreover, all banks submit all new Shari’ah-compliant types of 
transactions to internal Shari’ah advisory boards in order to check their 
conformity with Islamic principles. 
                                                 
9 About 40 percent of deposits are non-interest-bearing, a key structural factor supporting the 
profitability of the banking sector (IMF Country Report, 2006). 
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The underlying principle of Islamic banks is that there can be no interest 
charged on any transaction or service, as interest is considered usury and is 
condemned by the Quran. The glorious Quran states:  Those who devour usury 
will not stand except as stands one whom the devil by his touch has driven to 
madness. That is because they say: Trade is like usury: but Allah has 
permitted trade and forbidden usury.... Allah will deprive usury of all 
blessing, but will give increase for deeds of charity, for He loves not any 
ungrateful sinner.... of your demand for usury, if you are indeed believers. If 
you do it not, take notice of war from Allah and His messenger, but if you 
repent you shall have your capital sums; deal not unjustly, and you shall not 
be dealt with unjustly. And if the debtor is in difficulty, grant him time till it is 
easy for him to repay. But if you remit it by way of charity, that is best for you 
if you only knew. [Surah al Baqarah, verse 275-280].  
However, interest is replaced by a share-out key determined in advance for a 
share of risks and profits among the borrower, the bank, and the productive 
capital (Barakat and Rao, 2004). There are a number of traditional shari’ah-
compliant financing products, which can be classified into two categories. 
Following provides very brief review of these instruments.  
A. Partnership Contracts 
In tolerating profits as opposed to interest, Islamic finance allows partnership 
contracts. There are two principal forms of partnership contracts in Islamic 
finance that also employ the principles of profit/loss sharing. These are:  
Mudaraba: This form of a contract is structured between the Rabb’ulmal (i.e. 
supplier of capital) and the entrepreneur who services it. One party supplies 
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the capital to a second entrepreneurial party (mudarib) for the procession of 
some trade on the condition that the resulting profits are distributed in 
mutually agreed proportions while all capital loss is borne on the provider of 
the capital. In case of loss, the entrepreneur bears the brunt of the opportunity 
cost of time and labour. 
Musharaka: The meaning of the Arabic word musharakah is derived from the 
word sharikah meaning partnership. A musharakah contract is very similar to 
the conventional sense of a partnership arrangement where the partners or 
shareholders use their capital through a joint venture, Limited Partnership, to 
generate a profit. However, profits or losses are split between the shareholders 
according to some agreed-on pre-determined formula depending on the 
investment ratio. 
B. Exchange Contracts 
Working capital financing is a keystone of every financial system. According 
to shari’ah, extended lines of credit that bear interest are not allowed. 
Consequently, other avenues of working capital financing are required and 
these are found in exchange contracts. Unlike partnership contracts, these 
types of contract do not entail partnership engagements.  
Price deferred sale: there are two type of price differed sale contract, namely, 
Murabaha and Bai’muajjal. In a Murabaha contracts, the buyer can seek for 
Rabb’ulmal or money provider (e.g. bank) that finances the purchase of an 
asset by buying it on behalf of her/him. Rabb’ulmal then adds a mark-up in its 
sale price to its client who pays for it on a deferred basis. It is deemed 
acceptable for good’s supplier to charge higher prices for deferred payments. 
 107 
Such transactions are regarded as trades and not loans. Financing on such a 
deferred payment basis is called Bai’muajjal.  
Goods Deferred Sale (Bai’salam):  A manufacturer seeks Bai’salam when 
he/she seeks to finance the production of goods he is financing. This involves 
the buyer to pay price in advance at a discount to the producer before the 
delivery time. This form of contract is very similar to the Bankers’ 
Acceptance financing in the conventional banking system (Barakat and Rao, 
2004). 
Ijara: The meaning of the Arabic word Ijarah is rent. It is an Islamic form of 
leasing. Here, the Rabb’ulmal (e.g. leasing company or bank) buys land, 
machinery or equipment such as aircrafts and ships and leases it out under 
instalment plans to end-users. As in Western leasing, there may be an option 
to buy the goods built into the contracts. The rental rates of returns on the 
contract can be both fixed and floating depending on the particular originator. 
The share of Shari’ah-compliant banking services and products has grown 
rapidly in recent years. To fill the gap, all Saudi commercial banks have 
engaged in two main Sharia-compliant products namely, Bai’salam and 
murabaha. At end-2003, Bai’salam constituted 46% of total Sharia-compliant 
banking sector assets while murabaha transactions accounted for 31% (IMF 
Country Report, 2006). However, most of the Shari’ah-compliant products are 
at the individual level. According to Barakat and Rao (2004), the National 
Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia reported in 2002 that 95% of their business 
was done with individuals to buy durable goods.  
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Generally, the banking sector in the Saudi Arabia is quite advanced and 
supported by a modern and efficient payment and settlement infrastructure. 
The capacity of sector to respond to macroeconomic shocks has been 
considerably strengthened over the past decade. According to an IMF Country 
Report (2006), the banking sector is robust to various credit, liquidity, and 
interest rate events. However, despite the overall robustness of the banking 
sector and its supporting infrastructure, the role of the banking sector in 
financing the private sector and meeting its credit needs remains relatively 
limited. Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that a good measure to determine the 
importance of the banking sector in financing firms is the ratio of bank claims 
on the private sector to the gross domestic product (GDP). Table 4.3 shows 
the total bank claims on the private sector from 2000 to 2004. On average, 
bank claims on the private sector amount to only 28.5% of GDP, exceeding 
30% in year 2004.  
 
If compared to the international data found in Rajan and Zingales (1995), the 
28.5% ratio is far below the 104.22%, 86.58%, 80.03%, 70.9%, 53.85%, and 
44.21% for Japan, Germany, France, United States, United Kingdom, and 
Canada respectively but close to 33.04% for Italy10. 
                                                 
10 The data extracted from table VII (page, 1448). 
Table 4.3: Bank claims on the private sector 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Bank Claims on the Private 
Sector  172.2 187.1 205.8 228.5 313.9 
As % Of GDP 24.4% 27.3% 29.1% 28.4% 33.4% 
Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (www.SAMA.co.sa) 
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Such weak role of the banking sector may reflect most banks’ conservative 
banking lending policy represented by the costly requirements. Indeed, for 
example, SAMBA Financial Group requirements for long-term debt are as 
follow:  
Partial financing of the project by the firm. 
Sufficient collateral assets at least to cover 100% of the value of the loan.  
Comprehensive study of the feasibility of the project showing the expected 
cash flow. 
The history of the firm including sales, other loans, tangible assets, past and 
expected growth, profitability and fixed costs the firm usually faces  
Such requirement would increase the cost of long-term debt and, thus, one 
would expect to observe low level of debt in general and long-term of debt in 
specific. Moreover, the conservative policy of banking is expected to be more 
in lending to small-middle enterprises (SMEs). Bevan and Danbolt (2002) 
argue that small companies are found to use the various short-term elements 
rather than long-term debt, which may indicate that they have difficulty 
accessing long-term borrowing. Therefore, such companies in turn would rely 
more on short-term debt as this term of debt does not require collateral assets. 
They may also rely more on trade credit, especially when such debt 
instrument is compliant with Shari’ah (Bai’muajjal). 
In light of these facts, one would expect a low level of interest-bearing debt in 
Saudi Arabia compared to other countries. Moreover, when firms use debt as 
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a source of funds, firms would employ more short-term than long-term debt 
due to costly requirements asked by banks.   
4.4 Capital Market 
In Saudi Arabia, the specialized financial institutes and brokerage houses do 
not exist. The capital market in Saudi Arabia consists of the bond and the 
stock markets. 
4.4.1.1 Saudi Stock Market (SSM) 
According to TADAWUL official web (www.tadawul.com.sa), during the 
1930’s, an official stock market began in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia when 
the first joint stock company- the Arab Automobile Company- issued shares. 
By the middle of the 1970’s, the total number of joint stock companies had 
risen to only fourteen, mainly concentrated in the cement and electricity 
sectors. In the late 1970s, the Saudi government decided to be more pro-active 
in developing the primary stock market by participating in the formation of 
many joint stock companies through the various secondary investment 
agencies that it had established- e.g. the Retirement Pensions Agency and the 
General Organization for Social Insurance. These agencies helped found 
several companies by supplying start-up capital (Basheikh A, 2002). Also, the 
Public Investment Fund invested a sizable portion of its capital in the 
formation of new joint companies. In the late 1970’s, the primary market 
witnessed tremendous growth when 19 new companies were offered to the 
public; this included a number of publicly held joint ventures banks that were 
owned by the public and major foreign institutions. They included Citibank 
(presently SAMBA Financial Group), British Bank of the Middle East 
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(presently Saudi British Bank), ABN-Amro (presently Saudi Holandi Bank), 
and Banque Indosuez (presently Saudi Faranci Bank). However, due to the 
lack of trading regulation at that time, stock trading was fairly limited.  
According to Basheikh A. (2002), in the early 1980’s, another jump in the 
development of the primary market took place in terms of the number of 
transaction and the marketability of securities when oil prices were increasing 
which in turn increased the government ability to finance many long-term 
development projects that were carried out by joint stock companies. 
Moreover, in 1984, the government decided to privatise 30 percent of the 
Saudi Basic Industrial Corporations (SABIC), which was valued at SAR 3 
billions. Therefore, the essential factor in the basic development the primary 
stock market in the kingdom has been government support.  
However, until the early of 1980’s, the market remained informally organized. 
In 1984, Royal Decree No. 1320/8 was approved and a combined ministerial 
committee including the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Commerce and 
the Governor of SAMA was formed to regulate and develop the Saudi Stock 
Market (SSM). The committee aimed to improve and develop the market by 
(i) encouraging Saudi investors to invest in the domestic economy in order to 
contribute to its growth, (ii) providing Saudi companies with a source of 
finance through the issue of securities, (iii) concentrating equity trading in a 
single market in which buy orders are matched so as to establish a fair price, 
(iv) providing an efficient market for the execution of all orders, supported by 
the latest electronics facilities, (vi) supplying efficient settlement and 
registration procedures which ensure the timely delivery of and payment for 
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security transactions and (vii) protecting investors and companies by the 
enforcement of effective equity market rules and procedures (SAMA, 1995). 
In order to accomplish these objectives, in April 1984, the ministerial 
committee issued new rules and regulations that included the following: (i) 
establishing of a share trading system through commercial banks; (ii) setting 
up a supervisory body for all securities trading; (iii) establishing a share 
control department (SCD) under the authority of SAMA and (iv) establishing 
a Saudi Share Registration Company (SSARC). 
In December 1984, SAMA established a share trading system to control and 
supervise the stock market. Commercial banks were to act as intermediaries in 
the purchase or sale shares on behalf of their clients; they were not allowed to 
buy or sell shares for their own interest. Each commercial bank was required 
to form a central trading unit (CTU) in the capital city Riyadh that would 
receive orders form branches. In carrying out these transactions, the 
commercial banks earn a commission based on the transaction value (up to a 
maximum of one percent) to be paid by both the seller and the buyer (SAMA, 
1985).           
According to SAMA (1995), in the second half of 1990, SAMA introduced 
the Electronic Securities Information System (ESIS). The system was 
introduced gradually starting with Riyadh, the capital city, and eventually 
covered the kingdom by the end of 1990. The system basically created a 
floorless, computer-based stock market covering the kingdom; it allowed buy 
(sell) orders that were entered at one bank’s share trading terminal to be 
matched instantaneously with corresponding sell (buy) orders entered in to the 
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system by any other bank. Advance developments to this system have seen the 
introduction of ESISLINE in 1992 and ESISNET in 1993. With these 
developments, it is now possible for a buyer or a seller to enter any connected 
Saudi bank branch, observe the price for the company in question, and place 
an order that can be executed in seconds if it is within the market price range. 
The order can be then be settled within 24 hours complete with the exchange 
of (i) transaction proceeds and (ii) the documentary evidence of the new title. 
The latest development for the system occurred in October 2001 when SAMA 
introduced a new service (TADAWUAL) for the trading and the settlement of 
shares in Saudi Arabia. This new system provides a continuous, order driven 
market, with up to the minute price, volume and the company information; it 
facilities an efficient and short trading cycle (www.tadawul.com). 
In 1985, the National Centre for Financial and Economics Information 
(NCFEI) produced the first indices of the Saudi Stock Market. Other indices 
were prepared by a number of commercial banks at that time. In March 1987, 
SAMA considered the NCFEI indices to be the official indices of the Saudi 
Stock Market. The NCFEI indices have a base value of 100 and change 
according to the share price data supplied by the share control department in 
SAMA. The indices published include a general index of the market and six 
sub-indices for the various sectors (Banking, Industrial, Services, 
Agricultural, Electricity, and Cement). These indices and daily trading 
information for all shares are published in the daily newspapers (Basheikh A, 
2002). 
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The SSM is considered as one of the largest stock market in the Arab world in 
terms of market capitalisation, with SAR 1,148.6 billions (about ₤164.1 
billions) as at the end 2004. Table 4.4 shows that there are 73 joint stock 
companies listed in the stock market, belonging to seven major sectors. This 
figure is projected to increase with the expected listing of additional 
companies over the next few years11. 
As Table 4.4 shows, the dominant sectors are the manufacturing and banking 
sectors with above 30% of total market capitalisation of the market followed 
by Telecom sector with about 20%. Other sectors are the Electrical Company 
with 9.7% and cement with 5.1% while the services sector represents nearly 
4% and agriculture is only 0.5%.  
It is believed that the degree of development of stock market influences 
financial decisions from stock split, to dividends, to stock issuance and to 
capital structure. To show the importance of the Saudi stock market in a 
firm’s financial decisions, Table 4.5 shows a time series indicators and ratios 
on the stock market over the period 2000 to 2004.  
                                                 
11 As the end of 2006, the number has increased to 86 companies. 
Table 4.4: size of the Saudi stock market as end of 2004 
Sector Number of companies 
Market 
 Capitalization 
(SAR billions) 
% 
Banking 9 355 30.3% 
Manufacturing 26 228 30.9% 
Telecom 2 111 19.9% 
Electrical 1 59 9.7% 
Cement 8 42 5.1% 
Services 18 5 3.7% 
Agricultural 9 355 0.5% 
Total 73 1,149 100 
Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (www.SAMA.co.sa) 
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The table shows that the market capitalization jumped from SAR 254 billions 
in year 2000 to SAR 1,149 billions in year 2004 with average growth 53.8% 
and exceeded 100% in year 2003. Moreover, from 2000 to 2004, the value of 
shares and the number of share traded, witnessed a remarkable increase. The 
number of shares traded in the SSM during 2000 was approximately 555 
millions. This number exceeded 10 billion in 2004. A similar pattern emerges 
when the volume of share statistics are analysed. The number of transactions 
jumped from 498 thousands in 2000 to over 13 millions in 2004.  
Although a strong growth is observed in Saudi stock market, it continues to 
lack depth. The number of listed companies and the size of the free-float of 
shares are small. The average of 72 companies listed in the market is 
considered extremely small12. Moreover, the relatively high proportion of 
shares held by the government and the concentration of ownership in a few 
hands of private investors keep a low percentage of stocks in circulation. The 
lack of brokerage houses and independent credit rating agency also constrains 
                                                 
12 The number decreased in year 2002 due to the emerging of 10 electrics companies in one 
company. 
Table 4.5: Stock market indicators 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Average 
Stock market capitalization 
(billions SAR) 254 275 281 590 1,149 531 
As percentage of GDP 35.9% 40.1% 39.7% 73.4% 122.4% 62.3% 
Value of shares traded (billions 
SAR) 65 84 134 596 1,774 510 
Number of shares traded  
(Millions) 555 692 1,736 5,566 10,298 3769 
Number of transactions 
(Thousands) 498 605 1,034 3,673 13,320 3826 
Number of firms  75 76 68 70 73 72 
Source: Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (www.SAMA.co.sa) 
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intermediation of information, which in turn would expose the investors to act 
based on rumours rather than on the basis of real fundamentals. The existence 
of such agencies is considered as one of the key elements to attracting national 
savings for investment in productive projects that would then create the 
potential for establishing more joint stock companies (Bakheet, 1999). 
In summary, despite the lack of market depth, stocks remain the first choice 
financing among listed companies.  Rajan and Zingales (1995) suggest that a 
good measure to determine the importance of the stock market is the ratio of 
stock market capitalisation to the gross domestic product (GDP). Table 4.5 
shows the market capitalisation from 2000 to 2004. On average, market 
capitalisation compromises 62.3% of GDP and exceeds 120 % in year 2004. 
Comparing this ratio to those of the G-7 studied by Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), we find the 62.3% is higher than United States (49.85%), Germany 
(25.79%), France (19.54%), Italy (21.17%) and Canada (50.56%) but less 
than Japan (85.31%) and United Kingdom (83.70%). Moreover, this ratio is 
higher than those of 10 developing countries studied by Booth et al. (2001) 
except Malaysia (68%). Moreover, comparing the ratio of market 
capitalisation to GDP (62.3%) with the ratio of bank claims on the private 
sector to GDP (28.5%), would suggest that public (equity) is more important 
than private financing (bank debt).  
4.5 Bond market 
The debt market consists of government bond market and corporate bond 
market. Since 1988, Saudi authorities have been relying on internal financing 
through issuing government bonds to finance their activities and borrowed 
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from banking sector to cover the budgetary deficit. SAMA through its 
investment department is the fiscal agent and debt manager by conducting 
monthly auctions and cites the volume of bond offered. Bonds include 
treasury bills, which range from one week to one month in maturity; floating 
rate notes with maturities at five years and seven years; and government 
development bonds (GDB) with maturities at two, three, five, seven, and ten 
years. However, the holdings of government debt securities are concentrated 
in government financial institutions, namely, the Pension Fund and the 
General Organization for Social Insurance (GOSI) and domestic commercial 
banks. The Pension Fund and the GOSI, however, own about 75% of the 
central government debt stock (IMF country report, 2006). During the last 15 
years, the government debt market went through evolutionary changes in 
terms of issuance procedure, pricing, maturity spectrum, and settlement (Al-
Sayari, 2003). In March 2004 the SAMA introduced a “Dutch” auction system 
for pricing GDB’s, replacing the previous system of predetermined prices.  
On the other hand, the corporate bond market has a short history although the 
requirements of issuing corporate bonds are formulated under articles 116 to 
119 of the Companies Act since 1965. According to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) country report (2006), the Saudi ORIX Leasing 
Company offered the first corporate bond issue in March 2003, amounting to 
SAR 45 million. The report described the Saudi’s corporate bond market as 
fledgling. However, the report argues that the condition under Article 117 of 
the Companies Law, which constrains the total amount of bonds that a 
company may issue to not exceed paid up capital may inhibit corporate bond 
market development. The IMF recommended this statutory constraint on 
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issuance should be removed since it keeps the issuing cost of short- and 
medium-term debt securities, such as commercial paper or medium-term notes 
expensive.  
In sum, the Saudi bond market, in particular, corporate bond market is 
negligible in the primary market. Moreover, bonds are not liquid due to the 
non-existence of secondary bond markets. This in turn would suggest that 
bank loans are the main debt-financing instrument. 
4.6 Legal system 
According to Ministry of Commerce and Industry (1999), article 218 of the 
corporate law gives management the right to run the firm during the 
proceedings. Moreover, on January 2, 1996, the Council of Ministers 
approved the Code of the Settlement Preventing Bankruptcy. The Code, 
which came into effect on June 1, 1996, provides a framework in which the 
debtor may reach a settlement with his creditors to avoid bankruptcy. The 
Code allows debtors to seek agreement with their creditors through 
committees to be set up at various local Chambers of Commerce in the 
Kingdom. If a settlement cannot be reached, or if the debtor so wishes, he may 
apply to the Sharia court, which reportedly does not allow repossession on 
grounds of compassion, and request that it call his creditors to offer them a 
settlement to avoid bankruptcy. When settlement proceedings begin, claims 
against the debtor are to be dropped.  
In sum, one can conclude that the Saudi legal system suffers from weak law 
and from weak enforcement of this law. These weaknesses in turn would 
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make the debt an expensive source of finance as the banks’ requirements 
become more restrictive in lending to firms in such legal system.    
4.7 Tax system  
One of the features in Saudi’s economy is the absence of income tax on 
citizens. Instead, there is one form of tax that is called Zakat, which is 
generally based on a payers’ net worth. Zakat is known as the third pillar of 
Islam, which indicates its importance and fundamental character in the 
religion. It can be defined as a system that organizes the transfer of wealth 
from the rich to the poor and needy. Literally, the word Zakat means purity or 
purification. Moreover, the payment of Zakat is regarded primarily as an act 
of worship of God. In the Holy Qur'an great stress is laid on the Zakat. The 
glorious Qur′ận states: Take of their wealth a portion (as charity) to purify 
them by it. [Surah AL Taw’bah, verse 103].   
It is believed that one of the reasons for the imposition of the Zakat is the fact 
that Islam calls for the purity of both the soul and the body. Since it is 
required from the rich to satisfy the needs of the poor, the paying of the Zakat, 
no doubt enhances caring within society and strengthens the relationship 
between the wealthy and the poor and needy. It reflects fulfilment of an early 
concept of social justice, as it is taken from each person according to his 
capacity.  
In Saudi Arabia, the government department of Zakat and Income Tax (DZIT) 
is responsible to manage the religious obligation of Zakat and tax. The Zakat 
on the individual's annual income from any legal source amounts to 2.5%. A 
Saudi company also pays 2.5% of the Zakat base. According to the 
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department of Zakat and Income Tax, Zakat base includes the share capital, 
retained earnings or accumulated deficit, long-term loans, notes payable and 
advances if they are used to finance fixed assets. Furthermore, the adjusted net 
income for Saudi Income Tax and Zakat purposes is added to the Zaka base. 
Deduction from the zakat base include net fixed assets and properties under 
construction, dividends distributed during the year not to exceed retained 
earnings at the beginning of the year, investment in other Saudi companies 
and Saudi government bonds, and adjusted deficits. If the Zakat base is 
negative or lower than the adjusted net income for the year, Zakat is imposed 
on the adjusted net income. If both are negative, no Zakat is due. 
Barakat and Rao (2004), argue that, in the non-tax Arab countries, the use of 
debt is no different from the use of equity as the payout on both is treated the 
same in the absence of tax advantages of debt for the corporation or tax 
advantage of equity for the investor. Consequently, the tax advantages of debt 
suggested by the trade off theory are expected to be minimal among Saudi 
firms.  
4.8 Ownership pattern  
La Porta et al. (1999) find a relationship between legal protection and 
ownership concentration in which countries with weak protection for investors 
tend to have higher ownership concentration and firms are typically controlled 
by families or the State. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that company 
ownership is highly concentrated and mainly controlled by families or the 
government in Saudi Arabia. Table 4.6 shows the percentage of the equity 
stake held by groups, namely, government, joint stock, foreign and others. 
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Table 4.6: Equity stakes (percent share) 
Sector  Gov. 
 
Joint Stock 
 
Foreign 
 
Others 
Banking 23% 2% 15% 60% 
Manufacturing 49% 4% 1% 46% 
Telecom 70% 0% 0% 30% 
Electrical 76% 7% 0% 17% 
Cement 19% 2% 2% 77% 
Services 19% 1% 0% 80% 
Agricultural 10% 0% 0% 90% 
Total 38% 2% 3% 57% 
Source: Bakheet Financial Advisors (www.bakheetgroup.com) 
 
The largest share is held by others (founder of the firms who are mostly rich 
families and individual investors) with 57% of the total market capitalisation 
and reaches 90%, 80%, and 77% in agricultural, services and cement sectors 
respectively. It is estimated that up to 90% of the companies are wholly 
family-owned, compared to 70% in the European Union of which at least 500 
of them can be classified as large in terms of volume of business 
(Washingtonpost.com). This means that 90% of 57% (or 51%) owned by 
family. Furthermore, as being the founder, wealthy families are the major 
shareholders of banks and, thus, they occupy the board of directors of these 
banks. For example, three out of the ten listed Saudi banks are founded by 
single family such as Bank Al-Jazira, Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp or 
by a small number of allied families such as bank Al Belad.  
As will be discussed shortly in the next section, the government have 
privatised some public enterprises in key industries but have maintained a 
majority. The table shows that government ownership is relatively extensive 
with overall 37% of the total market and reaches 76% and 70% in electrical 
and communication sectors respectively. Foreign share constitutes only 3% of 
the total market and reaches 19% in banking sector while cross ownership of 
joint stock companies’ comprise only 2% of the total market.  
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Although the Saudi Stock market is closed for trading to non-Saudis with the 
exception of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nationals, there are foreign 
partners who hold shares mainly in the banking sector13. However, foreign 
shareholding constitutes only 3% of the total market and reaches 19% in 
banking sector. Moreover, Saudi joint stock companies have cross ownership 
in which one company can own shares in other companies. For example, 
Saudi Basic Industries Corporation is the second largest shareholder of Saudi 
Arabian Fertilizer Company with 43% of the company's total outstanding 
shares. Some banks have ownership in other companies, in particular large 
companies. There are 30 cross ownerships among companies but with overall 
shareholding of just 2% of the total market.  
As pointed out earlier, 500 of the family-owned companies in Saudi Arabia 
can be classified as large. Indeed, the table in Appendix 2 shows that 62 
companies out of the large 100 Saudi companies are privately held 
corporations. These large corporations are the outcome of investments by a 
single family or a small number of allied families. The structure of most of 
these corporations is that each one has a business group that is organized 
around a holding company. For example, Olayan Group is a single family-
owned corporation comprising 50 companies and affiliated businesses 
engaged in distribution, manufacturing, services, and investment 
(www.olayan.com). In order to keep the control of business activity within the 
family, family members usually manage and control the firm.  
                                                 
13 GCC countries are Bahrain, Kwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates 
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4.9 The privatisation program  
Following two gulf wars and continued fluctuations in oil prices, Saudi Arabia 
started to experience budgetary deficits. Because of these crises, the Saudi 
authorities realized the importance of restructuring their economy in order to 
overcome these difficulties. Consequently, during the 1990s, Saudi Arabia 
underwent privatisation programs aimed at reducing government expenditure 
and inviting the private sector to take a more effective part in shaping the 
national economy (Naser, 1998).  
According to the Ministry of Planning, (2000), the successful implementation 
of the government's privatisation policy will be guided by consideration of all 
social and economic conditions prevailing in the Kingdom. The privatisation 
policy concentrates on the following four themes:  
Financing: mobilizing private funds for investment in ongoing public sector 
projects which experience financing difficulties due to budgetary constraints; 
Privatising Management: granting the private sector more opportunities to 
manage and operate public sector projects; 
Divestment: The gradual sale to the private sector of government shares in 
joint stock companies, following in-depth studies of each individual case, so 
that the social and economic costs and benefits can be properly evaluated and 
timing can be determined when appropriate conditions prevail; and  
Deregulation and promotion a positive climate for private investment through 
extending and increasing the effectiveness of the market mechanism. 
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It can be inferred from these themes that the state-owned companies are facing 
financial difficulties and the feasible solutions is equity financing via offering 
to the public part of its shares but with the government remaining a large 
shareholder. In light of this evidence, one can conclude that state-ownership 
of companies is likely to have a negative effect on debt levels.  
4.10 Conclusion 
This chapter presents the cultural and institutional aspects that are expected to 
affect the firm’s capital structure in Saudi Arabia. Though the Islamic law 
provides a variety of shari’ah-compliant financing products, banks limit the 
use of such products to individual customers. Such a limited role for banks 
reflects most likely the weak legal system and weak enforcement of this law 
in the country. The role of bond market is also very small due mainly to the 
requirements imposed on firms under the company’s law and due to the non-
existence of a secondary market.  
The growth observed in the stock market over the period of study would also 
suggest a negative effect on the level of debt of those listed companies. 
Falling costs of equity due to the high increase in the stock prices would 
motivate listed companies to rely more on equity to finance their growth. 
Moreover, the country has a unique tax system, which imposes a tiny 
percentage of zakat (tax) on Saudi firms. In such a system, the tax advantages 
of debt are expected to be minimal. 
The chapter also shows that the pattern of company ownership is highly 
concentrated in which rich families and government are the major 
shareholders of both the banks and the companies. This in turn would reduce 
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the agency costs of debt and would have a positive impact on firms’ debt 
levels in particular those large firms who have link with banks.   
However, the effect of socio-cultural and institutional factors on the 
determinants of capital structure will be discussed in the next chapter when 
the hypotheses will be developed in the context of such factors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5:  Hypotheses Development 
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5.1  Introduction  
Capital structure theories have very little to say about inter-country 
differences in corporate financing patterns. No existing theory explains how 
country-specific factors affect firm’s capital structure. However, empirical 
studies, in specific, cross-country studies (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1995; 
Booth et al., 2001; Giannetti, 2003; Fan et al., 2004; Hall et al., 2004; De Jong 
et al., 2007) demonstrate that inter-country variation in corporate leverage 
depends on institutional differences. Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that the 
institutional characteristics that affect capital structure are: tax code, 
bankruptcy laws, state of development of bond markets and patterns of 
ownership. Moreover, De Jong et al. (2007) find that institutional and legal 
environment and economic development affect not only the level of corporate 
leverage, but also firm-level determinants of leverage.  
Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is to develop testable hypotheses 
about those variables found in prior empirical studies to potentially determine 
a firm’s debt ratio in the context of the unique institutional characteristics of 
Saudi Arabia addressed in the previous chapter. Section 5.2 presents 
hypotheses development. Section 5.3 demonstrates the leverage 
measurements. Section 5.4 presents the measurement of explanatory variables. 
Finally, Section 5.5 provides a conclusion for the chapter.   
5.2 Hypotheses development  
5.2.1 Size 
Theoretically, it has been argued that large firms are more likely to have 
higher debt level than their smaller counterparts. Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
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and Graham et al. (1998) argue that large firms tend to be more diversified 
and have more stable cash flow and, thus they have less probability of going 
bankrupt. Accordingly, a positive relation between leverage and firm size 
would be observed. The main empirical research in general supports the 
positive influence of size on firm leverage. The empirical finding of previous 
studies analysed in chapter three reveals that 95.51% and 90.12% of the 
significant results are positively correlated with total and long-term debt ratios 
respectively. As total debt includes short-term debt elements, the higher 
percentage associated with it (i.e. 95.51% compared to 90.12%) implies that 
also short-term debt is positively related with size.  
It has been established that most of the large Saudi firms are business groups 
that are organized around a holding company. This indicates that they are 
diversified and, thus, are less likely to be exposed to financial distress and 
default. As a result, Saudi larger firms are expected to have higher level of 
interest-bearing debt than their smaller counterparts. Thus, the following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
H1  a positive relationship will exist between size of the firm and debt ratios.   
5.2.2 Profitability 
One of the main theoretical controversies concerns the relationship between 
leverage and profitability. While trade off theory suggests a positive 
association between profitability of the firm and leverage due to the tax 
deductibility of corporate interest payments, the pecking order hypothesis 
suggests negative relationship due to information asymmetric consideration. 
Empirically, the overall results reveal that profitability has strong negative 
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influence on leverage which in turn provides strong support to the pecking 
order hypothesis but contradicts trade off theory.  
It has been pointed out earlier that Saudi firms are subject to low tax (Zakat) 
rate as well as having concentrated ownership patterns. Therefore, the positive 
relationship between profitability and leverage suggested by tax and agency 
theories is not expected. The following hypothesis, consequently, is proposed: 
H2 consistent with pecking order hypothesis, a negative relationship will exist 
between profitability and debt ratios.   
5.2.3 Tangibility 
It has been argue that tangibility might be the major factor in determining the 
firm’s debt level (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1990 and 
Rajan and Zingales, 1995). It represents the effect of the collateral value of 
assets on the firm’s leverage level. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that due 
to the conflicts between debt-holders and shareholders, debt-holders face the 
risk of asset substitution problem. However, if debt can be secured against 
assets, the borrower is restricted to using loaned funds for a specific project, 
and creditors have an improved guarantee of repayment. Therefore, this 
argument suggests a positive relationship between debt level and tangible 
fixed assets. However, the length of loans is likely to be matched to the length 
of life of assets used as collateral (matching principle). Therefore, a negative 
relationship between tangibility and short-term debt would be expected.  
Empirically, the overall direction of this relationship supports the positive 
influence of tangibility on firm's leverage. However, studies using long-term 
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debt ratio compared to those using total debt ratio have more power in 
explaining the hypothesised positive relationship with 98.87% compared to 
93.69% as a percentage of the total significant results. This in turn imply that 
the negative correlation between short-term and tangibility reducing the 
strength of the overall positive relationship with total debt. This is consistent 
with Booth et al. (2001) argument that due to conventional matching 
argument, the more the tangible the asset, the more the long-term debt, and 
the smaller the short-term debt. Moreover, Bevan and Danbolt (2002) found 
that tangibility is positively correlated with long-term debt but negatively 
correlated with short-term debt elements. 
Antoniou et al. (2002) argue that importance of collateral is more significant 
in traditional bank lending than in borrowings from capital markets. Since 
banks are the debt-holder in Saudi Arabia, the importance of fixed assets 
expected to be more significant. Indeed, it has been stated the one of the 
requirement of bank to consider lending long-term debt sufficient collateral 
assets at least to cover 100% of the value of the loan. Accordingly, the 
following hypothesis is proposed:  
H3a a positive relationship will exist between tangibility and long-term and 
total debt ratios. 
H3b due to matching principle, a negative relationship will exist between 
tangibility and short-term debt. 
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5.2.4 Free cash flow 
It has been pointed out earlier that agency theory argues that debt reduces the 
amount of free cash flow available to managers to undertake personally 
beneficial activities since it commits the firm to pay out cash (Jensen, 1986). 
This theory, therefore, suggests a direct relationship between free cash flow 
and leverage. However, if free cash flow is representing the capacity of the 
firm to generate internal resources, then a negative relationship between free 
cash flow and debt levels is expected (pecking order theory).  
However, the empirical finding of previous studies analysed in chapter three 
reveals that the relationship between free cash flow and leverage depend on 
the measure of debt used. While these studies find free cash flow to be 
negatively correlated with total debt, a positive association is observed for 
long-tem debt with weak significance percentage.   
It has been outlined earlier that the ownership of the Saudi firms is highly 
concentrated, so, the costs associated with the free cash flow suggested by 
agency theory will be at minimum. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is 
proposed: 
H4  a negative relationship will exist between free cash flow and debt ratios.     
5.2.5 Liquidity 
It has been argued that liquidity of the firm may have an influence on the 
choice between internal and external financing. According to the pecking 
order hypothesis, firms with financial slack (i.e. liquid assets such as cash and 
marketable securities) will prefer internal sources to finance future 
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investments. Accordingly, firms with higher liquidity ratio are expected to 
have lower debt ratio. Empirical, studies that have examined the affect of 
liquidity on firm's leverage seem to support the existence of the negative 
relationship between liquidity and debt in which 99.12% of the significant 
results are negative. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed:  
H5  a negative relationship will exist between liquidity and debt ratios.   
5.2.6 Uniqueness 
Titman (1984) argues that firms characterized by unique products impose 
potential costs on their customers, input suppliers, and workers when facing 
liquidation and so they should be financed with relatively less debt. These 
firms also find it difficult to borrow because their specific use of capital 
reduces the probability of an alternative use in the event of bankruptcy. Such 
firms are expected to spend more on R&D since their products are less likely 
to be duplicated by other firms. Furthermore, firms with relatively unique 
products are expected to advertise more and, in general, spend more in 
promoting and selling their products.  
The main empirical research that has examined the influence of uniqueness on 
firm leverage indicates that the overall direction support the existence of the 
negative relationship between uniqueness and leverage. Accordingly, the 
following hypothesis is proposed: 
H6  a negative relationship will exist between uniqueness and debt ratios.   
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5.2.7   Growth  
Myers (1977) argues that due to the potential for under-investment, firms with 
great growth opportunities should not be financed with long-term debt. Myers 
further argues that shortening the maturity of the firm’s debt obligations (i.e. 
increasing the use of short-term debt) can mitigate the incentive to under-
investment. Empirically, it has been found that the relationship between 
growth and leverage to depend on how the growth is measured. While the 
hypothesised negative relationship between growth and debt ratios is 
strengthen when growth is measured by market-to-book ratio, the strength of 
the negative correlation decreased with growth in assets and turn into positive 
with growth in sales.   
Antoniou et al. (2002), argue that in bank-oriented countries banks are 
frequently represented on the supervisory board of the companies and 
coordinate with the management of the firm and, thus, they are likely to be 
fully aware of the quality of future investment of the firm. This reduces the 
agency costs of debt, which in turn increases the borrowing ability of the 
firms. As discussed earlier, there is a multiple and strong relationship between 
banks and large listed Saudi firms. This relationship is reflected in the 
presence of the large shareholders on the banks' boards. Moreover, some 
banks have shares in some companies. Therefore, banks work closely with 
firm and know about the quality of the firm's future investment. The presence 
of such relationship reduces the agency cost of debt. However, companies 
with high growth opportunities are generally small in term of size. Therefore, 
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the conflicts between banks as lender and small listed and unlisted firms 
expected to be severe. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed:  
H7-a there will be a negative relationship between growth opportunity proxies 
and long-term and total debt ratios in both listed and unlisted samples. 
H7-b there will be a positive relationship between growth opportunity proxies 
and short-term debt in both listed and unlisted samples. 
5.2.8 Dividends 
One of the main predictions of the pecking order hypothesis is that higher 
dividend payouts lower retained earnings and that increases the need for debt 
to finance growth opportunities. This in turn suggests a direct relationship 
between dividends and debt ratios. On the other hand, dividends can control 
the free cash flow agency problem as higher dividends lower the amount of 
free cash flow (Stulz, 1990). This in turn suggests a negative relationship 
between dividends and debt ratios. 
 As with growth, the analysis of prior empirical studies reveals that the 
relationship between dividends and leverage depends on how the dividends is 
measured. While a negative relationship between dividends and debt ratios is 
found with the dividend payout ratio, a positive correlation is observed when 
dividends are measured by dividend yield.  
However, La Porta et al. (1999) argue that paying dividends in the developing 
countries is a sign of commitment to the shareholders rather than to the debt 
holders and firms pay dividends to build the reputation to market future stock 
issues. This in turn suggests negative relationship between dividends and debt 
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ratios. In previous chapter we observed that the Saudi stock market plays an 
important role in financing listed firms via equity. Accordingly, listed firm 
will pay dividends to build the reputation for future external equity financing. 
On the other hand, since unlisted firms are constrained from stock market, 
unlisted firm that pay dividends will reduce the amount of retained earning and, 
thus increase the need for debt. Accordingly, the following hypothesises are 
proposed:  
H8-a  due to reputation considerations, a negative relationship will exist 
between the dividend payout ratio and debt ratios in listed sample. 
H8-b  a positive relationship will exist between the dividend payout ratio and 
debt ratios in unlisted sample. 
5.2.9 Age 
 It has been argued that young firms are more likely to depend on debt 
instruments since they do not have sufficient internally funds to finance new 
investment. This in turn suggests negative correlation between age and 
leverage. On the other hand, aged firms have established a good relation with 
banks and form good reputation through time. Accordingly, they have better 
conditions and easier access to debt market than those new established.   
The analysis of prior empirical studies shows that the relationship between 
age and debt ratios to depend on how debt is measured. While age is found 
positively correlated with total debt ratio, it is found negatively associated 
with long-term debt ratio. This in turn implies that age is positively correlated 
 136 
with short-term debt. In line with the prior studies findings, the following 
hypotheses are proposed:  
H9 -a  a positive relationship will exist between age and short-term debt and 
total debt. 
H9 -b  a negative relationship will exist between age and long-term debt. 
5.2.10 Business risk  
It has been commonly argued in the literature that as debt involves 
commitment of periodic payments, firms with high variability in earnings 
have a greater risk not to meet their debt obligations, so increasing the 
probability of default. Thus, lenders will be less willing to lend or will charge 
a higher risk premium since they will have a greater probability of losing their 
money. Empirically, the analysis of prior studies shows that risk is 
significantly inversely correlated with debt ratios. 
Since Saudi banks are conservative in their lending policy, one would expect 
that banks are unwilling to lend to firm with high volatility in earnings. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed:  
H10  a negative relationship will exist between volatility in earnings as proxy 
for risk and debt ratios.   
5.2.11 Government ownership  
 In light of agency theory associated with debt benefits, shareholders owning 
large percentages of equity shares (particularly institutions) could prevent 
management from engaging in self-interest activities by reducing the free cash 
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flow through increasing the firm’s debt. Moreover, government-linked firms 
have several advantages such as easier access to alternative source of finance 
and guaranteed solvency (Deesomsak, Paudyal and Pescetto, 2004). These 
arguments suggest a positive relationship between share held by government 
and leverage. On the other hand, agency theory associated with debt benefits 
argues that government as large external shareholders may also force 
managers to engage in activities that benefit shareholders at the expense of 
debt-holders such as asset substitution (Myers, 1977). This in turn suggests 
negative relationship between shares held by government and leverage. 
Empirically, the analysis of prior studies reveals that government is negatively 
correlated with debt ratios based on book value, but insignificantly correlated 
with debt ratios based on market value.  
However, it has pointed out in previous chapter that the government has the 
majority ownership in several key companies in the Saudi stock market, 
which in turn make it the second largest shareholders in terms of market 
capitalisation. Also, it was also stated that one of the privatisation themes is 
equity financing for state companies due to government budgetary deficits. 
This in turn implies that government-link firms will rely on equity rather than 
on debt. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed:  
H11 a negative relationship will exist between the government ownership and 
debt ratios. 
5.2.12 Industry classification 
The industry in which a firm operates will have a significant effect on its 
capital structure. Bradley et al (1984) found that firms belonging to the same 
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industry generally have similar financial structures whereas firms from 
different industry classes generally have different financial structures. 
Moreover, Harris and Raviv (1991) noted that Drugs, Instruments, Electronics 
and Food have low leverage whilst Paper, Textiles, Mill Products, Steel, 
Airlines and Cement have high leverage. The authors also note that utilities 
firms are more leveraged than non-utilities firms.  
 It has been pointed out earlier that Saudi companies are belonging to seven 
sectors. Besides the banking sector, industrial, telecommunication, electricity, 
cement, services and agriculture are the major sectors as defined by Saudi 
Stock Market. Manufacturing and cement firms, expected to have intensive 
fixed assets, are likely to use more debt than farming and the service sector. 
This in turn leads to the following hypothesis: 
H12 firms operating in the manufacturing and cement industries will show 
higher debt levels than those operating in farming and service industries. 
5.3  Leverage definitions  
In the literature of capital structure, there is no clear-cut definition of leverage. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) apply four different measures for leverage. The 
first definition of leverage is the ratio of total (non-equity) liabilities to total 
assets. A second one is the ratio of debt (both short-term and long-term) to 
total assets. Third is the ratio of total debt to net assets, where net assets are 
total assets less accounts payable and other current liabilities. The final 
definition is the ratio of total debt to capital, where capital is defined as total 
debt plus equity.  
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Three debt ratios will be used as dependent variables to test the determinants 
of capital structure of Saudi firms. These are: total debt, short-term debt and 
long-term debt all scaled by book value of total assets. There are several 
reasons for selecting these measures. First, it is necessary to find out the 
determinants of the use of the firms’ general level of leverage (i.e. total debt). 
Second, if any leverage is used, we need to know what determines the mix of 
long-term debt and short-term debt for financing asset growth. Our 
understanding goes first to the matching principle where long-term debt is 
used to finance fixed assets and short-term debt is used to finance working 
capital. However, prior empirical studies demonstrated that other factors 
determine the choice of debt maturity such as barriers to access to capital 
market, the development of bond market, size and profitability of the firms. 
Bevan and Danbolt (2002) find significant differences in the determinants of 
long-term and short-term debt ratios.   
Moreover, Titman and Wessels (1988) argue that the coefficients’ signs, 
magnitudes and even levels of significance of the explanatory variables will 
differ according to whether the debt ratios are defined in terms of book or 
market values. However, the book values of debt are used in this dissertation 
for the following reasons: 
Taking into account the scarcity of data, book values of debt data are usually 
available. 
Titman and Wessels (1988) argue that the correlation between book and 
market of debt is very large, thus, the misspecification due to using book 
value measures is probably fairly small.  
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Due to the weakness of the primary bond market and the non-existence of 
secondary bond market in Saudi Arabia, bonds are never tradable in 
secondary market, which means there is no market value of debt.  
Since bank loans are the dominant source of corporate debt, banks require 
fixed assets as collateral, which usually priced at book value. 
Managers consider the book value of their firm when making debt decisions. 
Zakat (tax) department considers book values in its regulations and 
proceedings. 
5.4 Explanatory Variables definitions 
5.4.1  Size  
Generally, logarithm of sales, logarithm of assets and number of employees 
are the variables that have been used in empirical studies to capture the affect 
of size on leverage. Based on prior studies included in the synthesis analysis 
conducted in chapter three, logarithm of assets appears to come first with 266 
out of 488 using the three proxies to capture the effect of size followed by 
logarithm of sales with 210 and only 12 uses the number of employees. 
Although all the three proxies show the expected positive influence of size on 
leverage, they have different explanatory power. While using logarithm of 
assets and logarithm of sales has demonstrated about the same strong results, 
using number of employees shows relatively moderate results.  
Accordingly, the logarithm of assets will be employed as the main proxy for 
size in this dissertation to capture the influence of size on leverage and 
logarithm of sales as an alternative proxy.  
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5.4.2 Tangibility  
Fixed assets to total assets is the common proxy most studies used to capture 
the effect of tangibility on leverage. However, different authors have used 
different measures for the concept of collateral value of assets. Most studies 
(e.g. Marsh, 1982; Friend and Lang, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Bevan 
and Danbolt, 2002 and 2004) employ the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. 
Titman and Wessels (1988), however, add inventory to the fixed assets. The 
main argument behind adding inventory is that debts are used partly to finance 
inventories, and in most cases inventories maintain some value when the firm 
is liquidated. 
In line with the majority, the ratio of fixed assets to total asset will be the main 
proxy for tangibility in this dissertation and the fixed assets and inventories to 
total assets will be the alternative proxy.  
5.4.3 Profitability 
Generally, there are two proxies employed in prior empirical studies to serve 
as bases for the measure of profitability. These are return on assets (ROA) and 
return on sales (ROS). The most common proxy found in the synthesis 
analysis of prior studies is return on assets with 449 compared to 62 using 
return on sales. However, the results of both proxies provide strong support to 
pecking order hypothesis as both proxies show strong negative influence on 
debt ratios.   
In lines with most studies, return on assets defined, as the ratio of earnings 
before interest, tax and depreciation (EBITDA) over total assets will be used 
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as the main proxy to capture the influence of profitability on leverage. The 
return on sales, on the other hand, will be used as an alternative proxy. 
5.4.4 Free cash flow 
To capture the effects of free cash flow most studies (e.g. Opler and Titman 
1993; Lasfer; 1995 and DeMiguel and Pindado, 2001) define free cash flow as 
interaction between cash flow expressed as the earnings before interest and 
tax plus depreciation normalised by total assets and Tobin’s q which is the 
market value of the firm to the replacement cost of its capital.  
However, due to the lack of market value data for unlisted firms, the free cash 
flow defined as the earnings before interest and tax plus depreciation less 
capital expenditure (i.e. positive growth in fixed assets) normalised by total 
assets will be the proxy used to capture the free cash flow’s influence on 
leverage.  
5.4.5 Liquidity 
The ratio of current assets over current liabilities is the common proxy that 
has been used by previous empirical studies to capture the influence of 
liquidity on leverage. In this dissertation, however, the quick ratio (current 
assets less inventory over current liabilities) will be used as the main proxy for 
liquidity since it focuses on the firm’s more liquid assets. The current ratio, on 
the other hand, will be used as an alternative proxy.  
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5.4.6 Uniqueness 
In order to capture the influence of uniqueness on capital structure, two 
measures have been employed in the empirical studies, namely, the ratio of 
R&D to sales and the ratio of selling expenses to sales. The most common 
proxy found in the synthesis analysis of prior studies is the ratio of R&D to 
sales with 66 compared to 28 using the ratio of selling expenses to sales. 
However, the results of both proxies provide strong support to Titman’s 
argument as both measures show strong negative influence on debt ratios.   
However, due to the lack of R&D data, the ratio of selling expenses to sales 
will be used as the main proxy for uniqueness. Moreover, dummy variable 
equal to one for firms reporting selling expenses and zero other wise will be 
used as an alternative proxy14. 
5.4.7 Growth  
Different proxies have been employed to capture the influence of growth 
opportunities on leverage. These are the ratio of market value of assets to 
book value of assets (market-to-book ratio), past growth in sales and past 
growth in assets. The most common used proxy found in the synthesis 
analysis of prior studies is market-to-book ratio with 350 compared to 63 and 
60 using past growth in sales and past growth in assets respectively. 
Generally, the market-to-book ratio defines as the ratio of book value of total 
assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to the book 
value of total assets.  
                                                 
14 This proxy for uniqueness is less than ideal since it is not possible to distinguish between 
firms that have zero selling expenses and those that have non-zero selling expenses but fail to 
report them separately.   
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Since the study involves listed and unlisted samples, two different measures 
will be employed in this dissertation to capture effect of growth opportunities 
on leverage. The market-to-book ratio value of assets (only for listed firm) 
and the growth in assets (unlisted sample) will be used as the main proxies for 
growth opportunities. Moreover, growth in sales (for unlisted sample) and 
both growth in assets and in sales (for listed sample) will be used as 
alternative proxies. 
5.4.8 Dividends 
Dividend payout ratio and to a lesser extent dividend yield are used in prior 
studies to capture the impact of dividends on the firm’s capital structure. 
However, the results of meta-analysis reveal that the two measures produce 
differing directions. While dividend payout ratio shows overall negative affect 
on leverage, dividend yield proxy reveals overall positive influence.  
Nevertheless, to investigate the influence of dividends on debt ratio, only 
dividend payout ratio will be employed here due to the lack of data 
concerning dividend yields. Additionally, a dummy variable equal to one for 
firms paying dividends and zero otherwise will be used as an alternative 
proxy. 
5.4.9 Age  
The number of years since the year of the firm’s establishment is the common 
proxy used to capture the influence of age on leverage. The overall results of 
this proxy show a positive impact on leverage. However, to improve the linear 
relationship with debt ratios, the natural log of the number of years since 
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company’s establishment will be used as the main proxy for age in this 
dissertation and the number of years as alternative proxy.  
5.4.10 Risk 
Two proxies have been used to capture the influence of risk on leverage, 
namely, earnings volatility measured as the standard deviation of the first 
difference in annual earnings over mean of annual earnings and systematic 
risk (β). However, the most common used proxy found in the synthesis 
analysis of prior studies is earnings volatility with 253 compared to only 10 
using systematic risk. In general, the results of both measures reveal the desire 
negative impact of risk on leverage that indicates riskier firms have lower debt 
ratios.  
Due to the lack of data related to systematic risk, the ratio of the standard 
deviation of first difference in annual earnings to the mean of annual earnings 
over the study period will be employed in this dissertation as a proxy variable 
for business risk.  
5.4.11 Government ownership: 
To capture the effect of the existence of government as a shareholder on 
firm’s capital structure, most of the studies included in the meta-analysis use a 
dummy variable equal to one for firms having shares held by government and 
zero other wise. One study, however, uses the actual percentage of 
outstanding shares held by the government. The major issue of using a 
dummy variable is that it ignores the high variation between the companies 
that report a positive data of the variable of interest. For example, company 
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with 70% of ownership held by the government is treated equally as the 
company with 2% of ownership. 
In this dissertation, since this issue is observed in the sample, the actual 
percentage of shares held by the government will be use to measure the effect 
of the presence of government on leverage.  
5.4.12 Industry classifications: 
Titman and Wessels (1988) employed a dummy variable equal to one for 
firms producing machines and equipment and zero otherwise to measure the 
influence of industry classification on leverage. Other researchers, however, 
included more than one dummy variable to capture the differences in the 
leverage ratios among different industries class. 
To investigate if capital structure varies among industry sectors, this 
dissertation will employ three dummy variables representing manufacture, 
cement and farming sectors in listed sample and two dummy variables 
representing manufacture and farming sectors in unlisted sample with the 
service sector being the base in both samples. Banking sector, however, is 
excluded since their balance sheets have a significantly different structure 
from those of non-financial companies as well as they are the major source of 
debt in the country.  
5.5 Conclusion  
Size, profitability, tangibility, free cash flow, liquidity, uniqueness, growth 
opportunity, dividends, age risk, government and industry classifications are 
the attributes that have been identified by prior empirical studies to potentially 
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determine firm’s debt ratio. However, De Jong et al. (2007) conclude that 
country-specific factors do matter in determining and affecting the leverage 
choice around the world and these factors should not be neglected in the 
analysis of a country’s capital structure. Accordingly, the hypotheses about 
the effect of identified attributes on the firm’s leverage are developed in the 
context of the unique institutional characteristics of Saudi Arabia. Moreover, 
the definition and the main proxies for these attributes as well as some 
alternative proxy are demonstrated in this chapter. Table 5.1 provides 
summary for the variables definition and hypothesised sign.   
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Table 5.1: Summary of the variables definition and hypothesised sign 
Hypothesised sign 
Listed Unlisted Attribute Main proxy Alternative proxy 
STD LTD TD STD LTD TD 
Size log of assets  Log of sales  + + + + + + 
Profitability EBITDA over total assets 
EBITDA over total 
sales - - - - - - 
Tangibility Fixed assets over total assets 
Fixed assets & 
inventory over 
total assets 
- + + - + + 
Free cash 
flow 
(EBIT + 
depreciation - 
capital expenditure) 
over total assets 
 - - - - - - 
Liquidity Quick ratio Current ratio - - - - - - 
Uniqueness Ratio of selling expenses to assets Dummy variables - + - - + - 
Growth 
opportunities 
Market-to-book 
ratio of equity 
(listed), growth in 
total assets 
(unlisted) 
Growth in total 
sales (unlisted) and 
sales & assets 
(listed) 
+ - - + - + 
Dividend Dividends payout ratio Dividend yield + + + - - - 
Age 
Log of number of 
years since 
establishment 
Number of years 
since 
establishment 
- - - + + + 
Risk Earnings volatility  - - - - - - 
Government 
ownership 
Percentage of 
shares held by 
government 
 - - -    
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Chapter 6:  : Research Methods 
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6.1 Introduction  
As discussed in chapter one, the aim of this research is to investigate the 
determinants of capital structure of Saudi companies. This requires that the 
sample selected should properly represent the population of Saudi companies. 
To meet this requirement, the decision was taken to extend the scope of the 
sample to include data for both publicly and privately limited companies 
(hereafter listed and unlisted companies).  
Section 6.2 involves general information about the sample. Section 6.3 
provides information about data collection procedure. Section 6.4 presents 
information about the guidelines in sample selection. Section 6.5 summarises 
variable calculation. Finally, sections 6.6 and 6.7 provide information about 
the data issues and testing procedures respectively.  
6.2 Sample  
Investigating both listed and unlisted companies ensured that different size 
companies are embodied in the sample and the companies represent the 
different industrial sectors in the Saudi market. The sample provides a good 
opportunity to investigate the effects and constraints of stock market listing 
(comparison of listed and unlisted companies). The data is likely to be 
reliable: it comes from reliable sources (i.e. ministry of commerce & industry 
and capital market authority) and high quality accounting standards are used 
for reporting.   
Merely selecting firms listed on the Saudi stock market would have biased the 
sample towards large firms. It would also have severely reduced the sample 
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size. At 31 January 2006, there were eighty public listed companies15 listed on 
the Saudi stock market, of which ten are banks, one is an insurance company 
and several companies are recent additions. The inclusion of unlisted 
companies enables both small and middle size firms to be investigated. 
According to the classification of the Ministry of Commerce in Saudi Arabia, 
listed companies in Saudi Arabia are the Public Limited Companies (i.e. Joint 
Stock Companies) that are traded on TADAWUL, the Saudi Arabia stock 
market. In order to be listed, each company needs to go through a two-stage 
admission process. First, the company has to apply to the “companies’ general 
department” at the ministry of commerce & industry for an initial public 
offering. If approved then the next step is to apply to the capital market 
authority to be admitted for offering securities to the public and trading. Once 
both processes are completed, the securities are officially listed on 
TADAWUL. On the other hand, unlisted companies are private limited 
liability companies. According to the ministry of commerce & industry, the 
limited liability company is a company that consists of two or more 
shareholders liable for the company's debts to the extent of their shares in the 
corporate capital. However, the number of shareholders in this company shall 
not exceed 50 and the corporate capital of this company shall not be less than 
five hundred thousand Saudi Riyals. Table 6.1 summarises the differences and 
similarities between the listed and unlisted companies. 
                                                 
15 Recently, four new companies, of which one belongs to the manufacturing sector and three 
are from the service sector, were listed increasing the total number to 84 listed companies. 
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6.2.1 Sources of data  
Unlike developed countries, for Saudi Arabia there is no readily available 
computerised database such as Datastream or Compustat. Datastream has data 
for just one Saudi Arabian company (SABIC). However, there are three 
governmental sources that maintain financial statements of Saudi companies 
as hard copies. The Capital Market Authority has financial statements of all 
publicly listed Saudi companies and these statements are available to the 
public. The other two governmental sources are the Ministry of Commerce 
and the Ministry of Finance represented by the “companies’ general 
department” and the “department of zakat and income tax” respectively. 
While the “department of zakat and income tax” maintains all the financial 
statements of all types of companies, the “companies’ general department” 
maintains only the financial statements of the publicly listed and privately 
unlisted companies16. However, accesses to these data are not available 
publicly. When requested, access to the “department of zakat and income tax” 
data was refused. Access to the “companies’ general department” data was 
                                                 
16 Since both are limited liability companies, they are required by the Companies’ Act to 
submit their financial statements to the “companies’ general department”  annually. 
Table 6.1:  Differences and similarities of listed and unlisted companies. 
 Form Number of partners/shareholders 
Minimum 
capital Liability 
Registration 
fee for five 
years 
Listed 
Company 
Joint-
stock Minimum 5 partners. SR 10 million. 
Limited to 
the amount 
contributed. 
SR 8000 
Unlisted 
Company 
Limited 
liability 
Minimum 2 partners. 
Maximum 50 partners. SR 500,000 
 
Limited to 
the amount 
contributed. 
SR 6000 
Source of data: The Ministry of Commerce and Industry web site  (www.commerce.gov.sa)  
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granted subject to the receipt of letters from my supervisor and my sponsor in 
Saudi Arabia explaining the nature and the purpose of the study. Given the 
now stated sources of data, the next section provides general information 
about the sources and their credibility.    
6.2.1.1 Capital Market Authority 
The history of the official Saudi stock market dates back only to 1985, which 
means that it is still in its early stage of development. However, its growth in 
recent years has led the Saudi government to release new legislation 
governing the stock market. In 2003, Royal Decree M30 (the Capital Market 
Law) approved the establishment of the Capital Market Authority (CMA). 
This newly established authority is a government organization with financial, 
legal and administrative independence, which reports directly to the Prime 
Minister. 
The authority has broad responsibilities for organizing and developing the 
stock market.  Since its establishment, CMA has been keen to create an 
appropriate investment environment. It has issued a number of implementing 
regulations to improve transparency and discipline levels. CMA sets specific 
and defined criteria for approving listed companies' requests to raise capital. 
In particular, it requires that firms issue a prospectus containing detailed 
information on the new issuance, a directors’ report, fully audited financial 
statements, and other related issues. Moreover, publicly listed firms are 
required to announce any material events that take place such as the 
acquisition or the disposition of significant amounts of assets. It is also 
noteworthy that CMA requires listed firms to submit to the authority quarterly 
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and annual reports on a timely basis; annual reports must be audited as 
required by the rules of the authority.  
To implement its regulations, the authority imposes strict punishments and 
monetary fines on companies that do not follow the disclosure regulations. 
For example, according to the CMA official site, the authority stopped the 
trading of "Al Baha Investment & Development Co." from April 6, 2005 
through July 14, 2005 because the company had not released its financial 
statements for the year 2003. 
6.2.1.2 Companies General Department 
Although the Companies Act was issued by Royal Decree M6 in 1965, the 
history of the Companies General Department starts in 1982 when the Royal 
Decree M23 amended the Companies’ Act and approved the establishment of 
this department. It operates under the supervision of the deputy minister of 
internal trade as the figure demonstrates in Appendix 3. According to the 
ministry of commerce and industry official web site, the department is 
responsible for the implementation of the provisions of the Companies Act 
including administrations of: 
1. Joint stock companies. 
2. Limited liabilities companies. 
3. Sole proprietorship companies. 
4. Foreign companies’ admission. 
5. Companies’ follow-up.  
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6. Professional companies. 
7. Communication. 
8. Archives.  
As can be inferred from the above, the department has wide responsibilities. 
One of its main duties is to ensure companies’ compliance with the 
Companies Act. Article 89 of the act covers disclosure and states that the 
Chairman of the Board of a public limited company is required to release to 
the public in the newspaper the financial statements audited in accordance 
with the accounting and auditing standards released by the Saudi Organization 
for Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA). In addition, the issue of the 
newspaper that has the publication of the financial statements combined with 
copies of the management report and the report of the independent licensed 
auditor must be submitted to the companies’ general department, at least, 25 
days before the shareholders’ general meeting. Article 175, on the other hand, 
requires the managers of a private limited company to submit to the 
companies’ general department copies of financial statements audited in 
accordance with the accounting and auditing standards released by SOCPA. 
The management report and the report of the independent licensed auditor 
copies, however, should be submitted to the department within six months of 
the ending of the accounting year.  
Overall, the fact that the capital market authority imposes strict disclosure and 
transparency regulations on publicly listed firms and that publicly and 
privately limited liability companies are legally required to submit audited 
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financial statements to the companies’ general department enhances the 
credibility of these sources and the reliability of the data.  
6.2.2 Accounting standards and data reliability 
The accounting profession in Saudi Arabia has two main characteristics. First, 
the government has been supporting a policy of continuous improvement. 
According to the SOCPA official site, before the discovery of oil in 1938 
there was little demand for auditing in the Kingdom and indeed it was not 
until 1965 that the Companies Act introduced specific requirements for 
company audit. However, the first law that regulated the auditing profession 
in Saudi Arabia was the Law of Certified Accountants, promulgated in 1974 
by Royal Decree 43. In 1986, Ministerial Resolution 692 approved the 
objectives and concepts of financial reporting and the standards of 
presentation and disclosure as guidelines for all CPAs.  
The professional accounting body that is responsible for the development of 
the accounting and auditing profession in Saudi Arabia, SOCPA, was 
established in 1991 under Royal Decree M12. It operates under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Commerce. Since its establishment, SOCPA 
has been seeking to develop the accounting profession through its objectives 
that include: 
1. Review, develop and approve accounting and auditing standards. 
2. Monitoring the performance of certified public accountants to ensure 
their compliance with accounting and auditing standards and with the 
provisions of CPA Regulations. 
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3. Establish SOCPA fellowship examination. 
4. Conduct research and studies; publish periodicals, books and bulletins 
covering accounting and auditing subjects; and participating in local 
and international committees and conferences relating to the 
profession of accounting and auditing. 
The second characteristic of the accounting profession in Saudi Arabia is its 
compatibility with the Saudi economic environment. According to the 
SOCPA official site, Saudi accounting standards are in general consistent with 
international accounting standards except for certain differences to adopt the 
economic and legal developments in the country. The five-year Saudi 
Development Plans (Ministry of Planning, 1990, 1995, 2000) concentrated on 
the government’s intention to privatise the state-owned enterprises, coupled 
with the release of the capital market law, recognising the need to improve the 
audit profession. Since, its beginning, SOCPA has been actively issuing a 
series of accounting and auditing standards through its specialised 
committees. As of November 2006, SOCPA has released 17 accounting and 
14 auditing standards (According to the SOCPA official site). As recognition 
of its works and its credibility, recently SOCPA has become a member of the 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC).  
Overall, the establishment of SOCPA combined with the release of the Capital 
Market Law have enhanced the quality and the credibility of the accounting 
profession in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the fact that firms included in the 
sample are legally required to use accounting standards released by SOCPA 
for reporting and auditing give the data the required reliability. 
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6.3 Data collection procedure 
6.3.1 Initial sample 
The fieldwork took place from the end of September of 2005 to the end of 
January of 2006 with another visit in March 2006 to check for those 
companies with incomplete records. The first step was constructing the list of 
the initial sample that should include information about all listed and unlisted 
companies. The initial list of listed companies was constructed based on the 
information maintained in TADAWUL web site. This particular web site 
provides updated information about the companies’ symbol, long name, short 
name and acronym. This procedure identified 80 companies that represent all 
companies listed on Saudi stock market at the end of January 2006 (as the 
table demonstrates in Appendix 3). Eleven financial companies were dropped 
from the initial list of listed firms (10 are banks and one is insurance 
company) as their balance sheets have a significantly different structure from 
those of non-financial companies. 
For unlisted companies, the initial list of 8143 companies was constructed 
based on the information provided in the commercial registration directory 
run by the archive division at the companies’ general department. This 
directory provides information about companies’ names, addresses, 
commercial record, and file numbers in the archive for all the companies in 
the country.  
6.3.2 Industry classification process 
Listed companies were classified into eight sectors using the Saudi Stock 
Market industry classification codes in TADAWUL. Table 6.2 shows the 
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manufacturing sector to be largest with 37.5%, followed by the service sector 
with 23.8%. The electricity and insurance sectors are small with just one 
company in each.  
Unlike the classification of listed firms, there are no specific codes identifying 
the industry sectors of unlisted firms. The archive division classifies 
companies into three industrial sectors; namely, manufacturing, service and 
agriculture sectors, so the Saudi Stock Market industry classification codes for 
manufacturing, service and agriculture sectors were used. As Table 6.2 shows, 
the service sector is by for the largest at 65.0%, followed by the 
manufacturing sector at 34.7%, and only with 0.3% for agriculture.  
Table 6.2: Saudi Stock Market industry classification codes assigned. 
Listed Unlisted 
Sector 
Sector 
classification 
code 
Number of 
companies % 
Number of 
companies % 
Banking 10s 10 12.5   
Manufacturing 20s 30 37.5 2824 34.7 
Cement 30s 8 10.0   
Service 40s 19 23.8 5298 65. 0 
Electricity 51 1 1.2   
Agriculture 60s 9 11.3 21 0. 3 
Telecommunication 70s 2 2.5   
Insurance 80s 1 1.2   
Total  80 100 8143 100 
Source: TADAWUL web site (www.tadawul.com.sa) and the Companies General 
Department.  
 
6.3.3 Collecting process 
Hard copies of the financial statements were collected from the Capital 
Market Authority. Three missing sets of financial statements were obtained 
from the “companies’ general department” (2 sets) and directly from the 
company (one set). For unlisted companies, all the financial statements were 
obtained from the “companies’ general department” at the ministry of 
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commerce. This task was very time-consuming, given the large number of 
companies the archive maintained and the extensive need for hand searching 
for data. The financial statements for companies having a complete set of data 
were scanned at the rate of approximately seven companies per day on 
average. The data was finally entered manually into an Excel spreadsheet at a 
later stage.   
6.3.4 Difficulties faced during data collection process  
While the people at the companies’ general department were very helpful, the 
task of data collection proved difficult:  
1. Two files are maintained for each company (financial statements and 
contracts and official letters) but documents were sometimes 
incorrectly filed. 
2. Files for companies with missing data (e.g. closed companies) were 
shelved together with other files. 
3. The company directory was out of date, since many firms that had 
closed down had not informed the department.  
6.4 Guidelines in sample selection  
Companies without complete data for the whole period under study (i.e. 2000 
to 2004) were excluded. For listed companies, the new eight companies were 
excluded as well as the Saudi electric company, which resulted from the 
merger in 2002 between the ten electricity companies working in the country.  
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For unlisted companies, it was found that data for the majority of companies 
was incomplete mainly because of the following:  
1. Companies had missing data in a particular year (3045 companies). 
2. Companies were new companies (2912 companies).  
3. Companies had closed down (1783 companies). 
Unfortunately, this drastically reduced the sample available for analysis. To 
summarise, the guidelines for selection of the sample of firms were as 
follows: 
1. Only listed and unlisted companies with limited liabilities were 
included. 
2. Only non-financial companies were included.  
3. Only companies with complete financial information over the whole 
period under study were included. 
Table 6.3 summaries the sample decomposition of the companies selected for 
this study. 
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The following items were hand-collected from the financial statements for 
each company for each 5 years 2000-2004: 
a. 13 items from the balance sheet. 
b. 7 items from the income statements. 
c. 2 from the cash flow statements.  
d. 2 general items 
e. Two further items were collected for listed companies. 
Table 6.3: Sample selection process 
Sector Banking Manuf. Service Cement Elect. Agric. Telec. Insu. Total 
Listed companies 
Initial 
sample 10 30 20 8 1 9 1 1 80 
Less Bank& 
Insurance (10)       (1) 11 
Less new  (5) (3)      8 
Less 
incomplete 
data 
 
    (1)    1 
Final 
dataset 0 25 17 8 0 9 1 0 60 
Unlisted companies 
Initial 
sample  2824 5298   21   8143 
Less 
incomplete 
data 
 (1326) (1716)   (3)   (3045) 
Less new 
  (1077) (1835)      (2912) 
Less closed 
down 
 
 (302) (1479)   (2)   (1783) 
Final 
dataset 
 
 119 268   16   403 
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Overall, 7,800 (48,360) observations were collected for listed (unlisted) 
companies making 56,160 in total.  
6.5 Variables calculation 
The variables calculation was based on the variable definitions provided in 
previous chapter. The short-term, long-term and total debt dependent variables 
are used in the present study. The dependent variables use the book value of 
the firm’s debt because they are in the form of bank loans. There are 13 (11) 
explanatory variables for listed (unlisted) firms that have been identified as 
potential determinants of capital structure. Moreover, some of these variables 
have alternative proxies.  
Table 6.4 summaries the calculation process of the selected dependents and 
independents variables including alternative proxies.  
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Table 6.4: Summary of the variables calculation  
Variable Proxies 
Dependent variables 
STD (Bank borrowing repayable in less than one year) / Total assets 
LTD (Bank borrowing repayable in more than one year) / Total assets 
TD ((STD) + (LTD)) / Total assets 
Independent variables 
SIZE Log (total sales) 
SIZE Log (total assets) 
PROFT EBITDA / Total assets 
PROFT EBITDA / Total sales 
TANG Fixed assets  / Total assets 
TANG (Fixed assets  + inventory)  / Total assets 
M / B (Total assets - Book Value of Equity + Market value of Equity at the end of each accounting year) / Total assets 
G. SALES (Total salest – Total salest-1) / Total salest-1 
G.ASSETS (Total assetst – Total assetst-1) / Total assetst-1 
RISK  SD (Net incomet - Net incomet-1) / Mean of Net income 
DIV Dividends paid / Net income 
DIVDUM Dummy variables, 1 if company paid dividends and zero otherwise 
FCF (EBIT + depreciation  - capital expenditure)/TA 
CR Current ratio = current assets / current liabilities 
QR Quick ratio = (current assets – inventory) / current liabilities 
UNIQ Sales & marketing expenses / Total assets 
UNIQDUM Dummy variables, 1 if company report Sales & marketing expenses and zero otherwise 
AGE Number of years since the company was founded 
LOGAGE Log (age) 
GOV % of outstanding shares owned by government 
GOVDUM Dummy variables, 1 if government hold shares in company and zero otherwise 
MINDUM Dummy variables, 1 if the company is belong to manufacturing sector and zero otherwise 
FARMDUM Dummy variables, 1 if the company is belong to agriculture sector and zero otherwise 
CEMEDUM Dummy variables, 1 if the company is belong to cement sector and zero otherwise 
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6.6 Data issues  
The fact that the data, in this dissertation, is a cross-section of firms raises 
concerns about the existence of heteroscedasticity. Pindyck and Rubinfeld 
(1998) state that “There are occasions in econometric modeling when the 
assumption of constant error variance, or homoscedasticity, is unreasonable. 
For example if one is examining a cross section of firms in one industry, error 
terms associated with large firms might have larger variance than those error 
terms associated with smaller firms…”(p. 146). Moreover, it probably arises 
when there is a wide range to the X variables, and when using grouped data, in 
which each observation is an average for a group and the groups are of 
different sizes (Greene, 2000). In the presence of such problem, the OLS 
parameter estimators are still unbiased and consistent, but are inefficient (not 
BLUE). This means that the variances of the estimated parameters are not the 
minimum variances. Further, the estimated variances of the estimated 
parameters will be biased estimators of the true variance of the estimated 
parameters.  
Another issue concerns the limited dependent variable in which the dependent 
variable (the level of debt) can take values between zero and one. Maddala 
(1983) argues that this problem occurs when dependent variables are limited 
in their range because of some choice mechanism. In this dissertation, the 
dependent variable is defined as the book value of debt (total, long or short 
term) divided by the book value of total assets. Thus, the values of the 
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dependent variable are generally constrained within the range of zero to one 
though this value can exceed one in extreme cases17.  
The existence of the lower limit (i.e. zero) and the upper limit (i.e. one) means 
that any results obtained from a regression model that are outside these limits 
are illogical. Maddala (1983) demonstrates that if an OLS estimator is used 
with a limited dependent variable, the residual will be correlated with the 
explanatory variables and, thus, the estimated parameters will be inconsistent 
and downward-biased (i.e. underestimate the true effect). Greene (2000) 
argues that such limits may cause the error term in an OLS regression to be 
heteroscedastic and the estimate will be biased toward zero. Generally, studies 
have dealt with this issue by using the estimation technique known as Tobit 
model. This model excludes the lower range of values (left truncation), upper 
range of values (right truncation), or both from the sample and, thus, it will 
produce slopes and standard errors that are less biased and more efficient than 
those obtained from OLS regression. In the framework of capital structure 
empirical studies, however, Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Bevan and 
Danbolt (2002) found that censored Tobit results are extremely similar to 
those obtained by employing OLS technique.  
Another common issue is when the data contain outlier observations. The 
outliers are the data points that are more than an arbitrary distance from the 
regression line (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). In another words, they are the 
data points that deviate from the rest of the data. In the presence of outliers, 
                                                 
17 This occurs when the company’s cumulative loss exceeds its capital. In this study, three 
unlisted companies reached this circumstance. However, according to article (180) of 
companies Act, the shareholders must provide financial guarantee letter that includes the 
shareholders commitment to pay the company’s debt if they decide to continue the business.  
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OLS estimation is inefficient and can be biased because its estimates are 
dragged towards the outliers, and because the variance of the estimates is 
artificially inflated. As is the case in most data, some outliers will be expected 
in the present study.  
6.7 Testing procedure 
This section outlines testing procedures designed to test the data and the 
hypotheses using techniques that take the above issues into account.  
6.7.1 Data testing 
The data testing is divided into two parts. The first pre-estimation procedure 
seeks to ensure the data is clean from outliers. The box plot based on 5 (inter-
quartile range) will be used to identify outliers in this dissertation due to the 
wide variation in the samples.  
The second part is post-estimation procedure, the objective of which is to 
ensure the estimation robustness. One instance in which robust estimation 
should be considered is when there is a strong suspicion of heteroscedasticity. 
To test for heteroscedasticity, The Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey test was used. In 
the presences of the heteroscedasticity, the White’s (1980) correction for 
heteroscedasticity was followed. Moreover, beside the correlation matrix, 
Variance Inflation Factor was used to test for multicollinearity. DFITS was 
employed to identify influential observations.  
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6.7.2 Hypotheses test  
The aim of this part is to investigate the theory and empirically suggested 
determinates of capital structure for both listed and unlisted companies. 
Although the capital structure literature provides information about the 
variables that influence capital structure and the nature of the influence, there 
is no certain model that can appropriately formulate the relationship. 
However, the majority of empirical analyses use a model in which debt ratio 
is regressed on a list of explanatory variables.  
Moreover, empirical analysis has traditionally used different types of data 
analysis, namely, pure time-series, pure cross-sectional, pooled and panel. 
However, few studies have been found in the literature to implement more 
than one type of analysis. In their work, Bevan and Danbolt (2004) found 
significant differences in the results obtained by employing pooled OLS from 
those obtained by using panel analysis, in particular, fixed effects estimation. 
Therefore, it is worth to investigate to what extent the results are sensitive to 
the changes in the estimation based on data types. To extend Bevan and 
Danbolt’s (2004) work, the analysis will be extended to involve also pure 
time-series and pure cross-sectional data regression analyses. 
Moreover, to test the hypotheses that previously developed in chapter 4, there 
are two general estimated models. The first one is examining the relationship 
between the debt ratios and capital structure determinants for listed firms. The 
second is examining the relationship between the debt ratios and capital 
structure determinants for unlisted firms.  
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6.7.2.1 Pooled time-series and cross-sectional analysis 
Generally, comparison studies start first with pooled regression. This model 
has a single overall intercept term (α) and coefficient estimates are based on 
variation between firms and over time. Accordingly, the estimated equations 
are as follow: 
Listed  
Leverage i, t = α + β1 SIZE i, t + β2 PROFT i, t + β3 TANG i, t + β4 M/Bi,t + β5 
RISK i,04 + β6 DIV i, t + β7 FCF i, t + β8 CR i, t + β9 UNIQ i, t + β10  AGE i, t + β11 
GOV. i, t+ β12 MINDUM + β13 FARMDUM + β14  CEMEDUM+  ε i, t 
Unlisted Leverage i, t = α + β1 SIZE i, t + β2 PROFT i, t + β3 TANG i, t + β4 G. 
Sales i, t + β5 RISK i, 04 + β6 DIV i, t + β7 FCF i, t + β8 CR i, t + β9 UNIQ i, t + β10   
AGE i, t + β11 MINDUM + β12 FARMDUM + εi,t 
Where i denote the individual firms, t refers to the time period (i.e. from 2000 
to 2004). Moreover, leverage refers to each of the leverage measures (i.e. total 
debt to total assets, short-term debt to total assets, and long-term debt to total 
assets). Due to its construction, risk proxy refers to year 2004.  
It is important to note that there is only one company from the 
telecommunication sector in the listed sample. Due to the nature of its 
business, it is included with the service sector. In both samples, the service 
sector is selected as the base because it constitutes the largest sector in the 
unlisted sample and the second largest in listed sample; it is also expected to 
be the one with lower levels of debt. Moreover, in unlisted sample regression 
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GOV and CEMEDUM variables are excluded since there were no unlisted 
government-linked and cement companies included in the sample.  
However, one issue associated with pooled analysis is that firms in the sample 
are included more than once over study period. This in turn may potentially 
overstate t-statistics (Barclay et al, 1995 and Bevan and Danbolt, 2004). 
6.7.2.2 Cross-sectional data analysis 
 
In pure average cross-sectional estimation, the two equations of the listed and 
the unlisted sample will be also estimated for the three debt elements. The 
regression estimation includes the 2004 debt level as dependent variable and 
the explanatory variables are four year average (2000-2003) except risk proxy. 
This process will produce more robust estimation since lagging will reduce 
the potential reverse causality between dependent and explanatory variables 
while averaging will reduce the effect of fluctuation in the explanatory 
variables (Titman and Wessels, 1988, Rajan and Zingales, 1995 and Bevan 
and Danbolt, 2002). Accordingly, the estimated equations are as follow: 
Listed  
Leveragei, 04 = α + β1 SIZEi, t-4 + β2 PROFTi, t-4  + β3 TANGi, t-4  + β4 M/Bi, t-4  
+ β5 RISKi, 04  + β6 DIVi, t-4  + β7 FCF i, t-4  + β8 CR i, t-4  + β9 UNIQ i, t-4  + β10   
AGE i, t-4  + β11 GOV. i, t-4  + β12   MINDUM + β13   FARMDUM + β14 
CEMEDUM+ εi 
Unlisted 
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 Leverage i, 04 = α + β1 SIZE i, t-4   + β2 PROFT i, t-4   + β3 TANG i, t-4   + β4 G. 
Sales i, t-4   + β5 RISK i, 04 + β6 DIV i, t-4  + β7 FCF i, t-4  + β8 CR i, t-4  + β9 UNIQ 
i, t-4  + β10   AGE i, t-4  + β11   MINDUM + β12   FARMDUM + εi 
Where i denote the individual firms, t-4 refers to the average for the previous 
four years (i.e. from 2000 to 2003). Moreover, leverage refers to each of the 
leverage measures (i.e. total debt to total assets, short-term debt to total assets, 
and long-term debt to total assets) at year 2004.  
Though it reduces the effects of the dispersion across firms, averaging the 
sample over the period of study ignores the time effects that should be 
considered in the analysis. Accordingly, it is important to investigate the 
association between debt elements and company characteristics using panel 
model since it incorporates both time-series as well as cross-sectional effects.  
6.7.2.3 Yearly cross-sectional estimation  
To illustrate the importance of the issues associated with pooled and cross-
sectional data analyses and to show the advantage of using panel data over 
these two analyses, it is important to run yearly cross-sectional estimation. In 
this analysis, the two equations of the listed and the unlisted sample are 
estimated for the three debt elements (i.e. short and long-term and total debts) 
for every year covered in this study (2000 through 2004). This process will 
result in estimating a total of 30 models of which 10 models are estimated for 
each debt element. 
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6.7.2.4 Panel data analysis 
Two approaches may be used in panel data analysis: fixed effects or random 
effects. The fixed effects model includes an intercept for each firm to capture 
firm-specific effects and coefficient estimates reflect within-firm variation. On 
the other hand, the random effects model assumes firm-specific effects are 
random variables and models them as part of the error term and coefficient 
estimates are based on average variation between firms and within firms. 
Generally, the choice between the two approaches depends on the Hausman 
specification test for the random and fixed effects.  
However, the panel data model, in particular the fixed effects model, has more 
improvements in estimation than time-series, cross-sectional and pooled 
models by controlling for firms heterogeneity bias. Baltagi (1995) argue that 
if omitted explanatory variables are correlated with explanatory variables 
included in the model, time-series, and cross-sectional studies not controlling 
for such heterogeneity run the risk of obtaining biased and inconsistent 
resulting estimates. Barclay et al. (1995) and Bevan and Danbolt, (2004) 
argue further that failure to control for time-invariant firm-specific factors 
may cause to observe over-estimate bias in the significance of coefficient 
under pooled OLS. Since fixed effects model assumes that omitted variables 
are constant over the time frame of study (time-invariant variables) and focus 
on within-firm variation, the heterogeneity bias is avoided.  
 Accordingly, given the potential importance for time-invariant firm-specific 
heterogeneity, fixed effects approach will be used in the analysis. Moreover, 
three explanatory variables, namely, industries dummies, government 
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ownership, and Risk are excluded from the estimated models. While 
industries dummies and government ownership variables are excluded from 
the estimation because they do not vary over time; the risk measure is omitted 
due to its construction issue.  
6.7.3 Estimation technique 
 A number of previous studies have employed different regression techniques 
to estimate models: linear structural equation modelling technique (Titman 
and Wessels, 1988); Logit estimation procedure (Jordan et al., 1998); Tobit 
estimator model (Rajan and Zingales, 1995 and Bevan and Danbolt, 2002); 
panel-data estimation procedure (Antoniou et al., 2002 and Bevan and 
Danbolt, 2004) In the present study, a large number of companies had zero 
debt as Table 6.5 demonstrates. 
 
 Moreover, Greene (2000, p. 924) states that the “Tobit model remains the 
standard approach to modelling a dependent variable that display a large 
cluster of limit values, usually zeros”. In order to overcome the truncation 
issue and to retain all the desired regression properties, the Tobit estimation 
technique will be employed in this dissertation but not for fixed effects model.  
 
Table 6.5: summary number of dependent variable with zero value 
STD LTD TD  
No. Of cases with 0 % No. Of cases with 0 % No. Of cases with 0 % 
Listed 90 30 131 44 87 29 
Unlisted 789 39 1626 81 752 37 
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6.8 Conclusion  
This chapter presented the research method followed in this study. The sample 
involves data from both listed and unlisted companies. Unlike developed 
countries, for Saudi Arabia there is no readily available computerised database 
such as Datastream or Compustat. Accordingly, the data collection has been a 
major task in this study. The data has been hand-collected from reliable 
sources (i.e. ministry of commerce& industry and capital market authority). 
The final sample includes data for 463 companies of which 60 companies are 
listed and 403 companies are unlisted over the period of 2000 to 2004. 
Furthermore, this chapter discussed testing procedures designed to test both 
the data and the hypotheses under investigation. Pre-estimation and post-
estimation test procedures are followed in this study to ensure the data is clean 
from outliers and ensure the estimation robustness. To test the hypotheses and 
the sensitivity of the results, various model and estimation techniques are 
proposed. Cross-sectional (yearly and average), pooled and panel models will 
be employed in this study. To estimate these models, Tobit, OLS and fixed 
effects estimation techniques will be undertaken. 
 
 175 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7:  RESULTS 
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7.1 Introduction 
This chapter present the results of capital structure determinants in Saudi 
Arabia. Specifically, this chapter seeks to provide answers to the research 
questions in the context of the culture and institutional aspects of Saudi 
Arabia. The chapter starts with a detailed debt analysis. Such analysis will 
provide the basis for the interpretation of determinates of the capital structure 
of the listed and unlisted companies in Saudi Arabia.    
This chapter is organised as follows: section 7.2 presents debt analysis. 
Section 7.3 presents the analysis of the determinants of the capital structure 
that includes pooled, average, yearly panel data analyses. Section 7.4 presents 
the alternative pro xies analysis. Section 7.5 presents robustness check. 
Finally, the chapter end with section 7.6 which presents the chapter 
conclusion. 
7.2 Debt Analysis  
Previous cross-country studies emphasis the importance of institutional 
characteristics in determining the choice between debt and equity financing. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), argue that the difference between the so-called 
bank-oriented countries Japan, Germany, France and Italy and in the so-called 
market-oriented countries US, UK and Canada is reflected in the level of 
leverage. This part of analysis focus on debt level of listed and unlisted 
companies in light of the socio-cultural and institutional characteristics 
provided in chapter four. 
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In order for us to have a clear vision about the capital structure determinants 
in Saudi Arabia, it is very important to have a close look at the debt elements 
of the listed and unlisted companies. Bevan and Danbolt (2002) suggest that 
analyses of gearing based only upon long-term debt provide only one piece of 
the picture, and a fuller understanding of capital structure and its determinants 
requires a detailed analysis of all forms of corporate debt. Table 7.1 provides a 
descriptive summary of the short-term debt (STD), long-term debt (LTD), 
total debt (TD), and total liabilities (TL) ratios (all scaled by total assets) for 
listed and unlisted companies.  
From this table, it can be seen that Saudi listed firms generally have a lower 
level of total debt than unlisted firms do (10.9% for listed compared 16.3% for 
unlisted). However, at the disaggregate level, unlisted firms rely more havely 
on short-term debt (12.9% for unlisted compared to 5.3% for listed) but on 
substantially lower amounts of long-term debt than listed firms (5.7% for 
Table 7.1: Summary statistics of financial ratios for listed and unlisted firms. 
Debt Type STD LTD TD TL 
Panel A: Listed companies 
Mean 5.3% 5.7% 10.9% 27.2% 
Median 1.5% 0.8% 4.0% 24.0% 
SD 8.3% 9.5% 13.8% 16.7 
Min 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.05% 
Max 54.4% 45.0% 57.9% 83.1% 
N 60 60 60 60 
Panel B: Unlisted companies 
Mean 12.9% 3.5% 16.3% 51.51% 
Median 4.2% 0.0% 7% 53.24% 
SD 18% 11% 21% 24% 
Min 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
Max 102.3% 124.1% 124.1% 159.8% 
N 403 403 403 403 
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listed compared to 3.5% for unlisted). This may reflect the fact that unlisted 
firms are more likely to be small firms; thus, they do not have access to the 
capital markets and nor do they have easy access to long-term bank debt; 
hence, they rely on short-term debt and on their profit to finance growth.  
The table further shows that total liabilities on average accounted for 27.2% 
and 57.5% of the total assets for listed and unlisted companies respectively. 
This highlights the striking differences between listed and unlisted firms in 
term of financing choice. The table shows that, in general, listed firm are less 
dependent on debt elements compared to unlisted firms. This in turn indicates 
that listed firm are using alternative financing instruments. Accordingly, 
further analysis has been carried out to determine firm’s financing preference.  
Figure 7.1 shows that both groups rely heavily on external rather than internal 
financing18. However, listed companies seem to finance their growth mainly 
by using equity with about 57%, followed by liability with about 27% and 
finally internally generated funds with about 16%. However, Table 7.1 shows 
that total debt constitutes about 11% of total assets (about 40% of total 
liability).  
                                                 
18 The calculation method is as follow: 
Internal finance = (retained earning+ provisions)/ assets 
External finance (liability) = total liability/assets 
External finance (equity) = 1- Internal finance - External finance (debt) 
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Figure 7.1: Financial preferences 
 
 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, the high level of equity financing and the low level of debt 
financing may reflect the institutional characteristics of Saudi Arabia. It has 
been observed in chapter four that market capitalization has an average 
growth of 53.8% over the period 2000 to 2004 with the number of companies 
listed in the market remaining relatively constant. This implies that the market 
has witnessed increase in both the price and the number of shares of existing 
listed companies over the period. According to equity market timing 
consideration, firms tend to raise substantial amounts of equity capital when 
the equity market is perceived to be more favourable (Baker and Wurgler, 
2002). Therefore, the increase in the share price reduces the cost of equity, in 
particular when firms perceive their shares valuations are high and, thus 
motivate the existing companies to raise equity, which is reflected in the high 
level of equity observed in the above figure.  
The low level of observed debt in the listed sample can be explained also by 
the weak legal system and weak enforcement of the law in Saudi Arabia 
compared to developed countries (assuming well-developed legal systems). It 
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has been pointed out earlier in chapter four that bankruptcy law is more 
friendly to creditors, thus, banks impose costly requirements in their long-
term lending policy (e.g. sufficient collateral assets at least to cover 100% of 
the value of the loan). This in turns increase the cost of debt. On the other 
hand, the lacks of enforcement of company law, individual shareholders do 
not have sufficient investment protection. Share capital has become somewhat 
a ‘‘free’’ source of finance. Moreover, it has been pointed in chapter four that 
corporate bond market virtually does not exist in Saudi arabia due to the 
constrain imposed by the company Law on the issuance of bond, which states 
that the total amount of bonds a company may issue to not exceed paid up 
capital. Such constrain keeps the issuing cost of corporate bond expensive 
and, thus, inhibited the popularity of such debt instrument among Saudi firms. 
Saudi companies are also subject to pay annually zakat that is 2.5 % of the 
zakat base. This trivial level of tax (Zakat) makes the tax advantage of debt 
suggested by trade-off theory negligible. Barakat and Rao (2004) argue that, 
in the non-tax Arab countries (included is Saudi Arabia), the use of debt is no 
different from the use of equity as the payout on both is treated the same in 
the absence of tax advantages of debt for the corporation or tax advantage of 
equity for the investor. Therefore, in the absence of tax advantages of debt, 
Saudi firms prefer to issue the cheap equity rather than costly debt.   
On the other hand, Figure 7.1 shows that unlisted companies use external 
finance other than equity, which is mainly total liability with about 52%, 
followed by internally generated funds with about 25% and finally equity with 
about 23%.  
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7.2.1 International comparison 
In general, the indebtedness of Saudi companies is very low compared to the 
level of debt of the companies in other countries found in previous studies. If 
compared to the international data found in Rajan and Zingales (1995), the 
Saudi listed firms can be regarded as significantly under levered in term of 
total debt. Indeed, the 10.9% of total debt is far below the 37%, 52%, 39%, 
46%, 46%, 29%, and 39% for United States, Japan Germany, France, Italy, 
United Kingdom, and Canada respectively. To further confirm this fact, 
Figure 7.2 provides a comparison between the debt level components of the 
Saudi listed firms and their UK counterparts based on 1997 data found in 
Bevan and Danbolt (2004)19.  
Figure 7.2: Debt components comparison between Saudi listed and UK firms  
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From this figure, it appears that there is a significant difference in financing 
preferences between Saudi and UK companies in terms of total liabilities ratio 
(TLIABS). While this ratio constitutes 48.94% of the total assets of UK 
companies, it forms 27.2% of the total assets of Saudi companies. On the 
                                                 
19 These data extracted from table A1 (page, 65). BBLT1 refers to the average of bank 
borrowing repayable in less than one year and BBGT1 refers to the average of bank 
borrowing repayable in more than one year.   
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other hand, it can be seen that there are insignificant differences between 
average total bank debt (TD) of Saudi companies and the total bank barrowing 
(BBLT1+BBGT1) of UK companies (10.9% versus 10.5%). In term of short-
term and long-term bank debt, also there are insignificant differences 
observed as the figure demonstrate. However, securitized debt is found to 
forms about 44% of the long-term debt in Bevan and Danbolt’s data. 
Therefore, it is not surprise to observe lower long-term debt among Saudi 
companies since there is very weak existence for bond debt.  
Since European SMEs studied by Hall et al. (2004) demonstrates almost the 
same average size of unlisted companies, a comparison between them is 
conducted. The mean of the size of Saudi unlisted firms as measured by the 
total assets is £19.3m, as we will see shortly in descriptive statistics, compared 
to the average size £19.4m of the European SMEs found in Hall et al. (2004). 
This implies that the majority of unlisted firms are SMEs. In terms of short-
term debt, the 12.9% ratio of total assets is far below the 62.9%, 49.8%, 
48.3%, 48.0%, 47.5%, 46.4%, 44.8%, and 38.2% for Italy, Spain, UK, 
Portugal, Ireland, Netherlands, Belgium, and Germany respectively. On the 
other hand, in terms of long-term debt, Saudi companies with 3.9% are second 
largest before Dutch companies with 2.1%, and far below German firms, the 
most heavily reliant on long-term debt with 28.5%.   
7.3 Determinants of capital structure analysis 
7.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
 In the previous chapter, there are 11 variables for listed firms and 10 
variables for unlisted firms identified as potential determinants of capital 
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structure; some of these variables have alternative proxies. Table 7.2 provides 
summary statistics for the variables for the unlisted and listed companies 
respectively. All explanatory variables are detailed in terms of mean, median, 
maximum, and standard deviation values.  
 From this table, it can be seen that the original scale of the measures of size 
are reported to provide meaningful information. Generally, the mean value of 
total sales of listed firms is greater than unlisted firms by about 16 times with 
SAR1510.7m and SAR97.2m (about £232m and £15m) for listed and unlisted 
companies respectively. Similarly, the listed firms’ mean value of total assets 
is far greater than unlisted firms by about 2700% with SAR3389.9m and 
SAR125.4m (about £521m and £19.3m) for listed and unlisted companies 
respectively. These observed information confirm the fact that listed firms are 
greater than unlisted firms in term of size.  
Contrary to the findings for size, it seems that unlisted firms are more 
profitable than listed firms. On average, the EBITDA accounted for only 9.8% 
of the total assets of listed firms and 28.3% of the total assets of unlisted 
firms. However, the mean of return on sales (ROS) for unlisted companies 
with 26.9% is slightly higher than 26.5% for listed firms. This finding reflects 
the fact that the profitability measure is very sensitive to which size variables 
(i.e. total assets or total sales) is used as the denominator of the profitability 
proxy at least in this study. 
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20 ₤1 is approximately equal to about 6.5 SAR. 
Table 7.2: Summary statistics of explanatory variables of listed and unlisted companies 
Sales and total assets represent the original value in Saudi  Riyal, ROA and ROS refer to EBITDA/Total assets and net income /Sales respectively, TANG1 and TANG2 are 
fixed assets / Total assets and fixed assets & inventory / Total assets respectively, FCF refers to the ratio of (operating cash flow- capital expenditure) to total assets, CR and 
QR refer to current ratio and Quick ratio respectively, UNIQ represents the ratio of marketing & selling expenses to sales, M/B is the market to book ratio, G. Sale and G. 
Assets refer to percentage change in total sales and percentage change in total assets over the period of study  respectively, DIV is the ratio of dividend paid to annual 
income,  RISK is the  standard deviation of the first difference in annual earnings over mean earnings over the period of study, , Age is the number of years since the 
company was founded, GOV is the percentage of shares held by the government MIN, FAR,  CEM and SER refer to manufacturing, farming, cement and service sectors 
dummy variables respectively. 
 
SIZE 
(Sales in m 
SAR20) 
SIZE 
(Assets in m 
SAR) 
ROA ROS 
TANG 
1 
 
TANG 
2 
 
M/B G. Sale G. Assets RISK DIV FCF CR QR UNIQ AGE GOV MIN FAR SER CEM 
Panel A: Listed companies 
Mean 1,510.7 3,389.9 9.8% 26.5% 44.7% 53.6% 1.6 20.5% 8.9% 0.24 38.1% 4.8% 2 1.5 6% 20.4 9.8% 41.7% 15.0% 30% 13.3% 
Median 185.2 739.5 8% 26% 48.6% 58.5% 1.3 4.6% 0.0% 0.11 28.8% 4% 1.4 1 3% 19 0     
Max 68,539.1 124,944.6 42% 111% 92.5% 92.8% 6.1 1165.3% 483.8% 12.98 340% 32% 13 13 57.5% 52 73%     
S. D 6,354.5 13,986.7 8.7% 29.9% 24.7% 25.2% 1.04 95.5% 39.3% 1.69 116.7% 10.1% 1.9 1.7 8.1% 10.5 18.4%     
Panel B: Unlisted companies 
Mean 97.2 125.4 28.3% 26.9% 25% 43% na  53.5% 11.6% 1.2 50.3% 6.5% 2.28 1.7 5.1% 14.2 na  29.5% 4.0% 66.5% na 
Median 28.8 28.2 23.6% 25% 17.7% 43.8% na 1% 0% 0.23 0.0% 4.4% 1.4 1.05 0% 13 na     
Max 7,153.9 13,507.7 373.2% 124.6% 95% 99.4% na 30785% 1754.5% 721.5 3393.6% 776.9% 52.5 40 116.7% 50 na     
S. D 305.6 668.4 23.4% 16% 23% 26.9% na 929.2% 67.7% 31.12 190.1% 28.3 3.4 2.8 9.2% 7.4 na     
 185 
The means of the asset structure proxies of listed firms (i.e. the ratio of fixed 
assets & inventory and the ratio of net fixed assets both scaled by total assets) 
accounted for 53.6% and 44.7% of total assets respectively. These levels are 
higher than those observed in the unlisted firm sample, which are 43.1% and 
25.1% of total assets respectively. Beside the fact that listed firms are larger 
than unlisted firms in term of assets, it is reflect the fact that the majority of 
companies in the unlisted sample operate in the service sector, which is 
characterized by less intensity of fixed assets. With regard to the free cash 
flow, liquidity, and uniqueness variables, the table illustrates that, on average, 
unlisted companies have slightly higher ratios than those listed companies, 
excluding the uniqueness ratio.  
In terms of growth, the mean of the market to book ratio for listed firms is 1.6. 
This may reflect that the sharp increase in stock prices during the study period 
made the market value of equity higher than its book value. However, in terms 
of growth in sales and assets, the table demonstrates that unlisted firms are 
witnessing much higher growth than listed firms.  
The table also shows that, on average, 38% of the earnings of listed firms are 
paid out as dividends, which is considered relatively high. This implies that 
listed firms are paying dividends for future external equity financing since 
equity is the main source of finance (figure 6.1). This is consistent with (La 
Porta, et al., 1999) argument that, in developing countries, firms pay dividends 
to build the reputation to market future stock issues. For unlisted companies, 
about 50% of the earnings are paid out as dividends. This implies that the 
shareholders of unlisted firms want to enjoy half of the company’s earnings 
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and retained the other half for the future growth. The volatility in annual 
earnings as a measure of risk indicates that unlisted firms are more risky than 
those listed firms. Also, it can be seen from the table that listed firm are older 
than unlisted firms. Finally, it can be observed that firms operating in the 
service sector form the majority (66.5%) of unlisted sample, while the 
majority (41.7%) of listed firms are in manufacturing. 
7.3.2 Data testing  
It has pointed out in the previous chapter that box plot procedure based on 5 
(inter-quartile range) is used to identify outliers in this dissertation due to the 
wide variation in the samples. Table 7.3 summarises the number of outliers 
identified for each variable and their percentage for the listed and unlisted 
samples. 
Table 7.3: Summary of outliers 
Outliers 
Variables Listed Unlisted 
 No. (%) No. (%) 
STD 2 0.7 0 0.0 
LTD 3 1.0 98 4.9 
TD 0 0.0 0 0.0 
SIZE (sales) 0 0.0 0 0.0 
SIZE (assets) 0 0.0 0 0.0 
ROA 0 0.0 102 5.1 
ROS 2 0. 7 49 2.4 
TANG1 0 0.0 0 0.0 
TANG2 0 0.0 0 0.0 
M/B 0 0.0   
G. Sales 13 4.3 62 3.1 
G. Assets 13 4.3 43 2.1 
RISK 32 10.7 114 5.7 
DIV 1 0.3 38 1.9 
FCF 0 0.0 16 0.8 
CR 4 1.3 100 5.0 
QR 11 3.7 82 4.1 
UNIQ 1 0.3 9 0.4 
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After outlier observations were detected, the next step is cleaning the sample 
from outliers. There are several approaches to dealing with outliers. A simple 
method and the one used in this study is to winsorise the data by replacing the 
extreme observations with the nearest un-outlier neighbours. 
Moreover, investigation of the present of the influential observations is also 
carried out in the present study using DFFITS process. As the table in the 
appendix 8 shows, numbers of influential observations (in both samples, less 
than 1% of the total observations) are identified in all models. Accordingly, 
influential observations are excluded from the models and reduced sample 
models are estimated. The unbalanced panel date fixed effect estimation 
technique results reveal that the effect of influential observation is marginal in 
unlisted sample and somewhat more important in listed sample. This most 
likely is due to sample size considerations.   
In the listed sample, with 4 out of the 300 appear to be influential 
observations, the major changes are observed in total debt model. The 
insignificant positive relationship with size and uniqueness observed under 
unreduced regression turn into significant at 1% and 5% levels respectively 
while the insignificant negative relationship with liquidity and age turn into 
significant at 1% and 5% levels respectively. Apparently, these changes 
reflect the changes observed at disaggregate levels. In short-term debt model, 
with 5 observations appear to be influential observations, the insignificant 
negative relationships with size turns into positively significant at 5% level 
and the insignificant negative relationships with age turns into significant at 
10% level. With only 2 observations seem to be influential observations, there 
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is no major change observed in long-term debt model except the increases in 
the significant level of the relationships with ROA and uniqueness proxies. 
Accordingly, these specifics relationships should be interpreted with caution 
in the analysis section.  In unlisted sample, though 13, 17 and 13 out of 2015 
are identified as influential observations in short-term, long-term and total 
debt respectively, the significant and the direction of the relationships of 
variables remain unchanged other than the positively significant at 1% 
relationship between tangibility and long-term debt decreased into 5% 
significance level. In light of these evidences, one would conclude that, the 
influence of the influential observations is minimal at least in unlisted sample. 
7.3.3 Result analysis 
Prior empirical studies have traditionally used different estimation methods 
based on the types of data to investigate the determinants of firm’s capital 
structure. The most common methods are pooled, pure average cross-
sectional, pure yearly cross-sectional and panel data analyses. Therefore, it is 
worth to investigate to what extent the obtained results are sensitive to the 
changes in the estimation methods. In their work, Bevan and Danbolt (2004) 
found significant differences in the results obtained by employing pooled OLS 
from those obtained by using panel analysis, in particular, fixed effects 
estimation. Accordingly, pooled, pure average cross-sectional, pure yearly 
cross-sectional and panel data analyses are curried out in this dissertation to 
provide a comprehensive analysis about the determinants of firm’s capital 
structure of listed and unlisted Saudi companies. The STATA application 
version (9) was used here to run the regressions. Moreover, Harris and Raviv 
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(1991) emphasise that the interpretation of the results must consider the 
differences in measuring both debt ratios and the dependent variables of 
interest. Indeed, the results of the meta-analysis procedure (chapter three) 
show that the debt and the attributes measurements are sensitive cases in 
determining the observed relationship with leverage. Therefore, different debt 
elements and alternative proxies have been employed in this dissertation to 
draw a general conclusion about the real determinants of listed and unlisted 
Saudi companies’ capital structure. 
7.3.4 Pooled analysis 
Using Tobit procedure, the debt ratios were censored at one, as there was 
several observations found above one. Table 7.4 presents the results for both 
listed and unlisted firms respectively. The table shows that all models report 
significant χ2 indicating the rejection of the null hypothesis of joint 
insignificance of the coefficients at less than 1% level. In addition, adjusted 
R2 is reported instead of the default output associated with TOBIT technique 
pseudo-R2. According to STATA Corp, the pseudo-R2 has no real meaning in 
terms of goodness-of-fit and, thus, it is better to calculate the R2 between the 
predicted and observed values21. The calculated R2 is similar to the one found 
in the OLS regression (www.stata.com/support/faqs/stat/pseudor2.html). 
Moreover, Graham et al. (1998) also report R2 with TOBIT estimation. 
Nevertheless, the table shows that the adjusted R2s’ differ among all models in 
both samples. The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test and the variance 
                                                 
21 To calculate the R2 in Stata, the following commands were used after each regression:  
predict p, quietly correlate p dependent variable and then display r^2. Then, adjusted R2 is 
calculated as follow = 1- ((1 - R2)((N-1) / (N - K))) Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998, p. 90) 
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inflation factor (VIF) are also reported and they will be discussed later in 
robustness check section. 
7.3.4.1 Size  
The proxy for size attribute is the natural log of assets. Table 7.4 shows that 
the regression coefficients of both samples for the effect of size on all debt 
ratios are systematically positive and statistically significant at the 1% level 
other than the relationship with short-term debt in listed sample. The results of 
the correlation with total debt reveals positive and significant at 1% with the 
highest magnitude observed among debt ratios in both samples. This finding 
is also consistent with the finding of previous empirical researchers using log 
of assets as proxy for size, which show that about 98% of the significant 
results are positively correlated with total debt. Moreover, these results appear 
to be driven by the results observed at disaggregate level. In listed sample, it 
seems that the obtained positively significant at 1% level relationship with 
long-term is the driving force since the relationship with short-term is 
insignificant. This implies that large firms rely more on long-term debt when 
they chose debt to finance their growth. In unlisted sample, on the other hand, 
the obtained positively significant at 1% level relationship with both short-
term and long-term debt ratios appears to be responsible for the results with 
total debt. This in turn implies that small-unlisted firms face difficulties in 
accessing both short-term and long-term banks debt. 
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Table 7.4: Pooled regression results of listed & unlisted sample based on Tobit estimation 
technique 
STD, LTD and TD refer to short-term, long-term, and total debt respectively. Size is the log of total assets. ROA refers to the 
return on assets. TANG1 is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. FCF refers to the earnings before interest and tax plus 
depreciation less capital expenditure normalised by total assets. QR refers to the quick ratio. UNIQ is the ratio of selling & 
marketing expenses to total sales. M/B refers to the market to book ratio and G.ASSETS is the growth in assets for listed and 
unlisted companies. DIV refers to dividends paid divided by net income. LOGAGE is the log number of years since firm 
founded. RISK is the standard deviation of the first difference in annual earnings over mean of annual earnings. GOV is the 
percentage of shares held by the government. MINDUM, CEMEDUM, and FARMDUM refer to manufacturing, cement, and 
farming sectors dummy variables respectively. White’s heteroskedastic-consistent covariance matrix estimation is used to 
adjust for heteroskedasticity. Probability of (Z) is in parentheses. Notes: *, **, and *** denote significant at the 10, 5, and 1% 
respectively (two tails). 
Listed (n = 300) Unlisted (n = 2015) 
 Exp. Sign STD LTD TD VIF STD LTD TD VIF 
0.016 0.033*** 0.050*** 1.82 0.059*** 0.019*** 0.092*** 1.4 LOGASSETS + 
(0.101) (0.003) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
0.224*** -0.227*** 
0.003 1.77 -0.046** -0.040*** -0.118*** 1.4 ROA - 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.966)  (0.037) (0.000) (0.000)  
0.001 0.086*** 0.086** 1.32 -0.115*** 0.092*** 0.035 1.3 TANG1 +/- (0.936) (0.000) (0.011)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.110)  
-0.248*** -0.054 -0.339*** 1.74 -0.124*** -0.011** -0.144*** 1.3 FCF - (0.001) (0.450) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.020) (0.000)  
-0.010** -0.005 -0.016*** 1.32 -0.032*** 0.002* -0.028*** 1.2 QR - (0.020) (0.122) (0.004)  (0.000) (0.052) (0.000)  
-0.014 -0.027 -0.055 1.73 0.001 0.049*** 0.078 1.2 UNIQ - (0.801) (0.661) (0.531)  (0.982) (0.005) (0.158)  
-0.003 -0.006 -0.008 1.81     M/B Ins (0.402) (0.157) (0.192)      
    -0.044*** -0.011*** -0.067*** 1.1 G. ASSETS Ins     (0.001) (0.004) (0.000)  
-0.009 -0.024** -0.034** 1.19 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 1.1 DIV -/+ (0.173) (0.016) (0.012)  (0.609) (0.237) (0.223)  
-0.048** -0.026 -0.074** 1.32 0.081*** -0.020*** 0.055*** 1.1 LOGAGE -/+ (0.033) (0.228) (0.020)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.004)  
-0.001 0.003 0.002 1.07 0.0001** 0.0001 0.0001* 1.0 RISK - (0.757) (0.280) (0.649)  (0.039) (0.571) (0.084)  
-0.085*** -0.020 -0.103*** 1.73     GOV + (0.000) (0.445) (0.004)      
0.040*** 0.067*** 0.109*** 1.79 0.005 0.016*** 0.019* 1.3 MINDUM + (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.534) (0.000) (0.068)  
0.032** 0.044** 0.081*** 2.35     CEMEDUM + (0.013) (0.037) (0.002)      
-0.008 -0.016 -0.023 1.94 -0.028 -0.001 -0.052** 1.1 FARMDUM - (0.432) (0.263) (0.230)  (0.220) (0.908) (0.040)  
-0.030 -0.222** -0.249*  -0.309*** -0.114*** -0.511***  INTERCEPT (0.745) (0.025) (0.075)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
Wald χ2 -test 117.14*** 96.84*** 153.06***  625.30*** 377.39*** 803.43***  
Adjusted R2 0.2589 0.2395 0.3094  0.1878 0.2565 0.2330  
Breusch - Pagan 
/Cook-Weisberg 
Hetero test 
87.04*** 82.45*** 54.16***  257.81*** 751.55*** 237.28***  
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Moreover, the table shows that short-term debt has higher magnitude than 
long-term debt while these magnitudes are opposite in listed sample. This may 
suggest that while large listed firms rely more on long-term debt, large 
unlisted firms rely more on short-term debt than on long-term debt.  
Accordingly, one is unable to reject the hypothesis that size has a positive 
influence on debt ratios in both samples other than the relationship with short-
term debt in listed sample where it is found insignificant. 
6.4.2.2 Profitability 
The return on assets (ROA) is used as the proxy for profitability. The results 
for listed sample reveal insignificant positive relationship between 
profitability and total debt. The strong positive and negative association with 
short-term and long-term debt ratios most likely drives this result. 
Accordingly, the observed negative relationship with long-term debt is 
consistent with pecking order hypothesis. On the other hand, the positive 
relationship with short-term debt is consistent with trade-off theory that 
suggests a positive relationship between debt and profitability due to tax 
considerations. However, it has been pointed out earlier that Saudi companies 
pay small level of tax (Zakat), which makes the tax advantage of debt for 
firms negligible. Nevertheless, this positive relationship may suggest that 
profitable firms resort to short-term debt to finance their current assets.  
On the other hand, the results of unlisted sample show that profitability has 
systematically significant (1%) negative influence on all debt ratios other than 
short-term debt where the significant level is 5%. This is interpreted as 
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meaning that a firm with higher profitability has lower debt ratios. These 
results, thus, lend strong support to the pecking order hypothesis.  
Moreover, the meta-analysis conducted in chapter three reveals that 100% and 
98.32% of the significant results finds a negative relationship between ROA 
and total and long-term debt ratios respectively. Therefore, the negative 
results observed in long-term in listed sample and all debt elements in unlisted 
sample are consistent with the prediction and with previous studies' findings 
using ROA as proxy for profitability.  
In sum, one is unable to reject hypotheses that profitability is negatively 
correlated with debt levels other than total and short-term debt ratios in listed 
sample, which are found insignificant with the first and positive with the 
second. 
7.3.4.2 Tangibility 
The ratio of fixed assets to total assets is used as proxy for tangibility. In listed 
sample, the relationship between tangibility and total debt is positive and 
significant at 5% level. At the disaggregate level, however, the strong positive 
relationship observed with long-term debt is the key element of the observed 
result in total debt since the relationship with short-term debt seems to be 
insignificant. In unlisted sample, on the other hand, the relationship between 
tangibility and total debt is insignificant. The strong negative and positive 
association with short-term and long-term debt ratios most likely drives this 
result.  
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In general, the positive relationship with long-term debt found in both samples 
implies that firms with sufficient collateral asset have easier access to long-
term bank loans. Recall that one of the requirements of Saudi banks to lend 
long-term debt is a sufficient collateral asset at least to cover 100% of the 
value of the loan. Moreover, it is consistent with meta-analysis finding that 
97.52% of significant results find positive relationship between tangibility and 
book based long-term debt. The insignificant result observed with total debt in 
unlisted sample appears to be common since only about 65% of total sample 
in meta-analysis find   significant results of which 90.21% finds positive 
direction. This indicates that the significant results most likely to be positive 
which also provide support to the relationship with total debt observed in 
listed sample. The insignificant relationship with short-term debt is also not 
surprising since comparing the significant results observed with total debt 
(65%) with those with long-term debt (76%) may suggest that the 
insignificant of the correlation with short-term debt is the key element of the 
observed differences. Moreover, the higher positive significant results 
observed with long-term debt (98%) compared to (90%) in total debt may 
suggest that the negative correlation between short-term and tangibility reduce 
the strength of the overall positive relationship with total debt.  
With exception of the insignificant positive relationship observed with short-
term debt in listed, the results are generally consistent with prediction and 
assumption that the length of loan is likely to be matched to the life of assets 
used as collateral. Accordingly, one fails to reject the hypotheses that 
tangibility is positively correlated with total and long-term debt ratio other 
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than the relationship with total debt in unlisted sample where it is found 
insignificant. One also is unable to reject the negative relationship between 
tangibility and short-term debt in unlisted sample but not for short-term debt 
in listed sample.  
7.3.4.3 Free cash flow 
The ratio of the earnings before interest and tax plus depreciation less capital 
expenditure to total assets is used to capture the influence of free cash flow on 
debt levels. The table shows that free cash flow variable in both samples is 
negatively correlated with total debt at 1% level of significant. At 
disaggregate level, however, a difference is observed between the two 
samples. In listed sample, the observed result in total debt seems to be driven 
by the strong significant (1%) negative association with short-term debt as the 
relationship with long-term debt is insignificant. On the other hand, the strong 
and moderate negative relationship observed with short-term and long-term 
debt ratios respectively seems to be both the driving forces of the total debt 
result.  
The results in both samples, however, most likely reflect the fact that the 
conflicts between managers and shareholders suggested by the free cash flow 
theory of Jensen (1986) are not an issue among Saudi companies. Indeed, the 
high concentrated ownership in the case of listed companies and the family 
ownership in the case of unlisted companies reduce such conflicts. 
Alternatively, if the free cash flow can be seen as the capacity of the firm’s 
internal generated resources, then the observed negative relationship provide 
strong support to the pecking order hypothesis. Moreover, the observed 
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significant negative relationship is consistent with the overall finding of 
previous empirical researchers, which shows that 78.52% of the significant 
results are negative. This in turn implies that the pecking order prediction 
outweigh the prediction of the free cash flow agency theory. 
In sum, one is unable to reject hypotheses that free cash flow is negatively 
correlated debt elements other than the relationship with long-term debt in 
listed sample, which is found insignificant. 
7.3.4.4  Liquidity  
The quick ratio, which is current assets less inventory to current liabilities, is 
used as a proxy for liquidity. At aggregate level, the relationship between 
liquidity and total debt in both samples appear to be negative and significant 
at 1% level. This is consistent with the finding of previous empirical 
researchers, which shows that 100% of the significant results reveal negative 
correlation between liquidity and total debt defined by book value. However, 
this result appears to be driven by the strong significant (1%) negative 
association with short-term debt. The result indicates that firms with 
insufficient liquidity use more short-term debt. This in turn lends support to 
the hypothesised negative relationship between liquidity and short-term debt 
and to Bevan and Danbolt’s (2004) argument that liquidity is an important 
determinant of short-term bank borrowing.  
On the other hand, the relationship with long-term debt is mixed. In listed 
sample, it is found that liquidity negatively but insignificantly correlated with 
long-term debt. Antoniuo et al. (2002) explain the low level of significance by 
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the fact that firms’ close relationship with banks mitigates asymmetric 
information problems, which in turn reduces the need for internal liquidity. 
The fact that Saudi listed firms have strong relationship with banks gives 
more credibility to this explanation. Moreover, the insignificant correlation 
with long-term debt is not surprising since about 30% of total sample in meta-
analysis find insignificant results. In unlisted sample, on the other hand, it is 
found that liquidity is positively correlated with long-term debt at 10% level 
of significance. This indicates that unlisted firms with sufficient liquidity have 
easier access to long-term bank loans. This result, however, are inconsistent 
with the finding of previous empirical researchers, which shows that 96.5% of 
the significant results reveal negative correlation between liquidity and long-
term debt defined by book value. It is also contradict the pecking order 
hypothesis, which suggests negative relationship. In summary, in both 
samples, while one is unable to reject the hypotheses that liquidity is 
negatively correlated with both total and short-term debt ratios, one is able to 
reject the hypothesised negative association with long-term debt. This in turn 
lends partial support to pecking order hypothesis. 
7.3.4.5  Uniqueness  
The proxy used to measure the impact of uniqueness is marketing and selling 
expenses. The results also reveal conflicting evidences. In listed sample, 
insignificant negative associations are observed between uniqueness and all 
debt elements. In unlisted sample, however, while a strong significant (1%) 
positive relationship with long-term, insignificant positive relationship with 
total debt and short-term debt ratios are obtained. Nevertheless, both results 
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are inconsistent with the prediction and with the Titman’s (1984) arguments 
that firms characterized by unique products should be financed with relatively 
less debt. The results also contradict the overall finding of previous empirical 
researchers, which shows that 99.15% of the significant results are negative. 
However, it is important to note that the significant positive relationship 
between book-based long-term debt and uniqueness as measured by marketing 
and selling expenses observed in unlisted sample is not surprising since 
42.43% of the previous empirical researchers’ findings show a significant 
positive relationship. This in turn raises the doubt about this proxy in 
capturing the suggested negative effect of uniqueness on leverage.   
In sum, one fails to accept the hypotheses that uniqueness as measured by 
marketing and selling expenses is negatively correlated with debt ratios at 
least in this study.  
7.3.4.6 Growth    
Due to the availability of data, two proxies for growth are employed to 
capture the impact on leverage. The market-to-book ratio and the growth in 
assets are used here to measure the growth variable for listed and unlisted 
firms respectively. The results show that insignificant negative relationship 
between market to book ratio and all debt levels is obtained in listed sample. 
These results in particular the relationship with long-term debt are not 
surprising since meta-analysis finding shows insignificant negative 
relationship exists between market to book ratio and long-term debt defined 
by book value. However, the relatively high significant correlation (0.46) 
observed in the correlation matrix in the appendix 7 between market-to-book 
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ratio and profitability as measured by ROA raises the concern about this 
result. Such high correlation might be responsible for observing insignificant 
result. Therefore, the result of this relationship should be interpreted with 
some caution.  
In unlisted sample, on the other hand, the strong significant (1%) negative 
association between growth in assets and total debt indicates the presence of 
the agency conflict between shareholders and lenders. it is consistent with the 
result obtained by meta-analysis that found 70.60% of the significant results 
of growth in assets are negatively correlated with total debt defined by book 
value. However, this result seems to be driven by the strong significant 
negative association observed with both short-term long-term debt ratios. 
Though the strong negative relationship with long-term lend support to the 
agency costs theory, it contradicts the meta-analysis finding where about 92% 
of the significant results find positive relationship between growth as 
measured by growth in assets and book based long-term debt. Moreover, the 
strong negative relationship with short-term debt contradicts the argument that 
the agency problem may be mitigated if the firm issue more short-term-debt. 
However, Bevan and Danbolt (2004) argue that banks are unwilling to 
provide short-term debt to growing firms before proven assets in place. This 
explanation, thus, is hold here due to the fact that Saudi banks adopt 
conservative lending policy.  
Accordingly, one is able to reject the hypothesised positive (negative) 
relationships between growth and short-term and (long-term and total) debt 
ratios in listed sample. In unlisted sample, on the other hand, while one is 
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unable to reject the negative relationships with long-term and total debt ratios, 
one is able to reject the positive relationship with short-term debt.   
7.3.4.7  Dividends 
The ratio of dividends paid to net income is used as a proxy for dividends 
payout. The results reveal that dividend coefficients are significantly 
negatively correlated with all the debt ratios other than short-term debt in 
listed sample but insignificantly correlated with all the debt ratios in the 
unlisted sample. However, the significant negative relationship provides 
support to La Porta et al.’s (1999) argument that paying dividends in the 
developing countries is a sign of commitment to build the reputation for future 
stock issues. Therefore, this argument can explain the significant negative 
relation observed in listed companies since the equity is the main source of 
funds among listed companies. These results are also consistent with meta-
analysis finding that 88% and 97% of the significant results finds negative 
relationship between dividends payout ratio and total and long-term debt 
ratios based on book value. On the other hand, the small magnitudes 
combined with the insignificant levels of the results observed in unlisted 
sample indicate that dividends are not determinant of the firm’s capital 
structure in unlisted sample.  
In sum, while one is unable to reject the hypothesised negative association 
between dividends and debt ratios other than association with short-term debt 
where it is found insignificant in listed sample, one reject the hypothesised 
positive association between dividends and debt ratios in unlisted sample. 
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7.3.4.8 Age  
The natural log of the number of years since company’s establishment is used 
as proxy for age. The analysis provides mixed results for the relation between 
age and debt ratios. In listed sample, a significant negative relationship 
observed between age and total debt ratio. This implies that new firms use 
more debt than older ones. At disaggregate level, however, the results reveal 
that the negative association observed with short-term debt mainly drives this 
result since insignificant results observed with long-term debt. These results in 
turn indicate that new listed firms rely more on short-term debt, as they are 
constrained from long-term debt. Accordingly, these results contradict the 
meta-analysis finding where about 80% (97%) of the significant results find 
positive (negative) relationship between age and total and (long-term) debt 
ratios. 
On the other hand, a significantly positive relationship between age and total 
debt ratios is observed in unlisted sample. This result most likely reflects the 
significant positive relationship observed between age and short-term debt 
ratio. This implies that these firms have a good reputation of credit and build a 
good relation with banks; thus, they have better conditions to obtain short-
term debt than younger firms. The negative association observed with long-
term debt ratio indicates that these firms are young and do not have sufficient 
internally funds to finance new investment. However, knowing the bank’s 
conservative long-tem lending policy suggests that the reputation and the 
strong relation with banks are the key issues. This result most likely suggests 
that the owners of these new firms are belonging to rich families who usually 
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occupy the board directors of the banks and, thus they have easy access to 
long-term debt. Moreover, these results are also consistent with the meta-
analysis findings mentioned above where age is found positively and 
negatively correlated with book based total and long-term debt ratios 
respectively.  
Accordingly, while one is able to reject the hypothesis that age positively 
correlated with total and short-term debt ratios and negative correlated with 
long-term debt ratio in listed sample, one is unable to reject in unlisted 
sample. 
7.3.4.9 Risk  
The standard deviation of the first difference in annual earnings over mean of 
the earning is applied as a proxy for risk. The table shows that the risk 
coefficients are insignificantly correlated with all debt ratios in the listed 
sample. In unlisted sample, however, a weak significant positive relationship 
observed between risk and total debt ratio, which is mainly driven by the 
moderate significant positive correlation observed with short-term debt. The 
results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that firms with high variability in 
earnings have a greater risk not to meet their debt obligations and, thus, they 
should have lower debt ratio. However, the small sizes of the coefficients 
observed in both samples raise the concerns about the risk measure since the 
length of the period employed in this study (i.e. five years). Such period may 
be too short to capture the effect of risk measure on debt ratios adequately. 
Accordingly, it is hard to draw a conclusion regarding this attribute.  
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7.3.4.10 Government 
The percentage of equity owned by the government is used as a proxy to 
measure the impact of government ownership on the capital structure of listed 
firms. The reported results show that the estimated coefficients of government 
with debt ratios are significantly negatively correlated with short-term and 
total debt, but statistically insignificantly correlated with long-term debt. This 
implies that companies with government ownership are using less debt. This 
is consistent with the argument that government chose to privatise some of its 
companies due to government budgetary deficits. This means that state 
companies will use more equity and less debt to finance their growth. 
Moreover, if La Porta et al.’s (1999) argument that firms in developing 
countries pay dividends to build the reputation to market future stock issues 
holds, then the significant positive correlation between government ownership 
and dividends observed in the correlation matrix in the appendix 7 supports 
the above argument. Furthermore, the observed significant negative 
relationship between government ownership and total debt is consistent with 
the finding of the previous studies that found 86.81% of the significant results 
are negatively correlated with total debt.  
However, though the observed results lend some support to the hypothesises, 
the relatively high correlation (0.57) between government and log assets as 
measure of size observed in the correlation matrix in the appendix 7 raise the 
concerns about this relationship. This high correlation may have some impact 
on the insignificant negative relationship observed with long-term debt since 
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size is found positively correlated with long-term debt. Accordingly, the 
previous interpretation of this relationship should be taken with caution.   
In short, one unable to reject hypothesises that government ownership is 
negatively associated with debt elements but not for the relationship with 
long-term debt where it is found insignificant. 
7.3.4.11 Industry 
Dummy variables are used to investigate if capital structure varies among 
industry sectors. MINDUM, CEMEDUM, and FARMDUM refer to 
manufacturing, cement, and farming sectors dummy variables respectively 
(with the service sector used as the base in both samples). The results show 
that companies in the manufacturing sector have a statistically positive 
correlation with all debt ratios in listed and with long-term and total debt 
ratios in unlisted sample. The results also show that cement sector has a 
significant positive relationship with all debt ratios in listed sample. These 
results, therefore, indicate that firms in these two sectors, in general, have 
higher debt level than those of firms in the service sector, which is the base 
sector in the analysis. For the farming sector, while an insignificant 
association with all debt ratios is observed in listed sample, only moderate 
significant (5%) negative relationship is obtained with total debt ratio in 
unlisted sample. Accordingly, the hypothesis that firms operate in 
manufacturing and cement industries will show higher debt levels than those 
operate in farming and service industries is unable to be rejected. 
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7.3.5 Average cross-sectional analysis based on 2004 debt ratios 
In pure average cross-sectional estimation, the results may be more robust 
since lagging the explanatory variables will reduce the potential reverse 
causality between dependent and explanatory variables and averaging will 
reduce the effect of fluctuation in the explanatory variables. However, sample 
size is considerably reduced with only one observation per company rather 
than five. For the average-based analysis, the two equations of the listed and 
the unlisted sample are also estimated for the three debt elements. The 
regression includes the 2004 leverage level as dependent variable and the 
explanatory variables are four year average (2000-2003).  
Table 7.5 presents the results for both listed and unlisted firms respectively. 
This shows that the explanatory power of the averaging regressions is 
generally slightly lower than the pooled regressions, as indicated by the lower 
adjusted R2s. However, the models report significant χ2 indicating the 
rejection of the null hypothesis of joint insignificance of the coefficients, at 
the 1% level in all models except short-term debt for listed companies (5% 
level).  
In the short-term debt models for listed companies, profitability, free cash 
flow, liquidity, manufacturing and cement dummies show results consistent 
with the pooled analysis, but with lower significance levels. However, the 
positive association with size now becomes significant (5% level) while the 
negative impact of age becomes insignificant. By contrast, for unlisted 
companies the results are consistently significant for size, tangibility, free 
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cash flow, liquidity and risk but the negative relationships with profitability 
and growth in assets become insignificant.  
For long-term debt in listed companies, size and the manufacturing dummy 
are the only variables that remain significant albeit at lower significance 
levels. In unlisted companies, the results are consistently significant for size, 
tangibility, free cash flow and uniqueness but the latter at a lower (10%) 
significance level. For total debt in listed companies, size and the 
manufacturing dummy continue to be highly significant; free cash flow, 
government and the cement dummy remain significant but at lower levels of 
significance than in the pooled regressions. For total debt in unlisted 
companies, the results for size, free cash flow, liquidity and risk variables are 
broadly consistent with the pooled regressions but profitability, growth in 
assets, age and the two industry dummies cease to be significant. 
Overall, it would appear that the broad thrust of the results remains unchanged 
in the average cross-sectional regressions. However, the results are less 
significant, probably partly as a result of the much-reduced sample size and 
partly because the pooled regression may overstate significance. 
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Table 7.5: Average cross-sectional analysis results of listed & unlisted sample based on 
Tobit technique 
STD, LTD and TD refer to short-term, long-term, and total debt respectively. Size is the log of total assets. ROA refers to the 
return on assets. TANG1 is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. FCF refers to the earnings before interest and tax plus 
depreciation less capital expenditure normalised by total assets. QR refers to the quick ratio. UNIQ is the ratio of selling & 
marketing expenses to total sales. M/B refers to the market to book ratio and G.ASSETS is the growth in assets for listed and 
unlisted companies. DIV refers to dividends paid divided by net income. LOGAGE is the log number of years since firm 
founded. RISK is the standard deviation of the first difference in annual earnings over mean of annual earnings. GOV is the 
percentage of shares held by the government. MINDUM, CEMEDUM, and FARMDUM refer to manufacturing, cement, 
and farming sectors dummy variables respectively. White’s heteroskedastic-consistent covariance matrix estimation is used 
to adjust for heteroskedasticity. Probability of (Z) is in parentheses. 
Notes: *, **, and *** denote significant at the 10, 5, and 1% respectively (two tails). 
Listed (n = 60) Unlisted (n = 403) 
 Exp.  Sign STD LTD TD VIF STD LTD TD VIF 
0.035** 0.051** 0.087*** 0.062*** 0.016*** 0.090*** LOGASSETS + 
(0.033) (0.016) (0.002) 
1.94 
 (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) 
1.48 
0.314* -0.086 0.228 -0.032 -0.030 -0.068 ROA - (0.067) (0.408) (0.227) 
2.23 
 (0.605) (0.132) (0.340) 1.68 
-0.036 0.026 -0.010 -0.136*** 0.078*** -0.009 TANG1 +/- (0.302) (0.548) (0.872) 
1.45 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.870) 1.29 
-0.512* -0.145 -0.657** -0.274*** -0.064*** -0.366*** FCF - (0.058) (0.529) (0.049) 
3.73 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.000) 1.64 
-0.018* -0.009 -0.027 -0.031*** 0.003 -0.023** QR - (0.086) (0.505) (0.134) 
1.92 
 (0.000) (0.153) (0.011) 1.24 
-0.005 -0.197 -0.202 0.058 0.079* 0.140 UNIQ - (0.974) (0.152) (0.367) 
2.60 
 (0.649) (0.090) (0.363) 1.33 
0.008 -0.011 -0.003    M/B Ins (0.595) (0.494) (0.903) 
3.76 
    
 
 
   -0.004 -0.002 -0.043 G. ASSETS Ins     (0.954) (0.925) (0.571) 1.19 
-0.014 -0.031 -0.045 0.003 -0.001 -0.003 DIV -/+ (0.432) (0.266) (0.237) 
1.75 
 (0.846) (0.887) (0.878) 1.27 
-0.012 0.016 0.004 0.071 -0.011 0.068 LOGAGE -/+ (0.705) (0.700) (0.950) 
1.45 
 (0.116) (0.327) (0.159) 1.17 
-0.003 0.006 0.003 0.0001** 0.0001 0.0001* RISK - (0.479) (0.156) (0.540) 
1.56 
 (0.030) (0.329) (0.060) 1.02 
-0.087** -0.034 -0.121*    GOV + (0.020) (0.474) (0.054) 
1.80 
    
 
 
0.031* 0.053** 0.084*** -0.001 0.009 0.001 MINDUM + (0.054) (0.044) (0.009) 
2.05 
 (0.941) (0.188) (0.975) 1.31 
0.053* 0.034 0.087*    
CEMEDUM + (0.058) (0.413) (0.070) 4.07    
 
 
0.017 0.011 0.028 -0.023 0.007 -0.031 FARMDUM - (0.531) (0.689) (0.520) 2.39 (0.732) (0.670) (0.663) 1.11 
-0.241 -0.401** -0.643**  -0.304*** -0.101** -0.506***  INTERCEPT (0.128) (0.037) (0.014)  (0.006) (0.039) (0.002)  
Wald χ2 -test 26.87** 29.42*** 36.42***  145.58*** 61.07*** 156.67***  
Adjusted R2 0.2528 0.1178 0.2642  0.1623 0.2073 0.1902  
 25.59*** 19.93*** 6.70***  32.89*** 224.50*** 42.78***  
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7.3.6 Yearly cross-sectional analysis 
To illustrate the disadvantages of pooled and average cross-sectional analysis, 
the two equations of the listed and the unlisted sample are estimated for the 
three debt elements (i.e. short-term, long-term, and total debts) for every year 
covered in this study (2000 through 2004). This process results in estimating a 
total of 30 models of which 10 models are estimated for each debit ratio. 
Tables in appendix 4 present the results of these models. As it can be seen, all 
models report significant χ2 indicating the rejection of the null hypothesis of 
joint insignificance of the coefficients but vary in the significance level.  
In short-term models, the results for listed companies show considerable 
variation in size and significance over the period. By contrast, the results for 
unlisted companies show consistent significant results for size, tangibility and 
liquidity; free cash flow and age are also consistent across 4 of the 5 years. In 
the long-term models, all the explanatory variables in listed sample have 
shown changes either in the significant levels or in the direction. In unlisted, 
size, profitability, and tangibility are the only variables that remains 
systematically significant but with variation in the significant level over the 
study period. In total debt models, as seen in short-term and long-term 
regressions, all the explanatory variables in listed sample have shown changes 
either in the significant levels or in the direction. In unlisted sample, on the 
other hand, size, free cash flow, liquidity and growth in assets remain 
systematically significant but with variation in the significant level over the 
study period. 
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As apparent in this illustration, the results interpretations and conclusions of 
pure cross-sectional analysis are dependent on the timing of the observation. 
Bevan and Danbolt (2004) conclude that failure to control for time effects 
may incur a serious bias into the analysis of corporate capital structure and 
raise question about some of the conclusions obtained under more traditional 
analyses. Indeed, comparing the results of pure cross-sectional regressions, 
average cross-sectional regressions and those of pooled regressions illustrate 
that the obtained results by pooled regression have the highest level of 
significance. The significance of estimated coefficients under pooled 
regression may be over estimated, as firms in the sample are included more 
than once over study period (Barclay et al., 1995 and Bevan and Danbolt, 
2004). Moreover, though it reduces the effects of the fluctuation in the 
explanatory variables, averaging the sample over the period of study ignores 
the time effects that should be considered in the analysis. This in turn may 
lead to under estimation bias. Accordingly, it is important to investigate the 
association between debt elements and company characteristics using 
estimation technique that overcome the disadvantages of pooled and average 
estimation techniques. One appropriate technique that incorporates both time-
series and cross-sectional effects and controls also for time-invariant firm-
specific factors is fixed effects panel data analysis. 
7.3.7 Fixed effects panel analysis 
Given the potential importance for time-invariant firm-specific heterogeneity, 
fixed effects approach is used in the analysis. Moreover, as pointed out earlier 
in methods chapter, industries dummies, government ownership, and Risk are 
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excluded from the estimated models due to either time-invariant or 
measurement issues associated with these variables. Table 7.6 presents the 
results of the panel data estimations. Over all, the fixed effects models are all 
report significant F-test indicating the rejection of the null hypothesis of joint 
insignificance of the coefficients at less than 1% level.  
7.3.7.1 Size  
It seems the impact of controlling for time-invariant heterogeneity on the 
relationship between size and debt elements is considerable in listed sample 
while it is trivial in unlisted sample. In listed sample, the strong significant 
(1%) positive relationship with total debt observed in pooled and average 
estimation techniques becomes positively insignificant. However, it has been 
seen earlier in testing data section that this result turns into a significant level 
(1%) under the reduced sample. At long-term debt level, the strong (moderate) 
significant positive relationship observed in pooled and (average) estimation 
techniques respectively becomes positively significant at 10% level. 
On the other hand, at the short-term debt level, the insignificant positive 
observed under pooled estimation technique and the significant at 5% positive 
relationship observed under average estimation technique respectively 
becomes negatively insignificant. However, this result seems to be driven by 
the some influential observations because turns into negative and significant 
5% level under the reduced sample. This in turns implies that large listed 
firms use more long-term debt and less short-term debt. 
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Table 7.6: fixed effects Panel data results 
 
STD, LTD and TD refer to short-term, long-term, and total debt respectively. Size is the log of total assets. ROA 
refers to the return on assets. TANG is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. FCF refers to the earnings before 
interest and tax plus depreciation less capital expenditure normalised by total assets. QR refers to the quick ratio. 
UNIQ is the ratio of selling & marketing expenses to total sales. M/B refers to the market to book ratio and 
G.ASSETS is the growth in assets for listed and unlisted companies. DIV refers to dividends paid divided by net 
income. LOGAGE is the log number of years since firm founded. 
 Note:  White’s heteroskedastic-consistent covariance matrix estimation is used to adjust for 
heteroskedasticity. Probability of (t) is in parentheses for. *, ** and *** denote significant at the 10, 
5, and 1% respectively (two tails).  
Listed Unlisted 
Panel  
STD LTD TD STD LTD TD 
-0.047 0.050* 0.004 0.066*** 0.024*** 0.097*** SIZE 
(0.469) (0.058) (0.964) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
-0.006 -0.189** -0.183 -0.082*** -0.014* -0.119*** 
ROA 
(0.939) (0.013) (0.102) (0.003) (0.072) (0.000) 
0.004 0.104** 0.092 -0.030 0.048*** 0.051 
TANG (0.935) (0.018) (0.234) (0.426) (0.007) (0.212) 
-0.130*** -0.011 -0.183** -0.110*** -0.002 -0.119*** 
FCF 
(0.003) (0.776) (0.010) (0.000) (0.415) (0.000) 
-0.007* -0.001 -0.008 -0.020*** 0.001 -0.019*** 
QR 
(0.079) (0.820) (0.149) (0.000) (0.292) (0.000) 
-0.016 0.213* 0.187 -0.053 0.007 0.103 
UNIQ (0.844) (0.052) (0.267) (0.572) (0.830) (0.239) 
0.003 -0.007 -0.005    
M/B (0.449) (0.126) (0.431)    
   -0.025** -0.005** -0.034*** 
G. Assets 
   (0.023) (0.034) (0.004) 
-0.001 -0.003 -0.003 0.003 0.001 0.005** 
DIV (0.818) (0.448) (0.603) (0.125) (0.270) (0.031) 
-0.126 0.032 -0.087 0.095*** -0.044*** 0.006 
LOGAGE 
(0.185) (0.626) (0.455) (0.006) (0.000) (0.865) 
0.636 -0.456* 0.183 -0.401** -0.118*** -0.519*** 
INTERCEPT 
(0.216) (0.064) (0.776) (0.013) (0.005) (0.002) 
F -test 3.98*** 4.04*** 5.15*** 13.87*** 3.33*** 14.70*** 
R2 within 0.1448 0.2023 0.2216 0.1218 0.0278 0.1311 
R2 between 0.0313 0.0729 0.0473 0.1838 0.2315 0.2448 
R2 overall 0.0389 0.0852 0.0680 0.1722 0.1949 0.2267 
Corr (ui, x) -0.4221 -0.2442 -0.1376 -0.0104 0.1217 0.0331 
N 300 300 300 2015 2015 2015 
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 Accordingly, under fixed effects regression and under the full sample at least, 
the hypothesised positive relationship between size and debt elements is 
rejected but not for the correlation with long-term debt where it is found 
positively significant.  
In unlisted sample, on the other hand, the relationship with all debt elements 
remains positively significant at 1% level with increases in coefficients’ 
magnitude. Accordingly, once is controlled for time-invariant heterogeneity, 
one remains to be unable to reject the hypothesised positive relationship 
between firm’s size and debt elements in unlisted sample.  
7.3.7.2 Profitability 
In listed sample, though the relationship with total debt continues to be 
insignificant as observed in previous estimation techniques, it becomes 
negative under fixed effect estimation. Moreover, The positively significant at 
1% and 10% levels relationship with short-term debt observed under pooled 
and average regressions respectively turns into insignificantly negative 
relationship. On the other hand, the significant at 1% and insignificant 
negative relationship observed under pooled and under average estimation 
techniques respectively becomes negatively significant at 5% level. 
Accordingly, while one is unable to reject the negative relationship between 
profitability and long-term debt, one is able to reject the negative relationship 
with both short-term and total debt in listed sample, once firm effects are 
controlled for. This in turn provides supports to the pecking order hypothesis 
only at the level of long-term debt. 
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In unlisted sample, however, the influence of profitability on all debt elements 
remains significantly negative. These results relatively are consistent with the 
results obtained under pooled with slight changes in the significant levels in 
particular at short-term and long-term debt ratios. On the other hand, the 
results contradict the insignificant results observed under average estimation 
techniques.  
In short, under fixed effects regression, one fails to reject the hypothesised 
negative relationship between profitability and debt elements in unlisted 
sample. This in turn provides strong support to the pecking order hypothesis. 
7.3.7.3 Tangibility  
In listed sample, the result of the relationship between tangibility and total 
debt reveals insignificant positive relationship, which is consistent with the 
result observed under average regression but with reverse sign. Both results, 
however, contradict the strong significant relationship observed under pooled 
regression. At disaggregate level, the relationship with short-term debt 
continues to be insignificant positive relationship which is consistent with the 
insignificant positive relationship observed under pooled regression and with 
the insignificant level but with reverse sign observed under average 
regression. Moreover, the strong significant (insignificant) positive 
relationship with long-term debt observed under pooled (average) regressions 
becomes positively significant at 5%, once one control for time-invariant 
heterogeneity.  
 214 
In unlisted sample, under fixed effects technique, the relationship between 
tangibility and total debt continues to be insignificant as observed in other two 
previous estimation techniques. Moreover, while the positively significant at 
1% level observed under pooled and average techniques is also obtained once 
firm effects are controlled for, the strong significant negative relationship 
observed with short-term debt observed under pooled and average regressions 
turns into insignificant level.  
In brief, the results support the collateral explanation at long-term models in 
both samples but contradict the matching principle at short-term models. 
Accordingly, one is unable to reject the hypothesis that tangibility is 
positively correlated with long-term debt but is able to rejects the 
hypothesised positive (negative) association with total (short-term) debt in 
both samples once is controlled for time-invariant heterogeneity. 
7.3.7.4 Free cash flow 
It appears that the estimation technique has marginal impact concerning the 
relationship between free cash flow and debt elements at least in listed 
sample. Indeed, the significant negative relationship with short-term and total 
debt and insignificant negative results with long-term debt observed in other 
estimation techniques continues to be observed under fixed effects estimation 
technique. In unlisted sample, however, while the significant negative 
relationship with short-term and total debt continues to be obtained, the 
association with long-term debt turns into insignificant level once controlled 
for time-invariant heterogeneity.      
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In short, under fixed effects analysis, the results lend support to pecking order 
hypothesis at short-term and total debt models in both samples but are 
undetermined at long-term models as insignificant relationships are observed 
in both samples. Nevertheless, the results contradict agency theory, which in 
turn imply that the free cash flow problem is not an issue among Saudi 
companies.  
Accordingly, one is unable to reject the hypothesised negative relationship 
between free cash flow and debt elements other than the relationship with 
long-term debt where it is found insignificant in both samples.   
7.3.7.5 Liquidity 
 In listed, as seen in average regressions, the strong significant (1%) negative 
relationship between liquidity and total debt obtained in pooled regression 
turns into insignificant level under fixed effects technique. As observed with 
size, this result seems to be driven by the some influential observations 
because it turns into significant at 1% level under the reduced sample. The 
relationship with long-term debt remains insignificant while the relationship 
with short-term debt remains negative but with decrease in the significant 
level from 5% under pooled to 10 % as under average model. In unlisted 
sample, the significant negative relationships with short-term and total debt 
ratios found in pooled and average regressions are also found to be negative 
and significant at 1% level once controlled for time-invariant heterogeneity. 
On the other hand, as seen in average regression, the weak significant positive 
relationship observed under pooled regression turns into insignificant level. In 
general, these results provide strong evidence to Bevan and Danbolt’s (2004) 
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suggestion that liquidity is an important of short-term bank borrowing since 
the negative relationship with total debt is mainly driven by the negative 
relationship with short-term debt in both sample and regardless to estimation 
techniques.  
Accordingly, one rejects the hypothesised negative relationship between 
liquidity and debt elements other than the relationship with short-term debt 
where it is found significant at 10% level in listed sample at least under the 
full sample. In unlisted sample, on the other hand, one failed to reject the 
hypothesised negative association with debt elements other than the 
relationship with long-term debt where it is found insignificant. 
7.3.7.6 Uniqueness 
In listed sample, the insignificant negative association with total debt 
observed in prior estimation techniques continues to be insignificant but with 
reverse sign (positive). However, this result seems also to be driven by the 
some influential observations because the insignificant positive relationship 
turns into significant at 5% level under the reduced sample.  
The relationship with long-term debt where the insignificant negative 
relationship observed in prior estimation techniques turns into positive and 
significant at 10% level. This result and the result observed with total debt 
under reduce sample, thus, contradict Titman’s (1984) argument that suggest 
negative association between uniquness and leverage. Also, if the selling 
expense used to capture the effects of uniqueness on leverage represent the 
capacity of pre-existing non-debt tax shields firms have, then these results 
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contradict tax theory, in particular, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argument 
that suggest negative relationship. Barakat and Rao (2004) also found that 
non-debt tax shields significantly positively correlated with leverage in non-
tax arab countries while significantly negatively correlated in tax-Arab 
countries. Nevertheless, the correlation with short-term debt, however, 
continues to be insignificant and negative as seen in prior estimation 
techniques.  
In the unlisted sample, the association with total debt continues to be 
positively insignificant as observed in prior estimation techniques. At 
disaggregate level, the insignificant negative correlation with short-term debt 
observed in prior estimation techniques continue to be insignificant but with 
reverse in sign. However, the strong (weak) significant positive relationship 
with long-term debt found in pooled and average regressions respectively 
turns into insignificant once is controlled for time-invariant heterogeneity.   
In summary, the obtained results continue to contradict Titman’s (1984) 
arguments that suggest that uniqueness has negative influence on debt level. 
Accordingly, one continues to reject the hypothesised negative relationship 
between debt and uniqueness.  
7.3.7.7  Growth 
As observed in average regression, the analysis show that the insignificant 
negative relationship between market-to-book ratio and all debt levels 
observed in pooled regression remains insignificant with reverse sign in short-
term debt in listed sample. These results in turns contradict the hypothesised 
 218 
positive (negative) relationships between growth and short-term and (long-
term and total) debt ratios. In unlisted sample, the negatively significant at 1% 
level relationship between growth in assets and all debt ratios observed under 
pooled regression continues to be negatively significant at 1% level with total 
debt but with 5% level with both short-term and long-term debt. This in turns 
contradicts the insignificant results obtain under average regression. 
Nevertheless, the results indicate that growing unlisted firms face difficulties 
accessing to both long-term and short-term banking loans. 
In short, while one is able to reject the hypothesised positive (negative) 
relationships between growth and short-term and (long-term and total) debt 
ratios in listed sample, one is unable to reject the negative relationships with 
long-term and total debt ratios in unlisted sample but not for the positive 
relationship with short-term debt. 
7.3.7.8 Dividends 
It appears that the influence of dividends on the capital structure of Saudi 
firms is insignificant other than the weak positive relationship with once is 
controlled for time-invariant heterogeneity. In listed sample, as seen in 
average regression, while the insignificant negative relationship between 
dividends and short-term debt remains insignificantly negative observed in 
pooled regression, the significant negative relationship with long-term and 
total debt levels turns into insignificant level once firm effects are controlled 
for. In unlisted sample, however, the insignificant negative relationship 
between dividends and total debt observed under pervious regressions turns 
into positive and significant at 5% level. This in turn is consistent with the 
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prediction of pecking order hypothesis. At disaggregate level, however, the 
associations with short-term and long-term debt ratios continue to be 
insignificant.   
Accordingly, one is able to reject the hypothesised negative association 
between dividend payout ratio and debt in listed sample. In unlisted sample, 
on the other hand, one is able to reject the hypothesised positive association 
with debt elements other than the relationship with total debt where a 
significant positive relationship is observed.     
7.3.7.9 Age 
As seen in average regression, while the relationship between age and long-
term debt continues to be significant, the negative significant at 5% 
relationships with short-term and total debt ratio observed under pooled 
regression turns into insignificant level in listed sample. As seen in size, 
liquidity and uniqueness variables, these results seem also to be driven by the 
some influential observations because the insignificant negative correlation 
with total and short-term debt turns into significant at 5% and 10% levels 
respectively under the reduced sample. In unlisted sample, the strong 
significant positive and negative relationships with short-term and long-term 
debt ratios respectively observed under pooled regressions are also obtained 
once firm effects are controlled for. However, the strong significant positive 
relationship between age and total debt seen under pooled regression turns 
into insignificant level. These results contradict those observed in average 
regression where the results show insignificant level of confidence.    
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In summary, under fixed effects regression where time-invariant heterogeneity 
is controlled for, one is able to reject the hypothesised relationship with debt 
elements in listed sample but fails to reject in unlisted sample other than the 
relationship with total debt where it is found insignificant. 
7.4 Alternative proxies analysis 
Previous analyses suggest that the interpretation and conclusions of the results 
is dependent on the estimation techniques being used. Moreover, it has also 
found in chapter three that attributes measurements are sensitive cases in 
determining the observed relationship. Accordingly, to investigate the 
sensitivity of the obtained results in the original models to the proxies 
employed, and to draw a general conclusion about the determinants of the 
capital structure, alternative proxies have been used. For the purpose of 
testing, only one alternative proxy is added at once in the original models and 
the other variables are not replaced. For example, when alternative proxy is 
used to measure size (i.e. log of total sales) in the models for both samples, all 
other variables are as originally stated. The importance of this process is that 
it allows capturing the influence not only on the relation between leverage and 
the alternative proxy but, also, capturing the impact on other variables in the 
model as the alternative proxy introduced to the model.  
Moreover, since the results obtained by pooled and average techniques most 
likely are subject to over and under estimation bias respectively, the fixed 
effects technique where firm effects are controlled for is used in this analysis. 
As result, this process produces 27 models in listed sample and 24 models in 
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unlisted sample as tables illustrate in appendix 5. In general, the analysis 
reveals that all the models report significant F-test indicating the rejection of 
the null hypothesis of joint insignificance of the coefficients at less than 1% 
level.  
7.4.1.1 Size  
As the tables show, measuring size by natural logarithm of total sales has 
strong effect on the relationship between size and debt elements in listed 
sample. The insignificant positive relationship with total debt obtained under 
log of total assets proxy turns into positive and significant at 5% level under 
log of total sales proxy. Apparently, the results obtained at disaggregate level 
are the key issues. Indeed, the insignificant negative correlation with short-
term debt observed under log of total assets proxy turns into positively 
significant at 1% level. Moreover, the positively significant at 10% level 
relationship with long-term debt becomes insignificant. In light of these 
evidences, one would infer that large companies in term of sales are not 
necessary large in term of assets at least in Saudi listed sample. Knowing that 
bank’s long-term lending policy is linked to the assets companies have, the 
significant and insignificant positive relationship between log of sales and 
short-term and long-term debt ratios respectively may suggest that banks see 
these companies are small in term of assets. Therefore, these companies rely 
more on short-term bank borrowing to compensate for their restricted access 
to long-term bank loan.  
Furthermore, measuring size by log of sales leads also to some changes in 
other variables. In short-term debt, while the weak negative association with 
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liquidity becomes insignificant, the insignificant association with age turns 
into significant at 5%. Moreover, driven by the increase in significant level of 
the negative relationship between ROA and long-term debt, the previous 
insignificant negative relationship between ROA and total debt becomes 
significant at 5%. In unlisted sample, on the other hand, there is no major 
change occurred on the relationship between size as measured by log sales 
and debt elements other than the decrease in the significant level to 5% with 
the relationship with short-term and total debt ratios. Some changes 
concerning the relationship between growth in assets and both short-term and 
long-term debt ratios as well as the relationship between uniqueness and total 
debt. However, the relationships in the former turn into insignificant while in 
the later the relationship becomes positive at 10% level.  
7.4.1.2 Profitability  
The alternative proxy of profitability is the return on sales (ROS). In listed 
sample, there is no major change observed in the relationship between 
profitability and debt elements other than the reverse sign of the insignificant 
relationship with short-term debt. Noteworthy, the insignificant negative 
relationship between market-to-book ratio and long-term debt observed under 
return on assets (ROA) turns into significant at 5% once return on sales (ROS) 
is used as a proxy for profitability. This result combined with the positive 
relationship with long-term debt indicates that these growing firms are small. 
However, the correlation matrix of listed sample in the appendix 7 reveals that 
the correlation between market-to-book ratio and ROA is considered 
relatively high (0.46) compared to the correlation with ROS (0.20). This most 
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likely indicates that the insignificant result observed under ROA is driven by 
this high correlation. Accordingly, the result observed under ROS concerning 
the relationship between market-to-book ratio and long-term debt lends 
support to the agency costs of debt as well as to the hypothesised relationship 
between growth opportunity and long-term debt.   
 In unlisted sample, on the other hand, employing ROS to measure 
profitability has significant impact on the relationship between profitability 
and debt elements. Under this proxy, no major change observed in the 
relationship between profitability and debt elements other than the reverse 
sign of the relationship with long-term debt. The relationships continue to be 
insignificantly negative with short-term and total debt ratios and 
insignificantly positive with long-term debt.  
7.4.1.3 Tangibility 
The ratio of fixed assets and inventory scaled by total assets is used as 
alternative measure of tangibility. In both samples, the relationship between 
tangibility and debt elements remains unchanged. However, the relationship 
between liquidity and short-term debt becomes insignificant in listed sample.  
7.4.1.4 Liquidity 
Current ratio that is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities is used as 
alternative proxy for liquidity. In both samples, the relationship between 
liquidity and debt elements remains unchanged. However, using current ratio 
as proxy for liquidity leads to a change in the relationship between ROA and 
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total debt in listed sample where the insignificant negative relationship 
becomes significant at 10% level.  
7.4.1.5 Uniqueness  
A dummy variable is used as alternative proxy for uniqueness. As the results 
show the only changes are observed in listed sample in particular with total 
debt ratio. The previous insignificant positive relationship between uniqueness 
and total debt becomes significant at 5% under unique dummy variable. 
However, the result remains inconsistent with Titman’s (1984) argument that 
suggests uniqueness is negatively correlated with debt. As seen with size and 
liquidity, the increase in significant level of the negative relationship between 
ROA and long-term debt turns the previous insignificant negative relationship 
between ROA and total debt into significant at 5%.  
7.4.1.6 Growth  
While both growth in sales and the growth in assets are employed as 
alternative proxies (to M/B ratio) of growth opportunities in the listed sample, 
growth in sales is used as an alternative proxy (to growth in assets) in unlisted 
sample. In listed sample, while using growth in sales does not change the 
results in short-term debt model, it does cause significant changes in long-
term and total debt models. In long-term debt, the relationship with growth in 
sales turns into positively significant at 5% and the significant level of the 
relationship with ROA increase into 1% level of significance while the 
positive relationship with size becomes insignificant. These changes lead to 
observed positive and significant at 10% and negative and significant at 5% 
and reverse sign in the relationships between (growth in sales, ROA and size 
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respectively) and total debt. However, the significant weak and moderate 
positive relationship between growth in sales and total and long-term debt 
ratios respectively are consistent with meta-analysis findings. About 65% and 
87% of the significant results show positive relationship between growth in 
sales and total and long-term debt ratios respectively. In unlisted sample, the 
relationships between growth in sales and debt elements turn into insignificant 
levels with reverse sign observed with long-term debt.  
On the other hand, it seems the effect of the growth in assets, as second 
alternative proxy in listed sample on the relationship between growth and debt 
elements is marginal. The results remain insignificant but with reverse signs 
observed in the relationship with total and long-term debt ratios. However, 
some major changes are observed in some other variables. The 10% 
significant level of the negative relationship between liquidity and short-term 
debt becomes significant at 5% level. This in turn leads to turn the 
insignificant negative relationship between liquidity and total debt into 
significant at 10% level. As observed with size, liquidity and growth in sales, 
the increase in the significant (from 5% to 1% level) of the negative 
relationship between ROA and long-term debt turns the previous insignificant 
negative relationship between ROA and total debt into significant at 5%. 
However, the relationship between size and long-term debt turns into 
insignificant which in turn leads to a reverse sign in the insignificant 
relationship with total debt.  
Using the growth in sales as an alternative measures of growth in unlisted 
sample, however, turnover the relationship with long-term debt from 
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significant negative into significant positive and with total debt from 
significant negative into insignificant. This, however, is consistent with 
previous study findings, which found positive relationship between long-term 
debt and growth in sales. The overall direction implies that while growth 
appears to have insignificant impact on debt ratios in listed sample, it has 
strong negative association with short-term and total debt and moderate 
negative relationship with long-term debt in unlisted sample.  
7.4.1.7 Dividends  
The dummy variable is used as alternative proxy to measure to capture the 
impact of the dividends on debt levels of which company that report dividends 
is given one and zero other wise. In listed sample, the impact of the alternative 
proxy on the relationship between dividends and debt elements is 
insignificant. However, the insignificant negative relationship between ROA 
and total debt becomes significant at 10% level. In unlisted sample, on the 
other hand, the positively significant at 5% relationship between dividends 
and total debt turns into insignificant level under the alternative proxy.    
7.4.1.8 Age 
The number of year since establishment is used as alternative proxy to capture 
the effect of age on debt ratios. While the effect of this alternative proxy 
seems to be insignificant on the results in listed sample, it dose effect the 
results in unlisted sample. Under this proxy, the positively significant at 1% 
level relationship between age and short-term debt observed under log age 
remains significant but at 5%, which in turn leads us to continue observing 
insignificant relationship between age and total debt but with reverse sign. 
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Moreover, under this proxy, the insignificant positive relationship between 
dividends and short-term debt becomes significant at 10% level. 
7.5 Regression diagnostics  
Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Bevan and Danbolt (2002) find that the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) results are very similar to those obtained by 
employing TOBIT technique. Consistent with the finding of these two studies, 
the table in the appendix 6 shows that the results are extremely robust to those 
obtained by employing Tobit techniques. Accordingly, Pooled regression, in 
particular, OLS estimation technique is used in this section due to the fact that 
it provides more options than TOBIT technique to test for issues such as 
heteroskedasticity and influential observations. 
The fact the data is a cross-section raises the issue of the heteroskedasticity. 
The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test is used in the present study to test for 
heteroskedasticity. The probability associated with this test is reported in the 
bottom row at the result’s table. The results show the presence of 
heteroskedasticity at 1% level of significance in all models and in both 
samples. Accordingly, the reported significant levels for the regression 
coefficients are corrected from heteroskedasticity using White’s 
heteroskedastic-consistent covariance matrix estimation, which is a default 
procedure to obtain robust standard errors in STATA. 
Moreover, since the data involves cross section and time-series, it raises the 
suspicion about the existent of both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
issues. Accordingly, it is worth to check for the robustness of the results using 
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the appropriate technique that is consistent in the presence of such 
disturbances. Since Newey-West estimator with a lag length of zero is 
equivalent to a White’s heteroscedastic covariance estimator, it is consistent in 
the presence of both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation with a lag length 
greater than zero. Greene (2000) suggests that the Newey-West estimator is 
consistent in the presence of both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
disturbances. Accordingly, Newey-West estimator with one lag is employed 
here and the results are shown in the table at appendix 6. As it can be seen 
from the table, while the coefficient sizes remain unchanged the change 
occurred only to the standard errors, which cause the level of significance to 
change. While eight changes are observed in listed sample, three are observed 
in unlisted sample. The shaded area highlights these changes. However, two 
out of the three changes observed in unlisted sample in particular the 
relationship between both manufacturing and farming dummies with total debt 
turns into insignificant level. Despite of the changes observed in other 
variables, the relationships of these variables with debt elements remain 
significant. Accordingly, it seems that the influence of the autocorrelation is 
minimal.  
Furthermore, testing for multicollinearity is also carried out through the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) and the pair-wise correlation matrix. Table 7.4 
reports the VIF values for both listed and unlisted firms. Under this test, VIF 
value greater than 10 indicates multicollinearity problem (Gujarati, 2003). 
From this table it can be confirmed that multicollinearity is not an issue since 
the VIF values are far below the cut-off point. However, the alternative 
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proxies’ analysis reveals that the multicollinearity issue most likely exists 
among some variables in particular in listed sample. A good example for the 
presence of multicollinearity is the changed in the significant level of the 
relationship between market-to-book and long-term debt ratios observed in 
listed sample once ROS is employed as alternative proxy to ROA. 
Accordingly, the interpretations and conclusions of the results should be taken 
with caution. The pair-wise correlation matrixes for listed and unlisted 
samples are presented in the tables respectively in the appendix 7.  
Finally, the normality assumption of the regressions residuals is checked using 
the normal Probability plot (NPP) of the residuals. The figures in the appendix 
9 show that the plots derived from the regression models’ residuals are almost 
straight line. Gujarati, (2003) argues that, in general, if the fitted line in the 
NPP is approximately a straight line, one can conclude that the residuals are 
normally distributed. Accordingly, in to a large extent, the normality 
assumption holds in the present study.  
7.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter show that the surrounding socio-culture and institutional 
characteristics in Saudi Arabia have significant impact on the firms’ financing 
choices. Generally, issues such as growth in stock market, weak legal system, 
zakat and barriers imposed on bond issuance combined with banks’ borrowing 
being the only source for debt play an important role in the preference of 
equity over debt among Saudi listed firms compared to firms in developed 
countries. Moreover, a remarkable difference between the capital choices of 
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listed firms and unlisted firms is also observed. Surprisingly, the data shows 
that listed firms generally have a lower level of total debt than unlisted firms 
do. However, at the disaggregate level, the data shows that unlisted firms have 
higher short-term debt but substantially lower amounts of long-term debt than 
listed firms. 
Moreover, the analyses show that the robustness of the results is limited due 
to reasons other than ones asserted by theory. Issues such as the choice of 
estimation technique or the choice of proxy are found to have an impact on 
the results. Indeed, the analysis shows that failing to control for time-invariant 
heterogeneity most likely lead to inherent biases such as overestimation bias 
in case of pooled regression or underestimation bias in case of average 
regression. The analysis reveals also that the relationships between some 
attributes and debt elements are dependent on the proxy being employed to 
capture the effect of certain attribute. 
Nevertheless, the analysis shows that some factors affecting firms’ capital 
structure in western countries’ environments also have similar effects on 
firms’ capital structure in Saudi Arabia despite the profound institutional 
differences between the two environments. 
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Chapter 8:  Conclusion  
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8.1 Introduction  
Since the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), the search for 
understanding capital structure choice continues to be an important area of 
research. In their efforts to understand the incentives for a firm to use debt, 
finance scholars have developed various theories and models. Each theory has 
explained facts about one or more factors that might determine a firm’s capital 
structure. However, the findings of prior empirical studies have provided 
confusing evidence related to the impact of these factors on capital structure. 
Moreover, the majority of these studies have been conducted in western 
economies that have many institutional similarities. However, our knowledge 
of capital structure within developing countries that often have different 
institutional characteristics remains limited due to the lack of work that has 
been done in these countries. Also, a major gap in the empirical research of 
firms’ capital structure determinants is the lack of research using unlisted 
firms data.  
This dissertation explores these issues, firstly through conducting a meta-
analysis of prior studies, and secondly by investigating firms’ capital structure 
determinants in Saudi Arabia using listed and unlisted firms’ data, as well as 
employing different estimation techniques and proxies.  
Section 8.2 summarises the main findings of the meta-analysis of prior studies 
and some potential limitations. Section 8.3 summarises the main results from 
the empirical analysis of the determinants of firm’s capital structure in Saudi 
Arabia. Section 8.4 outlines suggestions for future research.  
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8.2 Summary of the major results 
8.2.1 Meta-analysis findings 
In order to open the way for new ideas to identify the driving forces 
responsible for the apparent variation in the findings of prior capital structure 
studies, meta-analysis procedure is conducted in this dissertation. In general, it 
is found that issues such as measurement of both leverage and the explanatory 
variables have a significant impact on the variation in the findings of prior 
empirical studies. The analysis shows that size, tangibility, and profitability 
have consistent direction and strong relationship regardless of the 
measurement issue. However, the results reveal that the direction of the 
relationship between leverage and attributes such as effective tax rate, non-
debt tax shields (NDTS), growth, uniqueness, dividends and age is sensitive to 
measurement of both leverage and the explanatory variables. For some 
attributes (risk, free cash flow, liquidity, and government ownership), the 
measurement differences influence the strength of relationship but not the 
direction. The overall impact of the factors considered important by many 
studies on leverage is summarised in Table 8.1.  
As the table shows, prior empirical evidence for the two main capital structure 
theories is mixed. While factors such as risk, NDTS, uniqueness, dividends, 
age, and government lend support to the trade-off theory, factors such as 
profitability, free cash flow, and liquidity are found to provide strong support 
to the pecking order hypothesis. Expectations from both theories are the same 
for size, tangibility and growth and these are strongly evidenced in prior 
studies.  
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Table 8.1: Results of the factors affecting capital structure. 
Prediction Attribute 
TOT POH 
Number of studies Finding Significant 
Size + + 488 + 0.0000 
Tangibility + + 266 + 0.0000 
Profitability + - 511 - -0.0000 
Risk -  262 - -0.0000 
Effective tax rate +  190 Insignificant 0.4951 
NDTS -  150 - -0.0000 
Growth - - 473 - -0.0000 
Uniqueness -  94 - -0.0000 
Dividends - + 53 - -0.0000 
Free cash flow + - 37 - -0.0000 
Liquidity  - 119 - -0.0000 
Age + - 36 + 0.0000 
Government + / -  27 - -0.0000 
Note: TOT and POH refer to trade off theory and pecking order hypothesis respectively. 
 
8.2.2 Limitation of meta-analysis 
While the overall consistency of results is impressive the findings need to be 
interpreted with an element of caution. The analysis ignores the different 
definitions used in measuring the dependent variable (such as scaling debt 
either by assets or equity) and some explanatory variables (such as time length 
in measuring earnings variability and growth in both assets and sales) as well 
as differences in research methods (such as pooled, cross-sectional and panel 
data methods). Also, the sample includes working papers to avoid bias, so it is 
possible that large studies, in terms of sample size, with poor quality / 
reliability may have impacted the overall results. However, the stability of the 
results of meta-analysis depends on the number of studies being included in 
the sample. Since the number of studies included in the present meta-analysis 
is relatively large (140 studies), the majority of which are retrieved from 
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published journals (103 studies compared to 37 working paper studies), the 
concern is limited. Indeed, eliminating the working paper studies, in 
particular, those with large sample size does not affect the overall conclusion. 
Such issues are shared by many studies employing the meta-analysis 
technique (e.g. Borkowski, 1996 and Ahmed and Courtis, 1999), and the 
limitations must be weighed against the benefits of the meta-analysis 
technique (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999).  
Despite these limitations and concerns, the meta-analysis technique has 
considerable benefits over the traditional literature review when seeking to 
aggregate and clarify conclusions from prior studies.  
8.3 Saudi firm’s capital structure determinants   
The limited number of cross-country studies (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1995; 
Booth et al., 2001; Giannetti, 2003; Hall et al., 2004; De Jong et al, 2007) 
confirms the importance of institutional factors in explaining cross-country 
capital structure differences. The present study identifies a significant 
difference between the capital choices of Saudi firms and firms in developed 
economies, in that Saudi firms have substantially lower amounts of debt. The 
10.9% total book-debt level observed in listed companies is far below the 
figure in most developed countries. For example, in 1991, the mean of total 
book-debt level in the G-7 countries was 41% (37% and 29% in the United 
States and United Kingdom respectively) (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). It is 
also below to the average total book-debt level of 32% in Arab countries 
(Barakat and Rao, 2004). The substantially low amount of debt reflects the 
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fact that the Saudi listed companies are mainly financed by share capital rather 
than debt. The data of listed companies shows that equity constitutes 57% of 
their assets.  
The main reasons that Saudi listed firms prefer equity to debt most likely 
reflect the institutional characteristics of Saudi Arabia and can be summarised 
as follows: 
1. The sharp increase in the stock market (53.8%) over the period 2000 to 
2004 encourages firms to use equity finance as much as possible. Baker and 
Wurgler (2002) argue that firms tend to raise substantial amounts of equity 
capital when the equity market is perceived to be more favourable. 
2. Saudi Arabia has relatively weak legal protection for lenders/creditors and 
poor enforcement of the law compared to developed countries (assuming 
well-developed legal systems). This encourages banks, the major source of 
debt in Saudi Arabia, to impose costly conditions in their lending policy. On 
the other hand, individual shareholder protection is also quite weak in Saudi 
Arabia. Overall, however, it would appear that ordinary share capital is a 
relatively cheap source of finance in Saudi Arabia. 
3. The corporate bond market is virtually non-existent due to the constraint 
imposed by company law on bond issuance; this states that the total amount 
of bonds issued by a company may not exceed paid up capital. Such a 
constraint inhibits the use of such debt instruments among Saudi firms. 
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4. The tax advantage of debt, crucial to trade-off theory, is very limited since 
the tax rate (zakat) imposed on firms is very low. Barakat and Rao (2004) 
argue that, in the non-tax Arab countries (including Saudi Arabia), the use 
of debt is no different from the use of equity. The payout on both is treated 
the same in the absence of tax advantages of debt for the corporation or tax 
advantage of equity for the investor.  The authors found tax-Arab countries 
use more debt than non-tax-Arab countries. 
A remarkable difference between the capital choices of listed and unlisted 
firms is also observed. The data shows that Saudi unlisted firms generally 
have a higher level of total debt than listed firms, comprised of relatively 
higher short-term debt but substantially lower amounts of long-term debt. This 
may reflect the fact that unlisted firms do not have access to the capital 
markets or easy access to long-term bank debt; hence, they have to rely on 
short-term debt to finance growth. This evidence is consistent with Titman 
and Wessels’ (1988) argument that small firms can be more leveraged than 
large firms and may prefer to borrow short-term rather than long-term due to 
the lower costs with this alternative.  
In investigating to what extent institutional characteristics influence capital 
structure determinants in Saudi Arabia, the results of the robust fixed effects 
model reveal that certain firm-specific factors, relevant to explaining capital 
structure in Western countries, are also relevant in Saudi despite its profound 
institutional differences. As suggested by the two leading theories (i.e. trade-
off and pecking order), size and tangibility show a positive influence on 
leverage, in particular, long-term debt in both samples. These results are also 
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consistent with the previous findings (e.g. US: Friend and Lang, 1988; Frank 
and Goyal 2003; UK: Bennett and Donnelly, 1993; Bevan and Danbolt, 2002, 
2004; Arab countries: Omet and Mashharawe, 2001; Barakat and Rao, 2004; 
Australia SMEs: Cassar and Holmes, 2003). 
An interesting difference between listed and unlisted companies is the 
strength of the relationship with the size predictor variable. It is strongly 
significant (1%) for all debt measures for unlisted, but quite weakly 
significant (10%) and only for long-term debt for listed sample. This may 
reflect the fact that listed firms have lower financial distress than unlisted 
firms (1783 unlisted firms close down during the sample period compared to 
no listed firms). Rajan and Zingales (1995) state that size can be considered a 
proxy for the inverse probability of default and should be weak when the costs 
of financial distress are low. The weak relationship may also reflect the fact 
that listed firms prefer equity to debt finance because of the relatively lower 
costs associated with equity issuance as stated earlier. Titman and Wessels 
(1988) argue that the cost of issuing debt and equity is related to firm size.    
The results also provide evidence consistent with pecking order theory. 
Profitability is found to be significantly negatively correlated with long-term 
debt in listed sample and with all debt levels in unlisted sample. This finding 
is consistent with findings of the vast majority of prior empirical studies (e.g. 
US: Baskin, 1989; Chang and Rhee, 1990; UK: Ozkan, 2001; Bevan and 
Danbolt, 2002, 2004; cross-country developed countries: Booth et al, 2001; 
Arab countries: Barakat and Rao, 2004; Omet and Mashharawe, 2001; 
unlisted and SMEs: Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Cassar and Holmes, 2003; Hall 
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et al, 2004). However, as indicated earlier, Saudi listed firms prefer finance 
their growth by equity rather than by debt argued to be due to market timing 
consideration and other Saudi institutional characteristics. Thus, Saudi listed 
firms seem to follow what might be called a “modified” pecking order in 
which retained profit is the first preferred source of funds, followed by equity, 
and lastly by debt.  
Another support for the pecking order model is that liquidity is found to be 
significantly negatively correlated with both short-term and total debt in 
unlisted sample but only with short-term debt in listed sample. This finding is 
also consistent with Omet and Mashharawe (2001) and Ozkan (2001), as well 
as Bevan and Danbolt (2004), who argue that liquidity is an important 
determinant of short-term bank financing. Partial support for pecking order 
theory is also observed in the unlisted sample where dividends are found to be 
significantly positively correlated with total debt, consistent with Baskin 
(1989) and Adedeji (1998). 
On the other hand, the trade-off model seems to have limited explanatory 
power in Saudi Arabia. Agency theory (an argument for the trade-off model) 
predicts that free cash flow should be positively related to debt levels. 
However, the results show a significant negative relationship between free 
cash flow and short-term and total debt as well as an insignificant relationship 
with long-term debt in both samples. These results are inconsistent with the 
use of debt to reduce the free cash flow (per agency theory) and, therefore, 
also inconsistent with trade-off theory. These results most likely reflect lower 
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agency costs related to government ownership in the listed firm sample and 
family ownership in the unlisted sample.  
Some support for trade-off theory is observed in the significant negative 
relationship between growth and long-term debt in unlisted sample, consistent 
with agency costs of debt.  On the other hand, the significant negative 
relationship between growth and short-term debt observed in the unlisted 
sample contradicts the positive relationship suggested by Myers (1977) and 
found by Hall et al (2004) for Italy, Portugal and UK samples and by Cassar 
and Holmes (2003) for Australian SMEs.  In the listed sample, however, the 
relationship between market-to-book ratio (as a proxy for growth 
opportunities) and all debt ratios is insignificant. This suggests that the agency 
costs of debt in Saudi Arabia may be low due to directors’ membership on 
both the board of directors of listed firms and of banks. Bevan and Danbolt 
(2004) also found, in their fixed effects analysis, insignificant associations 
between market-to-book ratio and both long-term and short-term debt ratios.  
In regard to testing the sensitivity of the results to the estimation techniques 
used, pooled, average cross-sectional, yearly cross-sectional and panel data 
estimation techniques were conducted on the listed and unlisted data over the 
period 2000 to 2004. As shown in Table 8.2, the analyses of pooled and 
average TOBIT estimation techniques reveal that while pooled regressions 
have most likely suffered from overestimation bias, average regressions have 
probably suffered from underestimation bias.  
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Indeed, the analyses of pure yearly cross-sectional regressions show that the 
magnitude and significance of the coefficients vary from year to year 
indicating that the interpretations and conclusions are dependent on the timing 
of the observation. Accordingly, fixed effects panel data techniques are used, 
in which time-invariant heterogeneity is controlled. The table shows that 
controlling for time-invariant firm-specific heterogeneity bias (fixed effects 
models) overturns several of the results obtained under pooled and average 
techniques. Also, results using pooled estimation have relatively more 
explanatory power than those obtained by average or fixed effects estimation.  
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Table 8.2: Comparison of pooled Tobit with averaged Tobit and fixed effects estimation results 
Hypothesised signs Pooled data Average Cross-sectional Fixed effects  
STD LTD TD STD LTD TD STD LTD TD STD LTD TD 
Panel A: Listed sample 
LOGASSETS + + + 0.016 0.033*** 0.050*** 0.035** 0.051** 0.087*** -0.047 0.050* 0.004 
ROA - - - 0.224*** -0.227*** 0.003 0.314* -0.086 0.228 -0.006 -0.189** -0.183 
TANG - + + 0.001 0.086*** 0.086** -0.036 0.026 -0.010 0.004 0.104** 0.092 
FCF - - - -0.248*** -0.054 -0.339*** -0.512* -0.145 -0.657** -0.130*** -0.011 -0.183** 
QR - - - -0.010** -0.005 -0.016*** -0.018* -0.009 -0.027 -0.007* -0.001 -0.008 
UNIQ - - - -0.014 -0.027 -0.055 -0.005 -0.197 -0.202 -0.016 0.213* 0.187 
M/B Ins. Ins. Ins. -0.003 -0.006 -0.008 0.008 -0.011 -0.003 0.003 -0.007 -0.005 
DIV - - - -0.009 -0.024** -0.034** -0.014 -0.031 -0.045 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 
LOGAGE + - + -0.048** -0.026 -0.074** -0.012 0.016 0.004 -0.126 0.032 -0.087 
Risk - - - -0.001 0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.006 0.003 na na na 
GOV - - - -0.085*** -0.020 -0.103*** -0.087** -0.034 -0.121* na na na 
MINDUM + + + 0.040*** 0.067*** 0.109*** 0.031* 0.053** 0.084*** na na na 
CEMEDUM + + + 0.032** 0.044** 0.081*** 0.053* 0.034 0.087* na na na 
FARMDUM ? ? ? -0.008 -0.016 -0.023 0.017 0.011 0.028 na na na 
Panel B: Unlisted sample 
LOGASSETS + + + 0.059*** 0.019*** 0.092*** 0.062*** 0.016*** 0.090*** 0.066*** 0.024*** 0.097*** 
ROA - - - -0.046** -0.040*** -0.118*** -0.032 -0.030 -0.068 -0.082*** -0.014* -0.119*** 
TANG - + + -0.115*** 0.092*** 0.035 -0.136*** 0.078*** -0.009 -0.030 0.048*** 0.051 
FCF - - - -0.124*** -0.011** -0.144*** -0.274*** -0.064*** -0.366*** -0.110*** -0.002 -0.119*** 
QR - - - -0.032*** 0.002* -0.028*** -0.031*** 0.003 -0.023** -0.020*** 0.001 -0.019*** 
UNIQ - - - 0.001 0.049*** 0.078 0.058 0.079* 0.140 -0.053 0.007 0.103 
G. ASSETS Ins. Ins. Ins. -0.044*** -0.011*** -0.067*** -0.004 -0.002 -0.043 -0.025** -0.005** -0.034*** 
DIV + + + -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 0.003 -0.001 -0.003 0.003 0.001 0.005** 
LOGAGE + - + 0.081*** -0.020*** 0.055*** 0.071 -0.011 0.068 0.095*** -0.044*** 0.006 
Risk  - - - 0.0001** 0.0001 0.0001* 0.0001** 0.0001 0.0001* na na na 
MINDUM + + + 0.005 0.016*** 0.019* -0.001 0.009 0.001 na na na 
FARMDUM ? ? ? -0.028 -0.001 -0.052** -0.023 0.007 -0.031 na na na 
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It is also found that the influence of alternative proxies on the results can be as 
important as the influence of differences in estimation techniques. For 
example, although the relationship between profitability and debt elements 
remains unchanged, using return on sales (ROS) as an alternative proxy for 
profitability changes the insignificant negative relationship between market-
to-book and long-term debt into significant for listed firms.  This result 
combined with the negative relationship already observed between growth in 
assets and debt elements for unlisted firms provides strong support to costs of 
debt agency theory. 
8.3.1 Limitation of the determinants analysis 
The relatively small size of the listed sample may have limited the 
explanatory power of the regression models.  Also, as with all research 
studies, care has to be exercised when seeking to generalise. The results 
depend upon the time period of investigation and its specific environmental 
characteristics. Notably, Saudi Arabia has been undergoing a period of rapid 
expansion in its stock market but bond markets are not yet developed.  
Despite these limitations, the results have provided valuable information 
about the determinants of capital structure of listed and unlisted companies in 
Saudi Arabia.   
8.4 Suggestion for future research 
This dissertation has triggered some topics for future research, referred to in 
limitation subsections. The following is a summary of the important issues 
that should be considered in future research: 
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The ignored different definitions in measuring both dependent and 
independent variables due time consideration or lack of data should be 
considered in future meta-analysis studies. 
 Factors such as differences in estimation techniques, the country of the study, 
period of the study are potential factors that need to be also tested. 
Conducting different meta-analysis method such as effect size meta-analysis 
is recommended to check the robustness of the finding.  
It would be useful to investigate behaviours more directly by conducting 
studies based on interviews, questionnaire surveys and case studies. 
The percentage held by large shareholder other than government will be of 
great benefit when the data is available.  
Though the finding provides some evidence supporting pecking order 
hypothesis, an appropriate test similar to Shyam Sunder and Myers (1999) is 
recommended. 
Volatility, growth in assets and growth in sales need to be retested under 
longer-term period when the data is available.  
Finally, it was hoped that the findings of this study might inform regulator 
bodies, academics and other researchers in general in Saudi Arabia. The 
analysis reveals that Saudi companies are missing an important debt 
instrument, bond debt. This absence limits the financing choice for 
companies, which in turn may inhibit their growth. Accordingly, it is strongly 
recommended that constraints related to bond issuance imposed on firms by 
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company law should be considered for removal. The potential success for 
such instruments is very promising since Islamic law provides alternative 
corporate bonds such as Sukuk Al Ijarah that are gaining popularity in other 
Muslim countries (e.g. Malaysia, Qatar and United Arab emirates)22.   
The other recommendation is the establishment of a database containing data 
about Saudi companies. The existence of such a database will encourage 
academics and other researchers to conduct research not only in finance but in 
the business area in general. Accordingly, it is hoped that the database 
assembled by the author may form the foundation for such a database.  
                                                 
22 According to Tariq (2004), Ijarah Sukuk is a certificate that is issued on stand-alone assets 
identified on the balance sheet. The assets can be parcels of land to be leased or leased 
equipment such as aircrafts and ships. The rental rates of returns on these Sukuk can be both 
fixed and floating depending on the particular originator. 
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Mehrotra et al (2005) JACF Table 4: page 24 USA 1979-97 
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4 Arab 
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Ooi J. (1999) JPIF Table IV: page 475 UK 1989-96 
Ozkan (2001) J B F A Table 2: page 187 UK 1984-96 
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Rajan and Zingales (1995) J F Table IX: page 1453 7 developed countries 1984-91 
Ramalho and Da Silva (2007) SSRN Table 4: page 30 Portugal 1999 
Sapar N. and Lukose P. (2002) SSRN Table VIII: page appendix India 1990-92 
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Short et al. (2002) IJEB Table 2: page 391 UK 1988-92 
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Song H. (2005) WP Table 8: page 21 SWEDEN 1992-00 
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Tong and Green (2005) AE Table, 4: page 2187 China 2001–03 
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5 developed 
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Wanzenried G. (2002) WP Table 7.2.1: page 23 10 European countries 1988-98 
Wen et al (2002) CGIR Table 2: page 79 China 1996-98 
Wi and Sorensen (1986) JFQA Table 3: page 139 USA 1970-80 
Wiwattanakantang 1999 P-BFJ Table 12 and 13: page 397-98 Thailand 1996 
Yan An (2006) JFQA Tables 5, 6: page 723-24 USA 1983-97 
Yu H. (2003) SSRN Table 7: page 34 Taiwan 1991-00 
Zou and Xiao (2006) BAR Table 4: page China 1993–00 
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Appendix 2 
 
Table-2: Top 100 Saudi Companies in 2003 
Company 
Revenue 
Rank in 
2003 
Revenue in 
2002 (SR in 
million) 
Assets 2002 
(SR in 
million) 
Sector Listed in SSM
Kingdom Holding Company 1 35,600 92,300 Diversified Y 
Saudi Basic Industries Corp. 2 34,026 99,172 Petrochemical Y 
Saudi Telecom Company 3 23,547 40,913 Telecom. Y 
Dallah Al-Baraka Group 4 17,374 47,974 Diversified N 
Saudi Aramco Mobil Refinery Co. Ltd 5 11,014 5,493 Petrochemicals N 
Consolidated Contractors Int’l Co. S.A.L 6 5,578 4,217 Contracting N 
Olayan group Holding Company 7 4,133 8,577 Diversified N 
Riyad Bank 8 3,673 67,209 Banking Y 
Savola Group 9 3,624 3,472 Agribusiness Y 
Saad Group 10 3,452 4,012 Diversified N 
Al Rajhi Banking & Investment Corp. 11 3,379 59,113 Banking Y 
Samba Financial group 12 3,143 76,362 Banking Y 
Al Faisaliah Group Co. (Ltd.) 13 2,500 1,645 Diversified N 
Alsuwaiket Trading & Contracting Co. 14 2,113 994 Contracting N 
S.A. Al Rajhi Co. 15 1,979 4,548 Agribusiness N 
The Saudi British Bank 16 1,841 46227 Banking Y 
Arab National Bank 17 1,718 44,299 Banking Y 
Banque Saudi Fransi 18 1,699 44,713 Banking Y 
Marei Bin Mahfouz Group of Co. Ltd. 19 1,670 1,695 Industrial N 
Riyadh Cables Group of Companies 20 1,536 1,590 Industrial N 
Saudi Hollandi Bank 21 1,523 26,899 Banking Y 
Al Duais Group 22 1,500 0 Hospitality N 
Zamil Industrial Investment Co. (ZIIC) 23 1,406 1,262 Industrial Y 
Al Tayyar Travel Group Ltd. 24 1,404 357 Services N 
El Seif Group of Companies 25 1,359 0 Diversified N 
National Gas & Ind. Co. 26 1,255 925 Industrial Y 
Arab Supply & Trading Corp. 27 1,216 1,732 Agribusiness N 
The National Shipping Co. of Saudi 
Arabia 28 1,210 4,398 Shipping Y 
Saudi Arabian Amiantit Co. 28 1,210 2,440 Industrial Y 
National Co. Cooperative Insurance 30 1,181 1,699 Insurance Y 
Haji Husein Alireza & Co. Ltd. 31 1,132 0 Trading N 
Isam Kabbani Group of Companies 32 1,128 871 Industrial N 
Alhamrani Group of Companies 33 956 1,024 Trading N 
Samama Group of Companies 34 900 559 Diversified N 
Southern Province Cement Co. 35 888 2,086 Industrial Y 
Gulf United Investment 36 825 500 Investment N 
Saudi Dairy Foodstuff Co. 37 795 827 Agribusiness Y 
Saleh & Abdulaziz Abahsain Co. Ltd. 38 785 722 Diversified N 
Al Obeikan Group for Ind. Invest. Co. 
Ltd. 39 753 963 Publishing N 
Yanbu Cement Co. 40 746 2,060 Industrial Y 
Saudi Cable Company 41 730 1,124 Industrial Y 
Arabic Computer Systems Ltd. 42 721 111 IT N 
Fursan Travel & Tourism 43 704 12 Services N 
Alsalam Aircraft Co. Ltd 44 652 645 Aeronautics N 
Al Tuwairqi Group of Companies 45 645 573 Industrial N 
Yamama Saudi Cement Co. Ltd. 46 625 1,372 Industrial Y 
The Saudi Investment Bank 47 608 19,957 Banking Y 
M. & A. Al Subeaei for Exchange & 
Trading 48 600 1,980 Finance N 
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Table-2: Top 100 Saudi Companies in 2003 
Company 
Revenue 
Rank in 
2003 
Revenue in 
2002 (SR in 
million) 
Assets 2002 
(SR in 
million) 
Sector Listed in SSM
Mohammed Al Mojil Group 48 600 1,500 Construction N 
AAl Taher Group 50 599 0 Diversified N 
Advanced Electronics Company 51 592 486 Electronics N 
Al Aujan Industries Co. 52 590 489 Industrial N 
Zahran Maintenance Co. 53 584 21 Engineering N 
Abdul Ghani El Ajou & Sons Holding 54 580 0 Diversified N 
Al Babtain Group 55 560 681 Industrial N 
Jarir Marketing Co. 56 541 559 Trading Y 
Arabian Agricultural Services Co. 57 521 923 Agribusiness N 
Jeddah Cable Company 58 515 140 Industrial N 
Arabian Cement Co. Ltd. 59 514 1,368 Industrial Y 
Al Alamiah Electronic Co. 60 514 502 IT N 
Aluminium Products Co. Ltd. 61 505 530 Industrial N 
Mohammed Assad Aldrees & Sons Co. 62 502 532 Petrochemical N 
The National Titanium Dioxide Co. Ltd. 63 465 1,092 Industrial N 
National Agricultural Development Co. 64 459 1,050 Agribusiness Y 
Trading & Industrial Group Holding Ltd. 65 450 500 Finance N 
Saudi Arabian Lubricating Oil Co. 66 418 402 Petrochemicals N 
Al Abdulkarim Trading Co. 67 380 0 Trading N 
Saudi Pharma. Ind. & Medical Appl. Co. 68 362 203 Medical Y 
ABB Contracting Company Ltd. 69 354 108 Contracting N 
Abdullah A.M Al Khodari Sons Co. 70 350 325 Contracting N 
ABB Electrical Industries Co. Ltd. 71 331 241 Industrial N 
Consolidated Contractors Co. WLL 72 326 327 Contracting N 
Arabian Drilling Company 73 318 460 Petrochemicals N 
 
Arabian Gulf Manuf. Ltd For Plastic Ind. 74 310 371 Industrial 
N 
 
Al Majal Services Co. 75 310 107 Services N 
Mekkah Construction & Development Co. 76 307 2,545 Contracting Y 
Arabian Geophysical & Surveying Co. 
Ltd. 77 305 406 Petrochemicals N 
Aswad Group 77 305 210 Contracting N 
Saudi Guardian Int’l. Float Glass Co. Ltd. 79 285 465 Industrial N 
Tihama for Adv., PR & Marketing 80 272 316 Advertising Y 
National Industrialization Co. 81 250 2,227 Industrial Y 
Elaf Group of Companies 82 247 68 Hospitality N 
Saudi Ceramic Co. 83 225 563 Industrial Y 
Samir Photographic Supplies 84 220 177 Electronics N 
Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Co. 85 212 4,320 Industrial Y 
International Computer Company Ltd. 86 200 3 IT N 
Al Jazira Bank 87 198 6 Banking Y 
Saudi Hotels & Resorts Co. 88 167 1,383 Hospitality Y 
Projects & Trading Co. 89 149 202 Construction N 
Arabian Pipes Co. 90 145 288 Industrial Y 
Hail Agricultural Development Co. 91 136 371 Agribusiness Y 
Saudi Fisheries Company 92 135 244 Agribusiness Y 
Mindshare S.A. 93 135 0 Advertising N 
Heating & Air conditioning Ent. Ltd 94 100 71 Industrial N 
L’Azurde Group for Industrial Investment 94 100 0 Jewelery N 
Taiba Inv. & Real Estate Dev. Co 96 90 1,272 Investment Y 
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Table-2: Top 100 Saudi Companies in 2003 
Company 
Revenue 
Rank in 
2003 
Revenue in 
2002 (SR in 
million) 
Assets 2002 
(SR in 
million) 
Sector Listed in SSM
Modern Arab Construction Co. Ltd 97 69 55 Contracting N 
Nardeen Lighting Co. Ltd. 98 66 44 Lighting N 
International System Engineering Co. Ltd 99 26 0 IT N 
Aljardan International Agencies 100 17 3 Technology N 
Source: www.arabnews.com 
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Appendix 3 
Figure -1: The organizational chart of the Companies General Department 
 
 
 
Source: The Ministry of Commerce and Industry web site (www.commerce.gov.sa) 
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 Table-3: The Initial list of Saudi listed companies as of at 31 January 2006 
No. Symbol Long Name Short Name Acronym 
1 2010 Saudi Basic Industries Corp SABIC SABIC 
2 2310 Saudi Internati.  Petroche Co Sipchem SIPCHEM 
3 4180 Ahmed H. Fitaihi Company AHF AHFCO 
4 4061 Al Mawashi Al Mukairish United Co. MMUCO MMUCO 
5 1120 Al Rajhi Bank Al Rajhi RJHI 
6 2140 Al-Ahsa Development Co. ADC AADC 
7 4130 Al-Baha Investment & Development co Al-baha ABDICO 
8 6070 Al-Jouf Agriculture Development Co. ALJOUF JADCO 
9 4200 Aldrees Petroleum & Transport Services Co. Aldrees Aldrees 
10 2280 Almarai Company Almarai ALMARAI 
11 2170 Alujain Corporation Alujain ALCO 
12 1080 Arab National Bank ARNB ARNB 
13 3010 Arabian Cement Co.LTd ACC ARCCO 
14 2200 Arabian Pipes Company APC APCO 
15 4150 Arriyadh Development Co. ARDCO ADCO 
16 4080 Aseer Trading, Tourism & Manufacturing Co. Aseer ATTMCO 
17 6060 Ashargiyah Agriculture Development Co. ASH SHARQIYAH ASACO 
18 1140 BANK ALBILAD ALBILAD ALBI 
19 1020 Bank AlJazira BJAZ BJAZ 
20 1050 Banque Saudi Fransi BSFR BSFR 
21 6080 Bishah Agriculture Development Co. BISHACO BISACO 
22 3080 Eastern Province Cement Co. E.P.C.C.O EACCO 
23 2300 Saudi Paper Manufacturing Co. SPM SPM 
24 2180 Filing & Packing Materials Manufacturing Co. FIPCO FIPCO 
25 2100 Food Products Co. githaiah FPCO 
26 6030 Hail Agriculture Development Co. HADCO HAACO 
27 4190 Jarir Marketing Co Jarir Jarir 
28 6090 Jazan Development Co. JAZADCO GIZACO 
29 4100 Makkah Construction & Development Co. MCDC MCDCO 
30 2210 Nama Chemicals Co. Nama Chemicals NAMA 
31 6010 National Agriculture Development Co. NADEC NADEC 
32 4160 National Agriculture Marketing Co. THIMAR THIMAR 
33 2080 National Gas & Industrialization Co. GASCO NGIC 
34 2090 National Gypsum Company NGC NGCO 
35 2060 National Industrialization Co NIC NIC 
36 2220 National Metal Manufacturing and Casting Co. Maadaniyah NMMCC 
37 6020 Qassim Agriculture Co. GACO QAACO 
38 1010 Riyad Bank RIBL RIBL 
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39 2260 Sahara Petrochemical Co. Petrochemical SPC 
40 1090 Samba Financial Group Samba Samba 
41 2120 Saudi Advanced Industries Co. SAIC SAICO 
42 2020 Saudi Arabia Fertilizers Co. SAFCO SAFCO 
43 2030 Saudi Arabia Refineries Co. SARCO SARCO 
44 2160 Saudi Arabian Amiantit Co. Amiantit SAAC 
45 4050 Saudi Automotive Services Co. SASCO SACO 
46 2110 Saudi Cable Company SCC SCACO 
47 3030 Saudi Cement Company. SCC SACCO 
48 2040 Saudi Ceramic Co. Saudi Ceramics SCERCO 
49 2230 Saudi Chemical Company SCC SCCO 
50 5110 Saudi Electricity Company Saudi Electric. SECO 
51 6050 Saudi Fisheries Co. SFICO SFICO 
52 1040 Saudi Hollandi Bank SHB AAAL 
53 4010 Saudi Hotels s Co. SHARِACO SHARCO 
54 2130 Saudi Industrial Development Co. SIDC SIDC 
55 4140 Saudi Industrial Export Co SIECO SIECO 
56 2250 Saudi Industrial Investment Group SIIG SIIG 
57 2190 Saudi Industrial Services Co. SISCO SISCO 
58 4110 Saudi Land Transport Co. mubarrad SLTCO 
59 2070 Saudi Pharmaceutical Indust.& Med. Appliances Corp. SPIMACO SPIMACO 
60 4040 Saudi Public Transport Co. SAPTCO SAPTCO 
61 4020 Saudi Real Estate Co. SRECO SRECO 
62 7010 Saudi Telecom STC STC 
63 2270 Saudia Dairy & Foodstuff .Co SADAFCO SADAFCO 
64 2050 SAVOLA Group Savola Group SAVOLA 
65 3050 Southern Province Cement Co. spcc SOCCO 
66 6040 Tabuk Agriculture Co. TADCO TAACO 
67 3090 Tabuk Cement Co. TCC TACCO 
68 4090 Taibah Investment & Real Estate Co. Taiba TIRECO 
69 8010 The Company for Cooperative Insurance NCCI NCCI 
70 2150 The National Co. for Glass Industries Zoujaj Zoujaj 
71 4030 The National Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia NSCSA NSCSA 
72 3040 The Qassim Cement Co QACCO QACCO 
73 1060 The Saudi British Bank SABB SABB 
74 1030 The Saudi Investment Bank saib SIBC 
75 4070 Tihama Advertising s Co. TAPRCO TAPRCO 
76 4170 Tourism Enterprise Co. TECO TECO 
77 3020 Yamamah Saudi Cement Co. Ltd. YSCC YACCO 
78 3060 Yanbu Cement Co. YCC YNCCO 
79 2290 Yanbu Petrochemical Company YANSAB YANSAB 
80 2240 Zamil Industrial Investment Co Zamil Indust ZIIC 
Source: TADAWUL web site (www.tadawul.com.sa) 
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Table-4: Pure cross-sectional regression (Short-term debt) 
Listed (n = 60) Unlisted (n = 403) STD 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
0.025 0.039** 0.011 0.009 0.025 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.068*** 0.053*** 0.051*** LOGASSETS (0.115) (0.039) (0.577) (0.713) (0.115) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.076 0.374*** 0.233* 0.054 0.293*** -0.029 -0.011 -0.017 -0.094* -0.083* ROA (0.502) (0.003) (0.092) (0.753) (0.008) (0.509) (0.843) (0.741) (0.066) (0.093) 
-0.040 0.047 -0.021 -0.016 0.010 -0.130*** -0.109*** -0.086** -0.112*** -0.139*** TANG1 (0.359) (0.182) (0.619) (0.700) (0.740) (0.001) (0.009) (0.042) (0.003) (0.000) 
-0.123 -0.199 -0.424** -0.235 -0.252** -0.043 -0.165*** -0.109** -0.156*** -0.176*** FCF (0.405) (0.177) (0.020) (0.168) (0.025) (0.290) (0.000) (0.017) (0.004) (0.000) 
-0.024*** -0.001 -0.014** 0.007 -0.010*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.030*** QR (0.001) (0.899) (0.016) (0.714) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.119 -0.066 -0.024 -0.070 -0.077 -0.077 0.025 0.013 0.002 0.092 UNIQ (0.248) (0.551) (0.887) (0.586) (0.420) (0.371) (0.821) (0.881) (0.989) (0.469) 
0.034* -0.006 0.005 0.016 -0.012*  -0.029 -0.065** -0.077** -0.030 M/B & G. 
ASSETS  (0.053) (0.669) (0.805) (0.332) (0.062)  (0.263) (0.023) (0.011) (0.313) 
0.000 -0.025** -0.018 0.003 -0.037* -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.007 0.002 DIV (0.994) (0.038) (0.129) (0.913) (0.082) (0.913) (0.866) (0.837) (0.294) (0.766) 
-0.086* -0.041 -0.046 -0.060 -0.036 0.062** 0.077** 0.064* 0.105** 0.079 LOGAGE (0.071) (0.340) (0.284) (0.295) (0.345) (0.039) (0.041) (0.096) (0.026) (0.156) 
    0.000     0.0001* RISK     (0.976)     (0.047) 
-0.084** -0.143*** -0.062 -0.064 -0.080**      Gov. (0.043) (0.002) (0.158) (0.255) (0.031)      
0.021 0.045** 0.055** 0.063** 0.019 0.021 0.011 -0.008 0.002 -0.002 MINDUM (0.382) (0.030) (0.041) (0.031) (0.194) (0.253) (0.561) (0.658) (0.918) (0.936) 
0.002 -0.007 0.064 -0.006 0.054**      CEMDUM (0.933) (0.779) (0.144) (0.914) (0.040)      
-0.010 -0.027 0.011 0.018 -0.006 -0.049 -0.030 -0.026 -0.017 -0.021 FARMDUM (0.729) (0.239) (0.682) (0.449) (0.782) (0.103) (0.560) (0.581) (0.768) (0.754) 
-0.047 -0.260 0.021 0.013 -0.096 -0.311*** -0.336*** -0.369*** -0.273** -0.226** 
INTERCEPT 
(0.757) (0.137) (0.912) (0.954) (0.531) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.014) (0.031) 
Wald χ2 -test 38.19*** 47.65*** 29.29*** 21.61* 36.09*** 120.83*** 133.22*** 124.37*** 128.25*** 152.40*** 
Adjusted R2 0.2172 0.2375 0.1710 0.0579 0.2111 0.1770 0.1884 0.1654 0.1760 0.1797 
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Table-5: Pure cross-sectional regression (Long-term debt) 
Listed (n = 60) Unlisted (n = 403) LTD 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
0.015 0.036 0.027 0.035 0.047** 0.023*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.022*** 0.018*** LOGASSETS (0.545) (0.129) (0.271) (0.213) (0.020) (0.000) (0.006) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) 
-0.217 -0.073 -0.379*** -0.293** -0.055 -0.035** -0.046*** -0.049*** -0.037** -0.028* ROA (0.121) (0.653) (0.004) (0.020) (0.648) (0.037) (0.006) (0.000) (0.026) (0.057) 
0.096 0.107** 0.090* 0.115** 0.112** 0.103*** 0.099*** 0.090*** 0.088*** 0.076*** TANG (0.125) (0.044) (0.062) (0.046) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.076 -0.356* -0.190 -0.057 0.085 -0.015 -0.002 -0.020* -0.019 -0.001 FCF (0.697) (0.067) (0.112) (0.726) (0.440) (0.181) (0.802) (0.076) (0.134) (0.903) 
0.003 0.012 -0.010 -0.008 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.002 QR (0.808) (0.296) (0.283) (0.253) (0.702) (0.682) (0.861) (0.106) (0.102) (0.316) 
0.100 -0.170 -0.087 -0.028 -0.109 0.064 0.040 0.047 0.037 0.058 UNIQ (0.449) (0.224) (0.525) (0.852) (0.371) (0.116) (0.228) (0.154) (0.399) (0.164) 
-0.004 -0.006 0.021 -0.024* -0.017*  -0.010* -0.012 -0.003 -0.012 M/B& GASSETS (0.862) (0.825) (0.284) (0.087) (0.063)  (0.097) (0.105) (0.743) (0.112) 
-0.036*** -0.038** 0.013 -0.022 -0.090*** -0.005** -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.003 DIV (0.006) (0.016) (0.497) (0.397) (0.007) (0.044) (0.647) (0.809) (0.957) (0.129) 
0.005 -0.023 -0.061 -0.079* 0.010 -0.012 -0.022* -0.018 -0.016 -0.023 LOGAGE (0.892) (0.641) (0.189) (0.095) (0.804) (0.273) (0.062) (0.152) (0.197) (0.101) 
    0.004     0.0001 RISK     (0.127)     (0.568) 
-0.068 -0.048 0.017 0.010 -0.028      Gov. (0.200) (0.429) (0.780) (0.871) (0.607)      
0.036 0.079** 0.092*** 0.075** 0.044* 0.022** 0.019** 0.015** 0.009 0.012* MINDUM (0.365) (0.015) (0.004) (0.016) (0.055) (0.011) (0.013) (0.048) (0.204) (0.073) 
0.023 0.046 0.053 0.095** 0.023      CEMDUM (0.723) (0.417) (0.373) (0.043) (0.464)      
-0.056 -0.035 0.008 -0.033 -0.032 -0.010 -0.002 -0.005 0.004 0.007 FARMDUM (0.118) (0.280) (0.821) (0.336) (0.278) (0.395) (0.906) (0.719) (0.794) (0.636) 
-0.098 -0.259 -0.156 -0.150 -0.364** -0.151*** -0.086* -0.096** -0.141*** -0.104** INTERCEPT (0.678) (0.231) (0.485) (0.548) (0.037) (0.000) (0.052) (0.026) (0.002) (0.016) 
Wald χ2 -test 28.45*** 32.05*** 31.65*** 29.35*** 27.85** 115.26*** 87.49*** 78.80*** 70.80*** 53.13*** 
Adjusted R2 0.0535 0.1992 0.1548 0.1331 0.2025 0.3009 0.2618 0.2467 0.2203 0.1833 
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Table-6: Pure cross-sectional regression (Total debt) 
Listed (n = 60) Unlisted (n = 403) TD 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
0.038 0.077** 0.039 0.044 0.072*** 0.099*** 0.093*** 0.099*** 0.087*** 0.078*** LOGASSETS (0.244) (0.013) (0.260) (0.225) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
-0.150 0.309 -0.148 -0.220 0.237 -0.102** -0.092 -0.096* -0.165*** -0.131** ROA (0.462) (0.164) (0.458) (0.273) (0.144) (0.050) (0.128) (0.076) (0.006) (0.021) 
0.059 0.156** 0.071 0.087 0.123** 0.055 0.058 0.052 0.025 -0.018 TANG1 (0.511) (0.036) (0.361) (0.308) (0.047) (0.260) (0.246) (0.295) (0.621) (0.725) 
-0.047 -0.576** -0.611*** -0.392* -0.168 -0.082* -0.164*** -0.140*** -0.173*** -0.181*** FCF (0.880) (0.017) (0.006) (0.077) (0.348) (0.068) (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) 
-0.022 0.011 -0.024** -0.006 -0.013* -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.025*** QR (0.151) (0.485) (0.045) (0.764) (0.056) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.222 -0.242 -0.108 -0.159 -0.185 0.067 0.071 0.060 0.063 0.171 UNIQ (0.254) (0.198) (0.635) (0.434) (0.276) (0.559) (0.573) (0.552) (0.622) (0.248) 
0.031 -0.011 0.027 -0.007 -0.029**  -0.046* -0.097*** -0.086*** -0.055* M/B (0.358) (0.700) (0.390) (0.749) (0.021)  (0.084) (0.002) (0.009) (0.095) 
-0.036* -0.065*** -0.005 -0.023 -0.127*** -0.009 -0.003 0.001 -0.010 -0.004 DIV (0.082) (0.002) (0.832) (0.621) (0.003) (0.346) (0.783) (0.904) (0.158) (0.662) 
-0.082 -0.062 -0.105 -0.148** -0.026 0.049 0.038 0.037 0.091* 0.067 LOGAGE (0.223) (0.386) (0.135) (0.050) (0.685) (0.160) (0.362) (0.399) (0.078) (0.274) 
    0.004     0.0001 RISK     (0.251)     (0.107) 
-0.151** -0.193** -0.045 -0.051 -0.107      Gov. (0.043) (0.011) (0.565) (0.527) (0.113)      
0.058 0.122*** 0.146*** 0.145*** 0.063** 0.041* 0.031 0.005 0.007 0.006 MINDUM (0.239) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.025) (0.082) (0.160) (0.827) (0.766) (0.791) 
0.026 0.035 0.113 0.111 0.076**      CEMDUM (0.723) (0.556) (0.178) (0.165) (0.048)      
-0.066 -0.064 0.017 -0.009 -0.038 -0.093** -0.056 -0.051 -0.034 -0.028 FARMDUM (0.195) (0.119) (0.710) (0.833) (0.373) (0.011) (0.322) (0.321) (0.585) (0.681) 
-0.133 -0.535* -0.146 -0.118 -0.460** -0.565*** -0.512*** -0.559*** -0.501*** -0.418*** INTERCEPT (0.678) (0.067) (0.648) (0.740) (0.045) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) 
Wald χ2 -test 33.68*** 66.58*** 39.97*** 36.76*** 44.87*** 168.27*** 175.13*** 163.75*** 165.85*** 165.16*** 
Adjusted R2 0.0829 0.3255 0.1839 0.1961 0.3411 0.2586 0.2432 0.2194 0.2147 0.1820 
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Appendix 5: Note: shaded cells represent the changes observed in the relationship when alternative proxy entered to the basic model while italic 
bold cells represent the alternative proxy position in the model. 
Table-7: Alternative proxies (short-term debt) Listed sample 
Listed STD Basic LOG-Sales ROS T. Asset & Invent. CR 
UNIQ- 
DUM 
Growth 
(Sales) 
Growth 
(Assets) 
DIV- 
DUM Age 
-0.047 0.029*** -0.048 -0.046 -0.047 -0.047 -0.049 -0.080 -0.048 -0.053 SIZE (0.469) (0.009) (0.451) (0.470) (0.465) (0.472) (0.468) (0.326) (0.452) (0.391) 
-0.006 -0.044 0.006 -0.006 -0.009 -0.010 -0.002 -0.010 -0.008 0.005 ROA (0.939) (0.571) (0.406) (0.937) (0.910) (0.899) (0.982) (0.893) (0.912) (0.947) 
0.004 0.004 0.005 0.010 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.026 -0.001 0.015 TANG (0.935) (0.924) (0.918) (0.811) (0.980) (0.956) (0.984) (0.597) (0.983) (0.748) 
-0.130*** -0.111*** -0.133*** -0.130*** -0.131*** -0.129*** -0.129*** -0.111*** -0.129*** -0.133*** FCF (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
-0.007* -0.006 -0.007* -0.006 -0.005* -0.007* -0.006* -0.007** -0.007* -0.006* QR (0.079) (0.201) (0.071) (0.103) (0.096) (0.073) (0.100) (0.029) (0.052) (0.075) 
-0.016 -0.009 -0.008 -0.020 -0.003 0.013 -0.009 -0.002 -0.015 -0.016 UNIQ (0.844) (0.915) (0.920) (0.805) (0.968) (0.181) (0.907) (0.979) (0.861) (0.836) 
0.003 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.065 0.004 -0.002 M/B (0.449) (0.763) (0.432) (0.448) (0.406) (0.435) (0.500) (0.183) (0.364) (0.622) 
-0.001 0.0003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.008 -0.001 DIV (0.818) (0.929) (0.846) (0.812) (0.944) (0.846) (0.879) (0.947) (0.337) (0.913) 
-0.126 -0.180** -0.123 -0.125 -0.125 -0.137 -0.103 -0.113 -0.123 0.000 LOGAGE (0.185) (0.017) (0.205) (0.187) (0.187) (0.156) (0.244) (0.169) (0.202) (0.979) 
0.636 0.054 0.641 0.628 0.644 0.643 0.628 0.906 0.655 0.534 INTERCEPT (0.216) (0.658) (0.201) (0.216) (0.212) (0.213) (0.233) (0.170) (0.203) (0.308) 
F -test 3.98*** 4.58*** 4.00*** 3.97*** 3.94*** 4.02*** 3.92*** 4.26*** 4.01*** 3.67*** 
R2 within 0.1448 0.1443 0.1497 0.1487 0.1522 0.1513 0.1490 0.1717 0.1525 0.1329 
R2 between 0.0313 0.1323 0.0302 0.0333 0.0285 0.0451 0.0277 0.0132 0.0321 0.0030 
R2 overall 0.0389 0.1302 0.0380 0.0410 0.0363 0.0520 0.0359 0.0196 0.0395 0.0091 
Corr (ui, x) -0.4221 -0.2637 -0.4213 -0.4133 -0.4353 -0.4190 -0.4064 -0.5808 -0.4438 -0.3878 
N 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 
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Table-8: Alternative proxies (long-term debt) Listed sample 
Listed LTD Basic LOG-Sales ROS T. Asset & Invent. CR 
UNIQ- 
DUM 
Growth 
(Sales) 
Growth 
(Assets) 
DIV- 
DUM Age 
0.050* 0.025 0.061** 0.049* 0.051* 0.054** 0.034 0.037 0.051* 0.052* SIZE (0.058) (0.149) (0.031) (0.059) (0.053) (0.040) (0.151) (0.240) (0.055) (0.052) 
-0.189** -0.242*** -0.028** -0.187** -0.191** -0.217*** -0.271*** -0.237*** -0.187** -0.193** ROA (0.013) (0.005) (0.018) (0.013) (0.014) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.014) (0.012) 
0.104** 0.088* 0.096** 0.094** 0.110** 0.096** 0.096** 0.109** 0.103** 0.101** TANG (0.018) (0.068) (0.030) (0.015) (0.011) (0.030) (0.035) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) 
-0.011 -0.020 -0.030 -0.012 -0.010 -0.014 -0.009 -0.008 -0.012 -0.010 FCF (0.776) (0.603) (0.400) (0.749) (0.799) (0.714) (0.812) (0.831) (0.759) (0.782) 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 QR (0.820) (0.636) (0.813) (0.875) (0.847) (0.701) (0.709) (0.600) (0.810) (0.794) 
0.213* 0.239** 0.190* 0.211* 0.210* 0.061** 0.238** 0.219** 0.216** 0.213* UNIQ (0.052) (0.036) (0.075) (0.059) (0.054) (0.019) (0.029) (0.046) (0.050) (0.057) 
-0.007 -0.006 -0.012*** -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 0.022** 0.015 -0.007 -0.006 M/B (0.126) (0.186) (0.008) (0.131) (0.113) (0.133) (0.025) (0.667) (0.119) (0.287) 
-0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 DIV (0.448) (0.417) (0.512) (0.479) (0.433) (0.451) (0.393) (0.369) (0.921) (0.422) 
0.032 0.031 0.038 0.022 0.035 -0.022 -0.041 -0.036 0.034 -0.000 LOGAGE (0.626) (0.626) (0.559) (0.746) (0.599) (0.745) (0.442) (0.513) (0.610) (0.888) 
-0.456* -0.206 -0.558** -0.434* -0.473* -0.445* -0.219 -0.262 -0.464* -0.429* INTERCEPT (0.064) (0.205) (0.031) (0.073) (0.056) (0.065) (0.319) (0.369) (0.057) (0.070) 
F -test 4.04*** 4.34*** 3.92*** 4.24*** 4.04*** 4.98*** 4.22*** 3.86*** 4.04*** 3.99*** 
R2 within 0.2023 0.1915 0.1966 0.2013 0.2022 0.2447 0.2111 0.1926 0.2013 0.2015 
R2 between 0.0729 0.0637 0.0684 0.0918 0.0713 0.0558 0.0903 0.0856 0.0689 0.0854 
R2 overall 0.0852 0.0787 0.0796 0.1039 0.0833 0.0717 0.1046 0.0975 0.0814 0.0972 
Corr (ui, x) -0.2442 -0.1422 -0.2787 -0.1756 -0.2615 -0.3158 -0.1457 -0.1697 -0.2504 -0.2145 
N 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 
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Table-9: Alternative proxies (total debt) Listed sample 
Listed TD Basic LOG-Sales ROS T. Asset & Invent. CR 
UNIQ- 
DUM 
Growth 
(Sales) 
Growth 
(Assets) 
DIV- 
DUM Age 
0.004 0.055** 0.013 0.002 0.004 0.007 -0.014 -0.043 0.002 -0.001 SIZE (0.964) (0.012) (0.874) (0.982) (0.964) (0.930) (0.855) (0.666) (0.978) (0.995) 
-0.183 -0.275** -0.022 -0.181 -0.188* -0.214* -0.258** -0.236** -0.184* -0.176 ROA (0.102) (0.017) (0.165) (0.104) (0.098) (0.052) (0.023) (0.034) (0.100) (0.121) 
0.092 0.077 0.085 0.076 0.095 0.077 0.081 0.119 0.087 0.099 TANG (0.234) (0.333) (0.271) (0.303) (0.220) (0.314) (0.299) (0.155) (0.275) (0.199) 
-0.183** -0.173*** -0.204*** -0.185*** -0.184*** -0.184*** -0.180*** -0.161*** -0.183*** -0.186*** FCF (0.010) (0.006) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) 
-0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009* -0.008 -0.008 QR (0.149) (0.171) (0.149) (0.156) (0.196) (0.113) (0.136) (0.060) (0.123) (0.146) 
0.187 0.220 0.171 0.189 0.198 0.074** 0.217 0.206 0.190 0.187 UNIQ (0.267) (0.202) (0.303) (0.270) (0.237) (0.014) (0.176) (0.191) (0.267) (0.254) 
-0.005 -0.006 -0.009 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 0.028* 0.080 -0.004 -0.008 M/B (0.431) (0.322) (0.106) (0.435) (0.430) (0.455) (0.071) (0.227) (0.491) (0.270) 
-0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.008 -0.003 DIV (0.603) (0.759) (0.665) (0.630) (0.700) (0.623) (0.601) (0.631) (0.472) (0.656) 
-0.087 -0.143 -0.079 -0.098 -0.084 -0.152 -0.138 -0.144 -0.083 -0.000 LOGAGE (0.455) (0.134) (0.508) (0.396) (0.470) (0.166) (0.175) (0.131) (0.482) (0.937) 
0.183 -0.155 0.091 0.212 0.177 0.201 0.405 0.647 0.195 0.114 INTERCEPT (0.776) (0.472) (0.888) (0.738) (0.782) (0.754) (0.519) (0.430) (0.761) (0.862) 
F -test 5.15*** 6.67*** 4.83*** 5.15*** 5.07*** 6.33*** 6.05*** 6.71*** 5.27*** 4.91*** 
R2 within 0.2216 0.2453 0.2153 0.2194 0.2195 0.2565 0.2337 0.2351 0.2228 0.2186 
R2 between 0.0473 0.1394 0.0798 0.0798 0.0396 0.0674 0.0348 0.0160 0.0467 0.0305 
R2 overall 0.0680 0.1535 0.0983 0.0983 0.0599 0.0894 0.0537 0.0306 0.0674 0.0517 
Corr (ui, x) -0.1376 -0.0845 -0.0593 -0.0593 -0.1568 -0.1676 -0.2344 -0.3446 -0.1411 -0.1472 
N 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 
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Table-10: Alternative proxies (short-term debt) Unlisted sample 
Unlisted 
STD Basic LOG-Sales ROS 
T. Asset 
& Invent. CR 
UNIQ- 
DUM 
Growth 
(Sales) 
DIV- 
DUM Age 
0.066*** 0.040** 0.067*** .067*** 0.061*** 0.066*** 0.052*** 0.065*** 0.071*** SIZE (0.003) (0.022) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.001) 
-0.082*** -0.126*** -0.015 -0.081*** -0.074*** -0.082*** -0.065** -0.083*** -0.082*** ROA (0.003) (0.000) (0.593) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.027) (0.003) (0.003) 
-0.030 -0.036 -0.033 -0.014 -0.039 -0.032 -0.025 -0.030 -0.032 TANG (0.426) (0.324) (0.389) (0.674) (0.320) (0.412) (0.510) (0.435) (0.400) 
-0.110*** -0.109*** -0.118*** -0.109*** -0.111*** -0.109*** -0.103*** -0.109*** -0.107*** FCF (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
-0.020*** -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** QR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
-0.053 -0.011 -0.055 -0.055 -0.052 -0.009 -0.061 -0.056 -0.048 UNIQ (0.572) (0.902) (0.557) (0.562) (0.581) (0.609) (0.522) (0.550) (0.611) 
-0.025** -0.016 -0.024** -0.025** -0.027** -0.025** -0.012 -0.026** -0.026** G. Assets (0.023) (0.121) (0.026) (0.025) (0.016) (0.025) (0.127) (0.018) (0.018) 
0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.004* DIV (0.125) (0.123) (0.108) (0.125) (0.112) (0.120) (0.112) (0.839) (0.096) 
0.095*** 0.098*** 0.087** 0.096*** 0.094*** 0.096*** 0.099*** 0.097*** 0.003** LOGAGE (0.006) (0.005) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.022) 
-0.401** -0.200* -0.416** -0.418** -0.358** -0.405** -0.311** -0.401** -0.379** INTERCEPT (0.013) (0.093) (0.011) (0.011) (0.026) (0.011) (0.032) (0.013) (0.018) 
F -test 13.87*** 13.57*** 12.30*** 13.64*** 13.47*** 13.87*** 13.71*** 13.77*** 13.02*** 
R2 within 0.1218 0.1211 0.1155 0.1214 0.1294 0.1217 0.1198 0.1207 0.1200 
R2 between 0.1838 0.1817 0.1890 0.1775 0.2010 0.1856 0.1844 0.1836 0.1877 
R2 overall 0.1722 0.1699 0.1752 0.1670 0.1876 0.1737 0.1721 0.1719 0.1750 
Corr (ui, x) -0.0104 0.0601 0.0269 -0.0274 0.0127 -0.0064 0.0439 -0.0118 -0.0118 
N 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 
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Table-11: Alternative proxies (long-term debt) Unlisted sample 
 Basic LOG-Sales ROS T. Asset & Invent. CR 
UNIQ- 
DUM 
Growth 
(Sales) 
DIV- 
DUM Age 
0.024*** 0.008*** 0.025*** 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.020*** 0.024*** 0.024*** SIZE (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
-0.014* -0.024*** 0.000 -0.016** -0.015* -0.015* -0.014* -0.014* -0.014* ROA (0.072) (0.005) (0.957) (0.048) (0.052) (0.068) (0.095) (0.071) (0.082) 
0.048*** 0.043** 0.048*** 0.029** 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 0.048*** TANG (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.014) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
-0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 FCF (0.415) (0.531) (0.164) (0.394) (0.466) (0.406) (0.826) (0.456) (0.212) 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 QR (0.292) (0.428) (0.468) (0.323) (0.181) (0.293) (0.276) (0.272) (0.286) 
0.007 0.017 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.003 0.008 0.006 0.006 UNIQ (0.830) (0.584) (0.847) (0.795) (0.824) (0.564) (0.790) (0.844) (0.844) 
-0.005** -0.000 -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** 0.000 -0.005** -0.005** G. Assets (0.034) (0.903) (0.034) (0.049) (0.039) (0.031) (0.994) (0.025) (0.034) 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 DIV (0.270) (0.268) (0.246) (0.286) (0.282) (0.275) (0.199) (0.781) (0.308) 
-0.044*** -0.037*** -0.045*** -0.047*** -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.002*** LOGAGE (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
-0.118*** -0.002 -0.121*** -0.101*** -0.124*** -0.116*** -0.090** -0.119*** -0.137*** INTERCEPT (0.005) (0.992) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.031) (0.004) (0.001) 
F -test 3.33*** 2.91*** 3.24*** 3.68*** 3.43*** 3.44*** 3.03*** 3.17*** 4.15*** 
R2 within 0.0278 0.0208 0.0261 0.0223 0.0286 0.0280 0.0265 0.0275 0.0310 
R2 between 0.2315 0.2036 0.2214 0.1800 0.2354 0.2323 0.2379 0.2361 0.2015 
R2 overall 0.1949 0.1683 0.1863 0.1516 0.1983 0.1957 0.1995 0.1986 0.1712 
Corr (ui, x) 0.1217 0.2258 0.1267 0.1203 0.1231 0.1243 0.1669 0.1326 0.0515 
N 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 
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Table-12: Alternative proxies (total debt) Unlisted sample 
 Basic LOG-Sales ROS T. Asset & Invent. CR 
UNIQ- 
DUM 
Growth 
(Sales) 
DIV- 
DUM Age 
0.097*** 0.038** 0.099*** 0.095*** 0.093*** 0.097*** 0.076*** 0.096*** 0.101*** SIZE (0.000) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
-0.119*** -0.162*** -0.035 -0.121*** -0.112*** -0.119*** -0.102*** -0.120*** -0.117*** ROA (0.000) (0.000) (0.237) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.051 0.034 0.046 0.031 0.044 0.052 0.058 0.052 0.050 TANG (0.212) (0.397) (0.262) (0.358) (0.281) (0.198) (0.153) (0.204) (0.222) 
-0.119*** -0.117*** -0.131*** -0.119*** -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.109*** -0.118*** -0.119*** FCF (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
-0.019*** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** QR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.103 0.148* 0.103 0.104 0.105 0.005 0.099 0.099 0.106 UNIQ (0.239) (0.094) (0.230) (0.232) (0.227) (0.805) (0.262) (0.258) (0.225) 
-0.034*** -0.016 -0.032*** -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.011 -0.035*** -0.034*** G. Assets (0.004) (0.131) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.157) (0.003) (0.003) 
0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.006** 0.001 0.005** DIV (0.031) (0.030) (0.023) (0.031) (0.027) (0.035) (0.021) (0.835) (0.026) 
0.006 0.030 -0.007 0.003 0.006 0.007 0.013 0.011 -0.001 LOGAGE (0.865) (0.410) (0.854) (0.928) (0.871) (0.841) (0.696) (0.760) (0.551) 
-0.519*** -0.091 -0.536** -0.501*** -0.483*** -0.519** -0.379** -0.519*** -0.532*** INTERCEPT (0.002) (0.440) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.001) 
F -test 14.70*** 13.54*** 12.70*** 14.48*** 14.71*** 14.75*** 14.36*** 14.40*** 14.53*** 
R2 within 0.1311 0.1217 0.1204 0.1305 0.1357 0.1304 0.1267 0.1290 0.1313 
R2 between 0.2448 0.2180 0.2339 0.2432 0.2493 0.2432 0.2434 0.2467 0.2376 
R2 overall 0.2267 0.1989 0.2157 0.2252 0.2311 0.2253 0.2239 0.2280 0.2207 
Corr (ui, x) 0.0331 0.1553 0.0581 0.0442 0.0456 0.0325 0.1026 0.0340 0.0229 
N 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 2015 
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 Table-13: Estimation robustness (Listed and Unlisted samples)  
Listed (n =300) Unlisted (n =2015) 
STD LTD TD STD LTD TD  
OLS Newey OLS Newey OLS Newey OLS Newey OLS Newey OLS Newey 
0.016 0.016 0.033*** 0.033** 0.050*** 0.050** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.091*** 0.091*** LOGASSETS 
(0.111) (0.182) (0.004) (0.023) (0.002) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.224*** 0.224*** -0.227*** -0.227*** 0.003 0.003 -0.046** -0.046** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.117*** -0.117*** ROA (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.967) (0.971) (0.038) (0.038) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.001 0.001 0.086*** 0.086*** 0.086** 0.086* -0.115*** -0.115*** 0.092*** 0.092*** 0.035 0.035 TANG1 (0.938) (0.951) (0.000) (0.005) (0.013) (0.057) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.114) (0.114) 
-0.248*** -0.248*** -0.054 -0.054 -0.339*** -0.339*** -0.124*** -0.124*** -0.011** -0.011** -0.144*** -0.144*** FCF (0.002) (0.004) (0.462) (0.477) (0.003) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) 
-0.010** -0.010** -0.005 -0.005 -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.032*** -0.032*** 0.002* 0.002* -0.028*** -0.028*** QR (0.024) (0.037) (0.132) (0.166) (0.005) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.051) (0.051) (0.000) (0.000) 
-0.014 -0.014 -0.027 -0.027 -0.055 -0.055 0.001 0.001 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.077 0.077 UNIQ (0.806) (0.839) (0.669) (0.725) (0.541) (0.618) (0.991) (0.991) (0.005) (0.005) (0.163) (0.163) 
-0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008       M/B (0.414) (0.446) (0.169) (0.230) (0.204) (0.244)       
      -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.067*** -0.067*** G Assets       (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
-0.009 -0.009 -0.024** -0.024** -0.034** -0.034** -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 DIVID (0.184) (0.221) (0.019) (0.028) (0.015) (0.023) (0.613) (0.638) (0.238) (0.242) (0.229) (0.260) 
-0.048** -0.048* -0.026 -0.026 -0.074** -0.074* 0.081*** 0.081*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 0.054*** 0.054** LOGAGE (0.038) (0.095) (0.240) (0.355) (0.024) (0.074) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.005) (0.028) 
-0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001* 0.0001* RISK (0.763) (0.763) (0.293) (0.284) (0.657) (0.664) (0.040) (0.041) (0.572) (0.573) (0.084) (0.085) 
-0.085*** -0.085*** -0.020 -0.020 -0.103*** -0.103**       GOV (0.000) (0.002) (0.456) (0.560) (0.005) (0.026)       
0.040*** 0.040*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.005 0.005 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.019* 0.019 MINDUM (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.541) (0.636) (0.000) (0.000) (0.068) (0.158) 
0.032** 0.032** 0.044** 0.044* 0.081*** 0.081**       CEMEDUM (0.016) (0.044) (0.043) (0.098) (0.003) (0.015)       
-0.008 -0.008 -0.016 -0.016 -0.023 -0.023 -0.028 -0.028 -0.001 -0.001 -0.051** -0.051 FARMDUM (0.444) (0.523) (0.276) (0.382) (0.243) (0.343) (0.223) (0.356) (0.908) (0.929) (0.041) (0.122) 
-0.030 -0.030 -0.222** -0.222* -0.249* -0.249 -0.309*** -0.309*** -0.114*** -0.114*** -0.511*** -0.511*** INTERCIPT (0.751) (0.795) (0.030) (0.089) (0.084) (0.171) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
F test 7.98*** 4.96*** 6.59*** 4.30*** 10.42*** 6.57*** 51.81*** 32.83*** 31.26*** 19.18*** 66.69*** 41.79*** 
Adjusted R2 0.2589 0. 2589 0.2395 0.2395 0.3094 0.3094 0.1878 0.1878 0.2565 0.2565 0.2330 0.2330 
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Table-14: Pair-wise correlation for listed sample 
 Log Sales 
Log 
Assets ROA ROS 
TANG1 
(Fixed) 
TANG2 
(F&Inv) FCF CR QR UNIQ 
UNIQ
DUM M/B 
G. 
Sales 
G. 
Assets
 
DIV 
 
 
 
DIV- 
DUM 
 
 
AGE 
 
 
 
LOG- 
AGE 
 
 
RISK
 
 
 
GOV 
 
 
 
MIN- 
DUM 
 
 
FAR- 
DUM 
 
CEM- 
DUM 
Log sales 1                       
Log Assets 0.84*** 1                      
ROA 0.50*** 0.22*** 1                     
ROS 0.19** 0.22*** 0.43*** 1                    
TANG1 0.09 0.22*** -0.06 0.05 1                   
TANG2 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.08 0.04 0.92*** 1                  
FCF 0.27*** 0.17*** 0.43*** 0.24*** -0.02 0.00 1                 
CR 0.02 -0.04 0.14** 0.07 -0.15** -0.11** 0.21*** 1                
QR -0.02 -0.05 0.09 0.07 -0.15** -0.23*** 0.19*** 0.91*** 1               
UNIQ -0.09 -0.15** 0.11* -0.15** -0.07 -0.01 -0.26*** 0.03 -0.02 1              
UNIQDUM 0.25*** 0.07 0.21*** -0.08 0.03 0.10* 0.00 0.16*** 0.12** 0.44*** 1             
M/B 0.29*** 0.23*** 0.46*** 0.20*** -0.00 -0.01 0.47*** 0.27*** 0.27*** -0.28*** 0.05 1            
G. Sales 0.25*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.20*** -0.03 -0.01 0.07 0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.13** 0.18*** 1           
G. Assets 0.08 0.13** 0.08 0.12** -0.27*** -0.28*** -0.15** 0.05 0.11* -0.04 -0.00 0.19*** 0.32*** 1          
DIV 0.26*** 0.21*** 0.27*** 0.18*** -0.03 0.03 0.29*** 0.07 -0.01 -0.09 0.05 0.16** -0.03 -0.05 1         
DIV 
DUM 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.28*** 0.01 0.03 0.38*** 0.07 0.04 -0.10* 0.01 0.34*** 0.12** -0.02 0.62*** 1        
AGE 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.17*** 0.23*** 0.06 0.01 0.28*** 0.20*** 0.20*** -0.17*** 0.11** 0.40*** 0.03 0.04 0.18*** 0.35*** 1       
LOG- 
AGE 0.16** 0.18*** 0.02 0.18** 0.07 -0.02 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.19*** -0.12** 0.13** 0.33*** -0.01 0.02 0.10* 0.25*** 0.93*** 1      
RISK -0.02 0.02 0.06 -0.04 -0.07 -0.08 -0.05 0.02 0.01 0.16** -0.08 0.06 0.06 0.24*** 0.02 0.03 -0.10* -0.09 1     
GOV 0.47*** 0.57*** 0.12** 0.13** 0.32*** 0.24*** 0.13** -0.00 0.01 -0.10* 0.03 0.13** -0.02 -0.07 0.14** 0.27*** 0.16** 0.18*** -0.01 1    
MIN- 
DUM 0.09 0.04 0.11* -0.01 -0.31*** -0.25*** -0.08- -0.16** -0.14** 0.11* -0.03 -0.05 0.10* 
0.21**
* -0.09 -0.10* -0.09 -0.10* -0.03 
-
0.21*** 1   
FAR- 
DUM -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.20*** -0.24*** 0.14** 0.14** -0.14** 0.10* 0.08 0.44*** 0.14**
-
0.27*** -0.13** -0.11* -0.15** -0.21*** -0.09 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.35*** 1  
CEM- 
DUM 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.32*** 0.25*** 0.08 0.09 0.52*** 0.42*** 0.39*** -0.24*** 
0.23**
* 0.51*** 0.11* -0.03 0.20*** 0.31*** 0.48*** 0.40*** -0.05 0.14** -0.33*** -0.16*** 1 
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Table-15: Pair-wise correlation for unlisted sample.  
 
 
Log 
Sales 
 
 
Log 
 Assets 
 
ROA ROS TANG  (Fixed) 
TANG 
 (F&Inv) FCF CR QR UNIQ 
UNIQ- 
DUM G. Sales G. Assets DIV 
DIV- 
DUM AGE 
LOG 
AGE RISK 
MIN- 
DUM 
FAR- 
DUM 
Log Sales 1                    
Log Assets 0.88*** 1                   
ROA -0.02 -0.31*** 1                  
ROS -0.25*** -0.15*** 0.53*** 1                 
TANG 1 0.03 0.13*** -0.13*** 0.03 1                
TANG 2 0.02 0.06** -0.03 0.05** 0.74*** 1               
FCF 0.08*** -0.02 0.29*** 0.13*** -0.08*** -0.09*** 1              
CR -0.27*** -0.26*** 0.19*** 0.27*** -0.15*** -0.09*** 0.13*** 1             
QR -0.26*** -0.24*** 0.17*** 0.25*** -0.19*** -0.33*** 0.15*** 0.92*** 1            
UNIQ 0.06*** 0.10*** 0.17*** 0.26*** 0.11*** 0.25*** -0.05** -0.09*** -0.17*** 1           
UNIQDUM 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.08*** 0.05** 0.14*** 0.30*** -0.01 -0.07*** -0.18*** 0.63*** 1          
G. Sale 0.14*** 0.06** 0.11*** -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.06** -0.04* -0.04* -0.01 0.04* 1         
G. Assets 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.00 0.05** -0.04* -0.06*** -0.26*** -0.07*** -0.05** -0.02 0.04* 0.45*** 1        
DIV 0.10*** 0.05** 0.10*** -0.01 -0.09*** -0.07*** 0.18*** 0.08*** 0.09*** -0.10*** -0.03 -0.12*** -0.11*** 1       
DIVDUM 0.24*** 0.15*** 0.20*** 0.02 -0.05** -0.04* 0.25*** 0.06** 0.07*** -0.10*** 0.04 -0.07*** -0.05** 0.55*** 1      
AGE 0.34*** 0.33*** -0.07*** -0.07*** 0.03 0.06** 0.09*** -0.07*** -0.09*** 0.02 0.14*** -0.05** -0.05** 0.07*** 0.17*** 1     
LOGAGE 0.33*** 0.31*** -0.05** -0.06** 0.03 0.06** 0.11*** -0.06*** -0.08*** 0.04* 0.15*** -0.06*** -0.06** 0.08*** 0.17*** 0.95*** 1    
RISK -0.02 -0.07*** 0.13*** 0.10*** -0.05** -0.06** 0.06** 0.11*** 0.11*** -0.11*** -0.07*** 0.05** 0.07*** 0.03 0.07*** 0.02 -0.00 1   
MIN-DUM 0.08*** 0.13*** -0.04* 0.08*** 0.38*** 0.40*** 0.01 0.01 -0.09*** 0.20*** 0.28*** 0.03 0.02 -0.04* 0.02 0.05** 0.04* -0.01 1  
FAR-DUM 0.11*** 0.13*** -0.00 0.01 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.01 -0.03 -0.04* 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.02 0.07*** 0.10*** -0.08*** -0.13*** 1 
 290 
Appendix 8 
 
Table-16: DFIT regression results 
STD, LTD and TD refer to short-term, long-term, and total debt respectively. Size is the log of total assets. 
ROA refers to the return on assets. TANG is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. FCF refers to the earnings 
before interest and tax plus depreciation less capital expenditure normalised by total assets. QR refers to the 
quick ratio. UNIQ is the ratio of selling & marketing expenses to total sales. M/B refers to the market to book 
ratio and G.ASSETS is the growth in assets for listed and unlisted companies. DIV refers to dividends paid 
divided by net income. LOGAGE is the log number of years since firm founded. 
Note:  White’s heteroskedastic-consistent covariance matrix estimation is used to adjust for heteroskedasticity. 
Probability of (t) are in parentheses for. *, ** and *** denote significant at the 10, 5, and 1% respectively (two 
tails). 
Listed Unlisted 
Panel 
STD LTD TD STD LTD TD 
0.039** 0.046* 0.111*** 0.064*** 0.022*** 0.098*** LOGASSETS 
(0.049) (0.082) (0.009) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
0.060 -0.224*** -0.111 -0.071*** -0.015* -0.117*** ROA 
(0.230) (0.002) (0.216) (0.009) (0.055) (0.000) 
0.030 0.112** 0.107 -0.037 0.045** 0.059 TANG1 (0.466) (0.013) (0.116) (0.307) (0.013) (0.149) 
-0.085** 0.023 -0.103* -0.109*** -0.001 -0.122*** FCF 
(0.013) (0.386) (0.058) (0.000) (0.691) (0.000) 
-0.009*** 0.000 -0.012*** -0.021*** 0.001 -0.020*** QR 
(0.000) (0.975) (0.006) (0.000) (0.353) (0.000) 
0.049 0.224** 0.343** -0.026 0.009 0.128 UNIQ (0.557) (0.040) (0.048) (0.779) (0.780) (0.134) 
-0.001 -0.006 -0.007    M/B (0.762) (0.182) (0.160)    
   -0.023** -0.006** -0.034*** G. Assets 
   (0.022) (0.011) (0.003) 
0.000 -0.006 -0.001 0.003 0.000 0.005** DIV (0.971) (0.110) (0.866) (0.144) (0.567) (0.027) 
-0.141* 0.021 -0.198** 0.089*** -0.050*** 0.000 LOGAGE 
(0.013) (0.742) (0.016) (0.009) (0.000) (0.997) 
-0.119 -0.407* -0.648* -0.385** -0.094** -0.525*** INTERCEPT 
(0.487) (0.097) (0.088) (0.015) (0.018) (0.002) 
F -test 6.71*** 4.02*** 9.88*** 14.01*** 3.32*** 15.20*** 
R2 within 0.2122 0.2148 0.3231 0.1259 0.0299 0.1412 
R2 between 0.0752 0.0788 0.0826 0.1976 0.2167 0.2544 
R2 overall 0.0825 0.0943 0.1033 0.1846 0.1809 0.2356 
Corr (ui, x) -0.3153 -0.2356 -0.3703 0.0028 0.1125 0.0179 
N 295 298 296 2002 1998 2002 
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Figure -2: Normal Probability Plot for Short-term debt (Listed) 
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Figure -3: Normal Probability Plot for Long-term debt (Listed) 
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Figure -4: Normal Probability Plot for Total debt (Listed) 
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Figure -5: Normal Probability Plot for Short-term debt (Unlisted) 
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Figure -6: Normal Probability Plot for Long-term debt (Unlisted) 
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Figure -7: Normal Probability Plot for Total debt (Unlisted) 
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